

Ghana During the First World War

*The Colonial Administration
of Sir Hugh Clifford*

Elizabeth Wrangham



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Contents

| | |
|---|-------|
| Foreword | ix |
| Introduction | xi |
| List of Abbreviations | xxvii |
| Section I: Prewar | |
| Chapter 1 • The Gold Coast's Prewar Economy: Production for Export | 5 |
| Chapter 2 • Clifford's Prewar Plans: Financing Development and Welfare | 23 |
| Chapter 3 • The Limits of Colonial Rule: Prewar British Administration | 45 |
| Section II: War | |
| Chapter 4 • The Gold Coast's Lifeline: The Impact of the War on Shipping and Trade | 67 |
| Chapter 5 • Wartime Disruption of the Gold Coast Economy: British Responses | 79 |
| Chapter 6 • Public Revenue, Private Income and the Currency: Wartime Financial Management | 117 |
| Chapter 7 • Wartime Development and Welfare: British Projects and African Enterprise | 141 |
| Chapter 8 • Wartime British Rule: Unevenness and Division | 189 |
| Chapter 9 • The Colonial Relationship: Stresses and Strains | 209 |
| Section III: Postwar | |
| Chapter 10 • After the War: Conclusions | 237 |

| | |
|---------------------|-----|
| Sources | 263 |
| Principal Officials | 279 |
| Appendix I | 281 |
| Appendix II | 283 |
| Appendix III | 285 |
| Index | 287 |

Foreword

The past
Is but the cinders
Of the present;
The future
The smoke
That escaped
Into the cloud-bound sky.

Be gentle, be kind my beloved,
For words become memories,
And memories, tools
In the hands of jesters ...

Kwesi Brew, "The Search," in G. Moore & U. Beier (eds.), *Modern Poetry from Africa*, (London, 1968), p. 96.

My introduction to Ghana came after studying history at Cambridge, when I went to teach at the Women's Teacher Training College in Tamale. During that year, 1965–1966, Kwame Nkrumah was overthrown; within the college, the Basel principal, Miss Mischler, retired and was succeeded by a Ghanaian, Miss Victoria Sackey. This research, undertaken many years later, arose out of my very happy experience of living in Ghana and working with staff and students of the college, including my fellow tutor and friend, Sue Trevelyan, and my own class, T4.

I am particularly indebted to Richard Rathbone (now professor emeritus of modern history at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth) for his judgment and constant support. I thank Toyin Falola (professor of history, University of Texas at Austin) for his constructive criticism and advice. I should also like to thank Dr. John Parker (senior lecturer in history, School of Oriental and African Studies, London University) for his encouragement; and Andrew Porter (professor emeritus, department of history, King's College, London University) and David Killingray (emeritus professor of modern history, Goldsmiths, London University) for their advice. Finally, I remember with gratitude and affection the kindness of the late Dr. Martin Lynn (Queen's University, Belfast).

Periods of study leave from Roehampton University have been essential for the completion of this book. I would also like to give special thanks for the kind help of Augustine Mensah of the Public Records and Archives Department of Ghana (PRAAD), and to Mrs. Asiedu for her kind hospitality in Accra during my research in Ghana. I must also thank the helpful staff of the UK National Archive; the British Museum newspaper library at Colindale; Rhodes House, at Oxford; the Guildhall Library; the Royal Geographical Society; the archive of the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew; and the libraries of SOAS and the Royal Commonwealth Society. Special thanks are due, too, to Mrs. Clifford Holmes,

for access to her collection of Sir Hugh Clifford's papers. I would like to record the help and efficiency of the editorial and production team at Carolina Academic Press.

I am grateful to London University's Thornley Fund for its support.

Finally, I dedicate this book to my beloved family, Gardner and Edward, in gratitude for their endless patience and unfailing support. It was, above all, Gardner's wise advice that made possible the completion of this work.

Elizabeth Wrangham

Introduction

In the Gold Coast colony (now independent Ghana), the First World War (1914–1918) happened to coincide with the relatively liberal governorship of Sir Hugh Clifford (1912–1919). The disruption brought about by the war, and the extent to which it was mediated through Clifford’s administration, were to have both an immediate and lasting impact on this British West African colony.

The First World War has been a largely neglected period in the history of the Gold Coast—often seen then as Britain’s “model” African colony. But though most of the fighting was remote, the war was in fact to prove central to its history. Indeed, this period would lie at the halfway point, chronologically, of colonial rule. The original coastal colony of the Gold Coast was proclaimed in 1874, and had therefore been established for forty years by the time of the First World War; independence came forty years later, in 1957. More importantly, the war was central in marking a lasting turn in the fortunes of the colony. The severe economic dislocation of the war appears to have played a part in changing the attitude of the colonized towards colonial rule in the Gold Coast. The timing is significant. The cumulative economic effects, within thirty years, of the First World War followed by the Depression and the Second World War were also to make for crucial social and political change—largely beyond the scope of this study—and made an important contribution to the process that ultimately led to ending British rule in this region.

The intention here is to examine and interpret what Karl Popper called “actual, singular or specific events”—and to only accept generalizations or “theoretical constructions” if backed by specific evidence.¹ But at the same time, the aim will be to contribute to a wider debate concerning the nature of British colonialism in Africa—and especially, on the *extent* of colonial power in a remote equatorial territory such as this. In view of such aims, previously neglected official sources provide particularly valuable evidence. As David Henige observes, “no one of us is without an ideology . . . an ensemble of beliefs, attitudes and aims”; these “underpin the way we argue, the evidence we use and how we use it, and the ways we hope to influence others.”²

This study rests on a range of sources, many of which—African as well as European—offer alternative, unofficial perceptions of life in the colony in this period. They will inform our understanding of the actual (as distinct from the supposed) consequences of colonialism. All colonial rule was, of course, intrusive and (ultimately) based on coercion. Yet the sources for the Gold Coast in this period will indicate that, while inequitable and disruptive, British colonial rule here was not consistently or universally damaging—in part because it had neither the intention nor the capacity to be so.

Insofar as it uses British colonial records as evidence, this study attempts to make sense of the ways in which officials took initiatives and, more often, reacted to circum-

1. K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism*, (London, 1957), p. 143.

2. D. Henige, *Historical Evidence and Argument*, (Wisconsin, 2005), p. 5.

stances—in short, what they thought they were doing. It is worth noting that documents produced at the time were, of course, for immediate, practical, internal use; they were not produced for the subsequent benefit of historians, of whatever “ideology.” British colonial thinking is not ours, but in seeking to make sense of this central episode of British colonial rule in the Gold Coast, we must try to understand it. As David Henige advocates, we need to “combine the use of evidence and argument (inseparably intertwined) to present a case.”³ And in the light of his advice it is, of course, just as important for readers as for writers of history that they should “maintain open minds not suffocated by a set of beliefs.”⁴

Unlike most of what has been written on the Gold Coast in the period of the First World War, this is not a military history. Studies of Britain’s African empire in this period have largely concentrated on a general picture of military recruitment and campaigns, and how, very broadly, the Great War affected the West African region, or even the whole African continent.⁵ For the Gold Coast, soldiers (approximately 10,000) and carriers (approximately 5,500), out of an African population of about two million, participated in the campaigns in West Africa.⁶ They fought in Togo in August 1914, in Cameroon between 1914 and 1916, and in the East Africa campaign that continued for the duration of the war.⁷

The study fills an important gap concerning both the impact of the First World War on one British colony and, more widely, the impact of the war on Britain’s West African empire, in what remained a nonsettler region of the continent. David Kimble provided a valuable, now classic, political study of the Gold Coast colony up to 1928, but with his strong political focus, he included less on colonial economic policy.⁸ Osuntokun’s book on Nigeria and Festus Cole’s work on Sierra Leone provide some comparisons with conditions elsewhere in British West Africa.⁹ There are also a few useful articles on the effect of the war on the Gold Coast colony: for example, those by Roger Thomas and David Killingray, and more recently, and especially on recruitment of labor, by Kwabena Akurang-Parry.¹⁰

The value of colonial history remains beyond doubt. Antony Hopkins argues a powerful defense: “Regional specialists writing indigenous history have nothing to fear from a revival of colonial history: the two are complementary.” He goes on to warn: “A greater cause for concern arises from the widespread adoption of stereotypes that reduce colonial policies and the colonial presence in general to acts of oppression . . . and imply that

3. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

5. Studies which largely concentrate on military aspects, in Southern and Eastern Africa as well as West Africa, include H. Strachan, *The First World War in Africa*, (Oxford, 2004); B. Farwell, *The Great War in Africa 1914–1918*, (London, 1987); M. Page (ed.), *Africa and the First World War*, (London, 1987); and K. Akurang-Parry, “Africa and World War I” in T. Falola (ed.), *Colonial Africa 1885–1939*, Vol. 3, (Carolina, 2002).

6. “Report on the Combatant Manpower of the Native Races of British West Africa 1923,” CO879/121/1098.

7. This study does not incorporate the Gold Coast’s administration of (German) Togoland during the war.

8. D. Kimble, *A Political History of Ghana, 1850–1928*, (Oxford, 1963). A more recent study of the political history of Ghana concentrates on the period since independence: R. S. Gocking, *The History of Ghana*, (Westport, 2005).

9. A. Osuntokun, *Nigeria in the First World War*, (London, 1979); F. Cole, “Sierra Leone and World War I,” unpublished PhD thesis, (London, 1994).

10. See listings in Bibliography, below, pp. 274, 271, 264, respectively.

colonial subjects were helpless victims.”¹¹ Among such stereotypes, this study reconsiders the extent to which “exploitation rather than development” was the colonial aim.¹² For men such as Governor Sir Hugh Clifford, “development” entailed the utilization of the Gold Coast’s natural resources—for Britain’s benefit, of course, yet, as he and others of his time saw it, for the benefit of Africans too.¹³ But the sources suggest that the colonial administration at this time was not capable of undertaking such economic tasks itself, especially in wartime, while its primary aim was simply retention of control, at minimum cost. It therefore seems an exaggeration to say that colonialism was at all times “bent on forcefully reshaping the values and ideas of colonial subjects.”¹⁴ Such changes as did occur appear to have been as much unforeseen results as intended consequences.

The aim in this study is therefore to follow an empirical approach to achieve a wider knowledge of the financial and economic basis of imperialism, as seen in one particular British African colony at one particular time. The study does not adopt the postmodernist concentration on cultural history; rather, it challenges the sometimes distorted picture produced by postcolonialists “in which cultural effects have been inflated *at the expense of economic and political institutions*.”¹⁵ As Richard Rathbone has argued, what is needed is “evidence rather than assertion” and “recognition of the diversity of experience rather than essentialism and generalisation.”¹⁶ Studies based on the colonial record have been dismissed too readily as merely “colonial bureaucratic accounts” that “overlook African perspectives and responses.”¹⁷ Historians of this period, as of any other, need to be grateful for any sources which have survived. While using a range of alternative sources including, for example, Africans’ speeches in the legislative council and independent African newspapers (*The Gold Coast Nation* and the *Gold Coast Leader*), we may acknowledge the difficulties where there are groups whose “voices” have not been heard and in many cases may never have been recorded. Meanwhile, for an understanding of what the British were trying to do (and why), of the challenges they faced, and of the degree to which they succeeded (or thought they were succeeding), what is required is a careful, detailed, scrutiny of the documents. Fortunately, colonial officials created a mass of documents at that time—reports and correspondence, for example—and unknowingly bequeathed them to scholars of a later age.¹⁸ This body of material helps us, moreover, to test general theories and general assumptions about the character of British colonial rule.

One such general assumption is that of universal African resistance. Barbara Bush, for example, gives primacy to resistance as having “always been a feature of the colonial relationship.”¹⁹ Indeed, she implies it was always *the* feature, using the term to cover any action which is “critical of, opposes, upsets or challenges the smooth running of colonial

11. A.G. Hopkins, “Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History,” *Past and Present*, 164, August 1999, pp. 229–230.

12. T. Falola (ed.), *The Dark Webs: Perspectives on Colonialism in Africa*, (Carolina, 2005), p. 12.

13. The benefits were to be unequal, though, one could argue, no more unequal than in any essentially capitalist enterprise.

14. T. Falola, *The Dark Webs*, p. 12.

15. A. Loomba, *Colonialism/PostColonialism*, (London, 2nd edition, 2005), p. 51. My italics.

16. R Rathbone, “Review,” *Journal of African History*, 48, 1, 2007, pp. 152–153.

17. K. Akurang-Parry, “African Agency and Cultural Initiatives in the British Imperial Military and Labor Recruitment Drives in the Gold Coast (Colonial Ghana) during the First World War,” *African Identities*, 4, 2, 2006, pp. 213 and 214–234 *passim*.

18. See, e.g., Colonial Office (CO96) for wide-ranging detailed correspondence between London and Accra.

19. B. Bush, *Imperialism, Race and Resistance*, (London, 1999), p. 16.

rule.”²⁰ Seemingly unwilling to accept the possibility that some of the colonized may have acquiesced, for at least some of the time, she paints a picture of a constant low-level guerrilla warfare against the colonizers—even, or especially, during those times when there was no *overt* resistance. Such a picture does not represent what the sources reveal across the Gold Coast in the first couple of decades of the twentieth century. While Bush subsequently—inconsistently, reluctantly—does acknowledge collaboration and even accommodation, she still appears to rule out a different type of response: that of Africans who did not see themselves primarily as victims of colonialism but as actors, as entrepreneurs, both willing and able to take advantage of the new context in which they found themselves. Was every cocoa farmer during the boom years prior to the outbreak of the First World War “always” engaged in acts of resistance? Was every “criticism” in an African newspaper a call for the end of colonial rule, and was every positive comment evidence of “the exercise of domination”? Such conclusions would be ungrounded and condescending.

Even when Bush approves of the notion of interdependency—which surely challenges her preferred notion of “domination” and its counterpart “liberation”—she has to see colonizers “collide” with the colonized.²¹ All is violence, confrontation, and oppression: surely far too simple and generalized a way to describe the shifting colonial relationship at all times and in all places. The British did “collide” with the Ashanti at the end of the nineteenth century. It is fiction, however, to describe the relationship between the Ashanti and the British as one of perpetual collision thereafter—though British officials were themselves surprised by how easy relations were with this people just before, and even during, the First World War. In short, notwithstanding her inconsistencies, Bush emphasizes just one theme, resistance (which was of course evident, in certain times and places, as we shall see later in this study), over all others, in what was a far more complex and variegated colonial relationship than she describes. As their own records clearly demonstrate, colonial administrators were “frustrated.”²² But they were constantly frustrated, not by daily acts of resistance, but by shortages of personnel and money and by a near-complete failure to understand the workings of the African societies they sought to administer.

In order to understand the impact of the war and its significance for the history of the Gold Coast, and the importance of Clifford’s administration, we need to look briefly at how this British colony came into being; how it was run; and what its purpose was, as far as London was concerned. In particular, we need to look at the mindset of the British colonial administration—what its original goals were—and at the nature of the obstacles it faced.

From his arrival in the Gold Coast in 1912, Clifford’s administration was made more difficult by the territory’s piecemeal origins.²³ Situated on the West African coast between the French territory of the Ivory Coast to the west and German Togoland to the east, it had been formed by joining together the original coastal colony and two inland dependencies, or protectorates, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. The original (coastal) colony, proclaimed in 1874 after the Ashanti war, had been divided into three administrative units: the eastern, central, and western provinces. In 1902, following the Ashanti revolt,

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 17.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

23 See Appendix I, “The Gold Coast in 1916,” page 279.

Orders in Council formally annexed the Ashanti kingdom to the north as a protectorate of the Gold Coast Colony. Ashanti's former tributary states further north were then added as the Northern Territories Protectorate.²³

Conforming to a typical model of the time, the colonial government in the Gold Coast consisted of British political officers attempting to direct the African population through their chiefs and elders in what was called "indirect rule." This was the context before the First World War: a colony run by a local British colonial administration, under a governor based on the coast (in the capital, Accra), where were located, too, the secretariat, the treasury, and all local government departments. As in the other colonies of British West Africa, a small number of political staff were directly responsible to the governor: chief commissioners (CCs), provincial commissioners (PCs), district commissioners (DCs), and assistants (ADCs). These were the main official contact between the local British colonial government on the coast and African chiefs and, through the chiefs and elders, their African subjects across the colony.²⁴

As with the other British West African colonies just before the First World War, British Crown Colony government in the Gold Coast was paternalist and authoritarian rather than democratic or representative. The governor headed the administration and, with the advice of his senior British officials in an executive council, reported back to the secretary of state for the colonies, a member of the cabinet, in the Colonial Office in London. The Gold Coast legislative council was also (like the Gold Coast executive council) simply an advisory forum concerned with issues such as legal bills and annual government financial estimates. Political reforms, for example increasing African representation on the legislative council, were to be introduced slowly and only when, according to the British paternalism of the time, members of the African population had reached the necessary educational and cultural level.

The representation on the legislative council tells us much about British colonial attitudes and priorities at this time. Apart from senior British officials, there were four "unofficials" nominated by the governor. The two British unofficials (W. H. Grey, a manager of the trading company Swanzy and Millers; and D. Hunt, representing the mines companies) between them spoke for the expatriate trading and mining interests. Their position reveals the typically close, if not always harmonious, ties between British commercial interests and the local colonial government in such a colony. The two African unofficials (both from Eastern Province: Mate Kole, the *konyor*, or head chief, of Many Krobo; and the Accra barrister, Thomas Hutton Mills) were nominated by the governor for the (absurd, impossible) task of speaking for the whole African population on administrative affairs. The African subjects of the Gold Coast colony were thus given almost no say in the higher echelons of colonial government. These included the Western-educated Africans living mostly in the coastal towns.

The expectations of London for an African equatorial colony were few and limited: to keep possession, keep order, and keep the books balanced. British officials, including, and especially, Governor Clifford, believed that, in addition, there would be both political and economic progress in the Gold Coast—but that this would take a long time to achieve.

23. Following usual practice, the whole Gold Coast territory including Ashanti and the NT (Northern Territories) will be referred to in this study as "the colony," whereas the original southern coastal strip (formally established in 1874) will be referred to as "the Colony." Modern spellings of place names will normally be used in the text.

24. For details and background, see D. Kimble, *A Political History*, especially chapters 8 and 11.

As late as 1931, years after Clifford's departure in 1919, Sir Charles Jeffries in the Colonial Office was to restate that independent government for the Gold Coast remained the British goal, even though still "far away in the dim and distant future."²⁵ It was not foreseen that, by the time of independence in the mid-twentieth century, the infrastructure of such British colonies would still be in a rudimentary state.

Above all, British imperial officials in the early twentieth century continued to support the view that colonies should be financially self-sufficient and not a drain on the resources of the metropolitan country (even in wartime). Government revenue in the Gold Coast was largely dependent on indirect taxation in the form of customs duties on imports; meanwhile, colonial officials under Treasury scrutiny were required to keep down expenditures. Even so, official and unofficial sources in Ghana and in Britain reveal that the history of the Gold Coast in this period, when placed under a microscope, was more complex than has been suggested. Official colonial records of economic data and financial policy remain useful and underused. Economic issues cast light on the preoccupations—and in many cases, the ignorance—of British colonial administrators in this period.

In addition, contemporary material used for this study reflects the arrogance, paternalism, and often the unwitting racism, of the British and wider European society. But Governor Clifford's colonial rule remained makeshift rather than malevolent. It reflected British officers' minimal understanding of local African societies, as well as the few resources available to them. As emphasized by Cain and Hopkins, this was "colonial rule with limited supplies of capital."²⁶ In short, we will see how little British officials of this equatorial African colony could achieve at this time. They faced a range of obstacles, and none was to be greater than the fluctuating global economic conditions of a world war. Globalization was then, as it has remained, the interaction of the universal and the local: not so much a theory as "a set of processes."²⁷

The number of British officers in the colony in this period dictated that colonial rule would be relatively light. According to the 1911 census, the total African population was just over one million—though this was clearly an underestimate. The figure just before the war is now thought to have been over two million: the 1911 census left out much of the population of the northeast province of the Northern Territories, and undercounted elsewhere.²⁸ These African subjects of the Gold Coast colony were governed at that time by a total British establishment of just 510 officials. The colonial administration in the Gold Coast was run on a shoestring with very few personnel (and fewer still during the war).

Nor did environmental features provide easy conditions for either trade or colonial administration. For example, there were no natural harbors for ships to bypass the heavy surf on the coast. Oceangoing ships had to anchor about half a mile out to sea in open roadsteads. Apart from the Accra plain in the southeast, tropical forest covered most of the Colony and most of Ashanti, giving way to savannah thinning to scrub in much of the Northern Territories. The northern boundary with what was then known as French

25. Sir Charles Jeffries, June 1931, quoted in D. Morgan, *The Official History of Colonial Development*, (London, 1980), p. 41.

26. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914–1990*, (London, 1993).

27. A. G. Hopkins (ed.), *Global History*, (London, 2006), p. 4.

28. See, e.g., K. D. Patterson, *Health in Colonial Ghana: Disease, Medicine, and Socio-Economic change 1900–1955* (Brandeis, MA, 1981), pp. 86–87.

Soudan (later Upper Volta, now Burkina Faso) was approximately 420 miles away from the sea and from the seat of the local colonial government on the coast.²⁹ Laissez-faire remained the official British approach to trade—but there was little possibility of any alternative, even before the war (though especially during it). Overall, the colonial government was largely a spectator of an export trade conducted by European trading, shipping, and mining companies, in association with African farmers, traders, and brokers. British and African merchants managed the exchange of cocoa and other raw material exports from the Gold Coast for a range of manufactured imports from Europe and beyond.

In this context of limited goals and limited capacity, one of the most significant continuing failures of British colonial rule in the Gold Coast at this time was its inability to deliver either “development” or “welfare” adequately. For British colonialism, “development” had a narrow definition. Indeed, its restriction largely to the building of an infrastructure that would further the export of commodities and the import and sale of foreign manufactures has long been labelled “underdevelopment”—notably in Walter Rodney’s classic 1972 polemic.³⁰ The point to stress here, however, is that even if the British had wanted to develop the economy of the territory itself (though they did not), it would have proved quite impracticable at this time: before the war, during it, or in its aftermath. Critics have understandably emphasized an economic imbalance in colonial rule that worked to the detriment of colonial subjects, but regarding underdevelopment, they have failed to fully account for the similarities between colonial and postcolonial African experience or for the general lack of capitalist development in sub-Saharan Africa in the first fifty years of independence.

In trying to explain the absence of more efficient capitalist development in British Africa, Geoffrey Kay argued that there was a British conspiracy to hold these colonies back in order to avoid political unrest.³¹ But there is no evidence of a British colonial “conspiracy” at this time against African producers. It is not hard to see why both the major expatriate commercial firms and the British colonial governments across British West Africa, including the Gold Coast, concentrated on trade rather than investing in manufacturing. It was not interest that was lacking so much as capital for investment, skilled manpower, and potential markets in the Gold Coast or overseas. Before the war, a cautious policy minimized the effects of market instability and risk—and required very little by way of capital investment. And from 1914, the problems of trying to counter the shortage of capital and skilled labor were made much more difficult by war conditions.

Though the *Gold Coast Leader* called for “factories and scientific knowledge” from Britain—and called on fellow Africans to start their own businesses—British officials chose to be, and had to be, onlookers.³² At the same time, European companies were made even more conservative by sharp wartime fluctuations in the price of African commodities. Not surprisingly, as Ralph Austen has pointed out, they continued to prefer liquid assets in trade rather than fixed assets in manufacturing plants.³³ Improved rail and

29. See Map, Appendix I, “The Gold Coast in 1916.”

30. W. Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, (London, 1972). “Welfare,” too, had a narrow definition for colonial officials, comprising, primarily, health and education: see below, especially Chapter 7.

31. G. B. Kay, *The Political Economy of Colonialism in Ghana*, (Cambridge, 1972).

32. *Gold Coast Leader*, editorial, 29/9/14.

33. See R. Austen, *African Economic History. Internal Development & External Dependency*, (London, 1987). And see Appendix III 4 for trade fluctuations.

road transport from the hinterland to the coast, alongside the continuing demand for European and American manufactured goods (despite high wartime prices), provided little incentive for companies to change their practices. The African press were to complain that the cost of rice and sugar doubled in the last months of 1914 alone, and “rich European firms” were accused of raising prices at the expense of “poor peoples” food necessities.³⁴ But expatriate trading firms continued to show no interest in investing private capital in production when African farmers were already there with raw materials to sell.³⁵

In the context of little private capital investment being available in Britain’s West African colonies, before and during the war, British officials in the Gold Coast did accept temporarily a limited government role. They provided a basic transport and communications infrastructure and a government-backed currency. But neither officials on the coast nor officials in London accepted government involvement in manufacture as either desirable or practical in the colonies (or even, of course, at that time, in Britain). It is thus hard to support Rhoda Howard’s assumption that a capitalist plot of “underdevelopment” existed to keep British colonies such as the Gold Coast in a state of “peripheral capitalism.”³⁶ The lack of capitalist development is presented anachronistically as a failure of the colonial government: in such studies as these, the British are damned for introducing capitalism, and also damned for introducing too little. As Jean Bayart observed in his powerful plea for recognition of complexity, the application of dependency theories to Africa led to “an increase in dogma” rather than “a careful study of political dynamics.”³⁷

The search for an explanation of the “enigma” of inefficient colonial capitalism led Anne Phillips to attempt an alternative analysis of “underdevelopment” in British West Africa. She perceived the weakness of British control of its West African colonies, but then blamed this on Britain’s “West African policy” of accepting the “peasant model” rather than the “plantation model” as the economic base for the region.³⁸ But there is no evidence for colonial governments having made a choice in this matter — or that a single British “model” policy ever existed in West Africa. The “plantation model” was never viable in the Gold Coast or elsewhere in British West Africa as an alternative to agricultural production undertaken by African farmers. The constraints faced by both African producers and British colonial officials need to be better understood; they form a major theme of this study.

While the British colonial government in the Gold Coast was authoritarian, it was certainly not all-powerful. For example, Africans continued to give short shrift to any challenges to their control over, or use of, their land. Africans, in this context, were for the most part not passive observers, let alone victims, but rather active players in a complex, interdependent relationship. British officers on the coast could do no more than continue to attempt to persuade African farmers to take the best advice, as they saw it, both to protect existing crops and to diversify production. They could not compel. Meanwhile,

34. Editorial, *Gold Coast Leader*, 22/8/14.

35. See, for example, A. G. Hopkins, *An Economic History of West Africa* (London, 1973), p. 213; and M. Havinden & D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies 1850–1960* (London & New York, 1993), pp. 19–21. Lever Brothers’ interest in palm oil plantations and processing was the exception. See Chapter 1.

36. R. Howard, *Colonialism and Underdevelopment in Ghana*, (London, 1978), p. 23.

37. J-F. Bayart, *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*, (Paris, 1989. English edition: London/New York, 1993), pp. ix, 5, 270.

38. A. Phillips, *The Enigma of Colonialism. British Policy in West Africa*, (London, 1989), p. 106.

the prewar boom in cocoa exports from the Gold Coast benefited all Africans and Europeans involved in the colonial economy.

This trade was a “collaborative” or “cooperative” venture between African producers and largely British traders, and it was, as Havinden and Meredith argue, “a rational way for the undeveloped tropical colonies to be integrated into the world economy.”³⁹ The term “collaboration” does not need to carry the pejorative overtones adopted by, for example, A. Isaacman and B. Isaacman, even though the colonial relationship in the Gold Coast, as in the other territories of Britain’s worldwide empire at the time, remained unequal.⁴⁰ Instead, the term can remind us that the relationship is better described as *interdependent* rather than simply *dependent*. British dependence on African producers in the Gold Coast will be further discussed in this study—involving, for example, taxes on imports that were bought by the African population and thus paid for the colonial administration. For British officials, there was no alternative to Africans retaining control of agricultural production. This was the basis of the colony’s trade and viability.

Meanwhile, Governor Clifford, and later his successor Guggisberg (governor, 1919 to 1927), both liberal “proconsuls,” attempted to nurture the political relationship with Africans in what today appears as contradictory directions. On the one hand, they tried to reinforce the structures of indirect rule by bolstering the authority of chiefs. On the other hand, and at the same time, they encouraged the aspirations of Western-educated Africans by promoting Africanization, including, in time, increasing the number of African representatives on the legislative council. There is little evidence that either paternalistic governor saw this dual policy as contradictory or as following a deliberate plan of “divide and rule.” The continuation of existing divisions among Africans through indirect rule was the outcome of an approach that owed little to guile and much to practicality: it was simply the least disruptive, most convenient, and above all, cheapest, way of establishing colonial rule. As for contradiction, both Clifford and Guggisberg appear to have considered their policies to be complementary: that in the fullness of time harmonious relations with the local African population could be more widely achieved—though the effects of war were to do little for the cause of harmony.

Colonial rule continued to exploit cheap African labor. Relentless cost-cutting contributed to the government policy, parallel with that of expatriate trading and mining companies, of keeping labor costs as low as possible.⁴¹ Yet here we should note a tendency, in the limited literature that exists on the colony in this period, to gloss over the contrast between the priorities of colonial government and those of private capital. In trying circumstances, there could in fact be difference and tension between them. Although the colonial administration’s overall *raison d’être* was to provide a framework for international trade, its day-to-day preoccupation was much more narrowly financial: the need to balance the books. The pervading *laissez-faire* policy of British colonial government towards international trade was, in a sense, an economic “nonpolicy.” On the other hand, entrepreneurs and private companies, African as well as British, were above all concerned with how economic conditions of trade and production affected their own profit and

39. M. Havinden & D. Meredith, *Colonialism and Development*, pp. 1–7.

40. A. Isaacman and B. Isaacman, “Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and Central Ghana c.1850–1920,” *The Journal of African Historical Studies*, X, I, 1977.

41. A similar policy of cost-cutting was followed elsewhere in the empire, for example, in Kenya. See J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, “Coping with the Contradictions: The Development of the Colonial State in Kenya, 1895–1914,” *Journal of African History*, 20, 1979, p. 501.

loss. Though it was of course through imperial agency that the region became firmly linked to the emerging global capitalist economy, such “capitalist relationships” should at times be distinguished from—and could be more significant than—the more narrowly defined “colonial relationship” in the Gold Coast between rulers and ruled.

And capitalism was not in crisis here. There have always been problems when attempts have been made to fit African conditions into a theoretical “grand narrative” such as Marxism: Gareth Austin’s research on the Ashanti shows that the Marxist model does not easily fit with the economic conditions of African land use there, such as relatively little wage labor and the spread of sharecropping.⁴² Meanwhile, Lenin’s description of imperialism in 1916 as “moribund capitalism” was to prove far from reality. Capitalism and imperialism were anything but moribund.

From several points of view, African as well as European, the situation in the Gold Coast colony by 1914, just before the war, was satisfactory, even promising. From the time of his arrival in the Gold Coast in 1912, Governor Clifford’s energy and sense of urgency raised hopes, at least among the Western-educated of the African population of the colony, as to what he would achieve during his period of office.⁴³ Indeed, just before the outbreak of the Great War, when Clifford held the final sitting of the legislative council before going home on leave in May 1914, he was thanked by the African unofficials for “his determination to advance the prosperity of the colony,” his “interest” in “native affairs,” his “recognition of the value of education,” and his efforts to advance “Africanization” by promoting “native” lawyers and “native” medical practitioners.⁴⁴

Clifford also received some praise from elsewhere: in the press, as “an able administrator . . . among the natives he is considered the most humane, best loved governor (beside Leslie Probyn) that any West African colony has ever known.”⁴⁵ From the perspective of the Colonial Office in London too, and the local British colonial government in Accra, this was a successful and prosperous small colony. A flourishing export trade depended on the rapidly rising production of cocoa grown by the African population in the forest regions of the Gold Coast. By 1913, cocoa production exceeded gold as the main export of the colony. African farmers were developing cocoa as the major cash crop in order to trade it for European and American manufactured imported goods—a fruitful exchange, which helps to explain their conditional acquiescence in colonial rule at this time.

The war brought a sudden end to the Gold Coast cocoa boom. As this study will show, the unprecedented fluctuations in the international demand for cocoa exports during, and immediately after, the war bore hard on the population of the colony, badly affecting African livelihoods as well as the finances of the colonial government.⁴⁶ British administrative

42. G. Austin, “The Emergence of Capitalist Relations in South Asante Cocoa Farming c.1916–1933,” *Journal of African History*, 28, 1987. See also G. Austin, *Labor, Land and Capital in Ghana: from Slavery to Free Labor in Asante, 1807–1956*, (Rochester, 2005).

43. Sir Hugh Clifford (1866–1941). Joined the civil service of the Malay States, 1883; British resident, Pahang, 1896–1899; governor, N. Borneo and Laban, 1899–1901; colonial secretary, Trinidad and Tobago, 1903–1907; colonial secretary, Ceylon, 1907–1912; governor, the Gold Coast, 1912–1919; governor, Nigeria, 1919–1925; governor, Ceylon, 1925–1927. Novelist; friend of Conrad and Kipling.

44. *LegCo* 1/5/14, *Gazette* 13/6/14, CO 99/55. The term “native” was used at this time not only by British officials but also, as here, by Africans of Africans.

45. *The African Telegraph and Gold Coast Mirror*, 14/11/14. (Published between 14/11/14 and 25/02/15 and then not for the rest of the war). Leslie Probyn was governor of Sierra Leone, 1904–1910.

46. See Appendix III, for fluctuations in wartime trade.

countermeasures to raise revenue and to cut spending were replicated in other British African colonies. But the Gold Coast colony's heavy dependence on the export of one (inessential) cash crop, cocoa, was to prove uniquely problematic during the war. And as we shall see, adverse wartime economic conditions made Africans far more critical than previously of colonial rule in this colony. The reaction of African subjects, first to Britain's prewar promise of improving living standards and then to its wartime agenda and record, was not static but responded to an ever-changing context. Kwabena Akurang-Parry has argued that the First World War "redefined the relationship between African communities and colonial rulers"; the ways in which this redefinition occurred in the Gold Coast will be reassessed here.⁴⁷

The fluctuations in trade, with a brief revival in demand for cocoa and a short-lived boom in 1916, have led some historians, such as N. A. Cox-George, to conclude that the war brought prosperity to the Gold Coast; Rathbone's surer judgment is that even the apparent boom of 1916 could not counter, in real terms, the depression in the export sector.⁴⁸ Africans suffered. Beneath what Martin Kilson has called the "upper-echelon elite" of Western-educated Africans, there existed a growing number of an African "sub-elite."⁴⁹ Clerks, skilled workers (including foremen and mechanics), teachers, transport owners, traders, brokers, and cash-crop farmers were all badly hit by the war and disruption to trade; many were to participate in the formation of unions and in the strikes of the postwar slump.⁵⁰ Indeed, the barter terms of trade were never to be so favorable in the colony after the First World War. The 1918 influenza epidemic and the postwar slump added to the depressive effect at the time. Not surprisingly, economic hardship produced a more critical African response to colonial rule.

British colonial officials did what they could to keep the colony solvent, although war conditions led to a greatly increased burden of impositions on the local African population. More government intervention in the war came in the form of much higher taxation (as well as recruitment) and numerous, albeit temporary, restrictive trading regulations. In this sense, the formerly light touch of colonial rule in the Gold Coast became considerably heavier during the war, notwithstanding the diminishing number of British personnel. New wartime export taxes and trade restrictions such as the imposition of limited numbers of licenses to ship appear to mark at least a temporary modification of *laissez-faire*. Yet war conditions were to encourage the ever-larger expatriate shipping and commercial companies (such as the British shippers, Elder Dempster; the trading companies, Swanzy and Millers; and the Ashanti Gold mining company) to dominate further the international trade in cash crops and mining—at the expense of smaller, often African, producers.

47. K. Akurang-Parry, "Africa and World War I," in T. Falola (ed.), *Colonial Africa 1885–1939*, p. 53.

48. N. A. Cox-George, quoted in R. Rathbone, "World War I and Africa: Introduction," *JAH*, XIX, 1978, p. 7.

49. M. Kilson, "The Emergent Elites of Black Africa 1900–1960," in P. Duignan & L. Gann (eds.), *Colonialism in Africa 1870–1960*, 2 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 355.

50. African occupational groups were largely male, including teachers. Gender is not usually specified in either the official or the unofficial records of the African population of the colony in this period. Pawnship labor, in which individuals were held in debt bondage, was predominantly female: see P.A. Lovejoy and T. Falola (eds.), *Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa*, (Trenton, NJ, 2003), Introduction, pp. 1–6. Regarding agricultural production, there are occasional references in sources used for this study to "family labor" and to "market women traders." For a discussion of this theme, see C. Coquery-Vidrovitch, *African Women. A Modern History* (Boulder, CO, 1997).

The trend toward monopoly among commercial companies was resented by the African public and deplored by British officials. But by 1917 and 1918, war conditions in the Gold Coast were far beyond the competence of the British imperial government, let alone the local colonial British administration, to control.

In complaining, as the war progressed, about the deterioration in their standard of living, Africans were in fact criticizing, not the apparent strength of wartime colonial government in the Gold Coast, but its essential weaknesses. This was Britain's war—but the British could not protect their African subjects from its harsh economic effects. As will be shown, unprecedented sharp fluctuations in overseas demand for exports and increasingly high prices of foreign imports led to a sustained rise in the cost of living for a wide spectrum of African society across the colony.⁵¹ At the same time, government intervention took the form of higher taxation, as mentioned above, rather than the provision of services, so Africans were squeezed and left to adapt as well as they could. Most planned construction work was brought to a halt during the war, and the small expenditure on welfare was severely reduced. Only modest public works, along with some spending on education and health—financed from a local and very narrow tax base—could be sustained in peacetime; little could be sustained in war at all.

During the war and in its immediate aftermath, expectations of what the colonial power should and would deliver changed. In particular, a new and wider spectrum of Africans in the Gold Coast protested against the deterioration in their standard of living. The result was an unprecedented African assertiveness and organized protest. In the event, the First World War's huge and durable impact served to disillusion those Africans who had looked forward to benefits from colonial rule. Clifford's prewar public plans proved to be in sharp contrast to subsequent burdens and policy postponements forced by the First World War. An interesting range of African "voices" penetrate both the official and unofficial records of this period. They filter through in a "history from below." Here are the Italian Marxist Gramsci's "subalterns"—in, for example, the organized protest of clerks' and traders' petitions, market women's complaints, demands of striking workers and artisans, and farmers' cocoa hold-ups. Apart from the cash crop farmers, most of these groups were concentrated in the coastal towns or in towns sited just inland. They had already been affected by a form of modernization in the period before the Great War with the provision of a whole range of "luxury" imports that had come to be regarded as necessities.⁵² When necessities became costly or even unattainable, African criticisms of the local British administration inevitably grew.

However, secondary literature for the Gold Coast is limited in this period, and what remains of contemporary sources concerning African and British administration needs to be reviewed with care. Western-educated African voices can also be "heard" in the speeches of African unofficials in the Legislative Council and in local African newspapers such as the *Gold Coast Leader* and *The Gold Coast Nation* that reflected the concerns of Western-educated Africans in the colony and the views of some chiefs.⁵³ However, sadly, much of this African "voice" was not recorded. Official and unofficial sources that do remain need to be studied together in order to achieve a better understanding of how colonial rule operated at this time.

51. See Chapter 6, below.

52. M. Howard, "Structure and Process in History," *Times Literary Supplement*, 23–29/6/89.

53. The term "Western-educated" was used at the time and is adopted here, neutrally, to incorporate the stratum of Africans referred to elsewhere in the literature as, e.g., "intelligentsia" or "intellectual elite" or even "educated natives." (Gocking, *History*, *passim*).

The essential economic purposes of empire were never in dispute. They were to deny territory to commercial rivals and to provide stable conditions for Britain's own international trade—while balancing the colonial books so that no territory became a drain on the British taxpayer. Yet British colonial rule could be more muddled than monolithic. There were disagreements and tensions between the Gold Coast and London—not to mention disagreements in London and tensions among British officials in the Gold Coast. Thus a further constraint on effective government in the territory was that imperial Britain did not speak with one voice. It seems that this diversity on the British side of the colonial relationship has not been as widely recognized as the diversity of the African population—yet it helps explain the way the colony was run at this time.⁵⁴ Indeed, on a range of issues during this period, as we shall see, the local British colonial government under Clifford was to sympathize with African opinion rather than with Whitehall.

Ambitious “men on the spot” such as Clifford often struggled to obtain agreement from the Colonial Office that, like Treasury officials, favored caution and continuity, and especially balanced budgets, over change and expense.⁵⁵ In addition, the Colonial Office itself sometimes fought running battles with other imperial British departments of state in the metropolis, such as the Foreign Office and the Treasury. During the war, authority over such colonies was spread more widely across a number of government departments in London, including the Ministries of War and Food and the Board of Trade. Meanwhile, alongside imperial officialdom, war conditions favored unofficial British economic agents, in the shape of the major expatriate commercial companies with their own agenda and the opportunities presented by the war to strengthen their influence on government. From the British colonial perspective, none of this made the colony easier to govern. Moreover, the particular interests and perceptions of the local British colonial government on the West African coast and officials up-country could—and did—vary widely. Within the Gold Coast colony, as will be shown in this study, there were, for example, occasional resounding clashes between Armitage, chief commissioner of the Northern Territories, and his northern officers with “the men from the ministry,” both in the secretariat in Accra and in the governor's residence on the coast.⁵⁶

It is remarkable that in this most unfavorable context—a disruptive global war and a government apparatus under strain—a dynamic colonial governor could have some personal impact. Yet just as not all European colonies in Africa—and not all the British ones—were the same, neither were all colonial governors alike. Sir Hugh Clifford's reputation needs to be reappraised—partly to qualify Gailey's uncritical judgment.⁵⁷ He was determined to set in hand a program of reform and development. This was his first governorship, but his already long and varied experience in the colonial service, in the Far East and in the West Indies, had given him a valuable perspective on the workings of the Colonial Office in Whitehall, as well as the confidence to stand up to London officials and argue his case—if necessary, at length. Colonial administration partly reflected a

54. Compare with French Africa. See C. M. Andrew & A. S. Kanya-Forstner, “France, Africa and the First World War,” *JAH*, XIX, 1, 1978, pp. 11–14, for the “fragmented ... official mind of French imperialism.”

55. See discussion in S. Constantine, *The Making of British Colonial Development Policy 1914–1940*, (London, 1984), p. 18.

56. See Chapter 8 below.

57. H. A. Gailey, *Clifford: Imperial Proconsul*, (London, 1982).

governor's personal style and temperament: Clifford was to have a discernible influence on the Gold Coast colony.

While modernization *theory* has long been rejected by historians as unconvincingly sweeping, overoptimistic, and Eurocentric, modernization *in practice*—bringing with it everything from Western medicine to motor vehicles—was precisely what Governor Clifford and his colonial staff sought. Such goods were sought, too, by both Western-educated and other Africans in pursuit of a higher standard of living. As Falola observes, “... as far as many colonial officials were concerned, they were modernisers” — regarding, for example, modern technology applied to transport and communications.⁵⁸ This “modernisation,” or the quest for modernity, remained an important shared aspiration in British colonial Africa, and it was to prove a demanding measure of the effectiveness of alien governance throughout the colonial period.⁵⁹ We shall later encounter Clifford's modernizing — though frustrated — agenda.

Modernization was particularly in demand during the time of Clifford's governorship, and as a result, his historical significance is complex, even somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, his positive proposals for improvements in the Gold Coast survived his departure from the colony in 1919. He had only just won a number of financial battles with the Colonial Office when the greater battles of the First World War had intervened — yet wartime disruption and economies simply postponed Clifford's development program until the 1920s. His successor, Guggisberg, has been given the credit for development in the Gold Coast in the interwar period, before the onset of the Depression.⁶⁰ Too little attention has been given to the extent to which his policies were Clifford's legacy. It may be true that, as a result of the 1914–1918 war, “the liberal conscience” within the British imperial government “abdicated in favour of more imperially minded figures” such as Curzon and Milner.⁶¹ But this was not true of humane proconsuls in the field such as Clifford and subsequently Guggisberg in the Gold Coast. The impact on the colony of these two particular governors in the fifteen years between 1912 and 1927 appears to have smoothed the path of British and African relations in the Gold Coast in the difficult period that followed. On the other hand, as already indicated, in the war period the balance of economic advantage shifted unfavorably for the local population. Ironically, the contrast between what Clifford had publicly sought at the outset, and what he was able to deliver during his governorship, fed disillusionment. Largely as a result of the disruptions of war, many Africans now concluded in increasing numbers that any benefits of the colonial presence, such as opening up international and subsequently global trade, were outweighed by its demands — or ineffectiveness.

British colonial rule was not the same across the various regions of the Gold Coast. In no area was it less beneficent or less effective than in the north, and another theme of this study is the tendency towards *unevenness* in the colonial impact — “uneven develop-

58. T. Falola, *Economic Reform and Modernization in Nigeria, 1945–1965*, (Kent State University Press, 2004), p. 10.

59. *Ibid.* Also see T. Falola, *The Power of African Cultures*, (Rochester, NY, 2003), pp. 6, 24, 71–73.

60. See, e.g., W. E. F. Ward, *A History of Ghana*, (London, 1958); F. Agbodeka, *Ghana in the Twentieth Century*, (Accra, 1972); and A. Boahen, *Ghana: Evolution and Change in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, (London, 1975).

61. R. Rathbone, “World War I and Africa. Introduction,” *Journal of African History*, xix, 1, 1978, p. 3.

ment” — as between the south and the north of the colony. A country which had come into being arbitrarily and piecemeal became even more lacking in homogeneity, and this was to prove part of the enduring legacy of colonial rule in 1957. Although officially a unitary state, the colony remained divided between the original coastal colony and the two inland protectorates, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. An existing imbalance between the three regions of the Gold Coast colony now grew. As illustrated by Jean Allman and John Parker, the northern region in particular had a very different experience of colonial rule both before and during the war: “A degree of confusion, division, and ineffectiveness characterised British rule in this area right up to the 1930s.”⁶² Here is an example, in one colony, of considerable regional disparity, with “patchy and differentiated modes of imperial and colonial penetration.”⁶³

While general theories concerning colonialism have tended to ignore such diversity, the war revealed the sharp difference between the two protectorates, Ashanti and the Northern Territories. Ashanti, recently conquered (after the “revolt” in 1901), was in due course believed by the government to be consenting to, because of prospering under, colonial rule. This was an ironic feature of the period: a colonial government which had hitherto been uncertain of the “loyalty” of the Ashanti kingdom now came to accept that there was nothing to fear. Ashanti farmers were now peacefully exploiting the economic opportunities provided by exceptionally successful cash crop production. However, the war period also saw the contrast intensified between the Colony and Ashanti on the one hand, and the north on the other. The Northern Territories had also, like Ashanti, been recently conquered by the military — a civilian administration had only been established in 1907 — but in this region, the war made for further unwelcome government intervention and coercion, without the prospect of economic opportunity. There were many signs in the war of a marked lack of consent to British colonial rule in the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast.

During the war, the main structures of the colonial administration and the colonial economy of the Gold Coast, as well as the dynamics of African societies, appeared to change little. There was continuity, in particular, in the ways in which local Africans took the opportunity to shape the evolving, though unequal, colonial relationship and turn it as far as they could to their advantage. Of course, patterns of domination varied across the empire, “penetrating deep in some societies” but “involving a comparatively superficial contact with others.”⁶⁴ In the case of the Gold Coast, there continued to be a relatively weak colonial administration. The few British administrative officers floated, as it were, on the surface of the territory, communicating for the most part with only a small number of their African subjects, such as chiefs, clerks, and certain members of the Western-educated elite. They remained largely ignorant of the lives of the rest.

A major aim of this study is to consider the variety of constraints under which all participants in the colonial relationship in the Gold Coast colony operated in this period so dominated by the world war. The viability of the colony depended on a healthy balance

62. J. Allman and J. Parker, *Tongnaab: The History of a West African God*, (Bloomington, Indiana, 2005), p. 73.

63. R. Rathbone, “World War I and Africa,” p. 1.

64. A. Loomba, *Colonialism/PostColonialism*, 2nd ed. (London, 2005), p. 9.

of trade—but the international export trade in cocoa could no longer be relied upon during the war. This inescapable fact redefined the options open to Africans, as well as to the British, in a constantly changing wartime context. As in the other three, all nonsettler colonies of British West Africa (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia), the First World War sharply exposed just how minimal was colonial government in the Gold Coast—and how it was increasingly incapable of meeting African aspirations. This new, postwar, African evaluation of colonial rule, in the light of wartime experience, leads us to a re-consideration of Richard Rathbone's view that "continuity and discontinuity were finely balanced" in such African colonies as the Gold Coast in the war period.⁶⁵

This period is not merely the chronological halfway point in the colonial history of the Gold Coast; it is a decisive moment. The First World War represents a pivotal discontinuity in the history of the Gold Coast. In their study of the British colony, Kenya, in this period, Lonsdale and Berman argued that "the legitimacy of the colonial state was hitched to the oxcart of African accumulation."⁶⁶ The First World War appears to mark the moment when the oxcart began to become unhitched in the Gold Coast. The sources do not reveal a definitive picture. But in the long term, the additional impact of the interwar depression and another world war increased frustration, undermined legitimacy, and led to the mass demand in the late 1940s, not merely for reform, but for an independent African government.

This study falls into sections marking three periods: before the war, the years of war, and the immediate aftermath. The aim will be to assess the impact of the First World War on the Gold Coast colony, together with the significance of Clifford's colonial administration. We will look first at the prewar economy and finances, along with an evaluation of the character and potential of British colonial government at that time. Secondly, covering the war period, three chapters consider the impact of the disruption of shipping and trade on the economy and finances of the territory and its people; while a further three chapters examine the impact on British policy and programs, the unevenness of British administration, and the significance of wartime conditions for evolving colonial relationships. The final chapter looks at the immediate postwar period and draws conclusions regarding the importance of the war in the history of the Gold Coast and the nature of British colonial rule in this part of equatorial Africa.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

66. J. Lonsdale and B. Berman, "Coping with the Contradictions," p. 497.

List of Abbreviations

| | |
|-------|---|
| ADC | Assistant District Commissioner |
| AETC | African and Eastern Trading Corporation |
| AGC | Ashanti Goldfields Corporation |
| ARPS | Aborigines Rights Protection Society |
| BBWA | Bank of British West Africa |
| BCGA | British Cotton Growing Association |
| CC | Chief Commissioner |
| CFAO | Compagnie Francaise de L'Afrique Occidentale |
| CO | Colonial Office, London |
| CPP | Convention Peoples' Party |
| DC | District Commissioner (District Officer) |
| ERDC | Empire Resources Development Committee |
| FO | Foreign Office |
| GCR | Gold Coast Regiment |
| JAH | Journal of African History |
| LegCo | Legislative Council |
| MOH | Medical Officer of Health |
| NCBWA | National Congress of British West Africa |
| NT | Northern Territories |
| PMO | Principal Medical Officer |
| PC | Provincial Commissioner |
| PRAAD | Public Records and Archive Department of Ghana |
| PRO | Public Records Office, now the National Archive (UK) |
| PWD | Public Works Department |
| SCOA | Societe Commerciale de L'Ouest Africaine |
| SPG | Society for the Propagation of the Gospel |
| SSO | Senior Sanitary Officer |
| UAC | United Africa Company |
| TAMS | Tropical Africa Medical and Sanitary Advisory Committee |
| WACB | West African Currency Board |
| WAFF | West Africa Frontier Force |
| WAMS | West Africa Medical Service |
| WO | War Office |