

Legislation and the Regulatory State

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CFPB v. Community Financial Services Association of America
144 S. Ct. 1474 (2024)

JUSTICE THOMAS, delivered the opinion of the Court.

Our Constitution gives Congress control over the public fisc, but it specifies that its control must be exercised in a specific manner. The Appropriations Clause commands that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, § 9, cl. 7. For most federal agencies, Congress provides funding on an annual basis. This annual process forces them to regularly implore Congress to fund their operations for the next year. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is different. The Bureau does not have to petition for funds each year. Instead, Congress authorized the Bureau to draw from the Federal Reserve System the amount its Director deems “reasonably necessary to carry out” the Bureau’s duties, subject only to an inflation-adjusted cap. 124 Stat. 1975, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5497(a)(1), (2). In this case, we must decide the narrow question whether this funding mechanism complies with the Appropriations Clause. We hold that it does.

I
A

Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in response to the 2008 financial crisis. 124 Stat. 1376. The Act created an independent financial regulator within the Federal Reserve System known as the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). Congress charged the Bureau with enforcing consumer financial protection laws to ensure “that all consumers have access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent, and competitive.” § 5511(a). ***

In addition to vesting the Bureau with sweeping authority, Congress shielded the Bureau from the influence of the political branches. To insulate the Bureau from the President’s control, Congress put a single Director with a 5-year term at the Bureau’s helm and made the Director removable only for inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance. §§ 5491(b)-(c). This Court held in *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*, 591 U.S.197 (2020), that the combination of single-Director leadership and for-cause removal protection unconstitutionally circumscribed the President’s ability to oversee the Executive Branch.

This case involves another one of the Bureau’s novel structural features, one that limits Congress’ control. Congress supplies most federal agencies with the funds necessary for their operations only on an annual basis, so those agencies must ask Congress for renewed funding each year. For the Bureau, however, Congress diminished this accountability by providing the Bureau a standing source of funding outside the ordinary annual appropriations process. Each year, the Bureau may requisition from the earnings of the Federal Reserve System “the amount determined by the [Bureau’s] Director to be reasonably necessary to carry out” its duties, subject only to a statutory cap. § 5497(a)(1). The Bureau cannot request more than 12 percent of the Federal Reserve System’s total operating expenses as reported in fiscal year 2009 (adjusted for inflation). §§ 5497(a)(2)(A)-(B). In fiscal year 2022, that cap was about \$734 million. ***

B

In 2017, the Bureau promulgated a regulation focused on high-interest consumer loans. See *Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans*, 12 CFR pt. 1041 (2018) (Payday Lending Rule). *** In the operative complaint, the associations argued, among other things, that the Bureau “takes federal government money without an appropriations act” in violation of the Appropriations Clause.

The District Court granted summary judgment to the Bureau. The Court of Appeals [reversed, reasoning that the Appropriations Clause] “does more than reinforce Congress’s power over fiscal matters; it affirmatively obligates Congress to use that authority ‘to maintain the boundaries between the branches and preserve individual liberty from the encroachments of executive power.’” *** By giving the Bureau a “self-actualizing, perpetual funding mechanism,” the court reasoned, Congress in effect abandoned this obligation. ***

We now reverse.

II

Under the Appropriations Clause, an appropriation is simply a law that authorizes expenditures from a specified source of public money for designated purposes. The statute that provides the Bureau’s funding meets these requirements. We therefore conclude that the Bureau’s funding mechanism does not violate the Appropriations Clause.

A

The Appropriations Clause provides that “[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Textually, the command is unmistakable—“no money can be paid out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of Congress.” *Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States*, 301 U.S.308, 321 (1937). Our decisions have long given the Appropriations Clause this straightforward reading. See, e.g., *Office of Personnel Management*, 496 U. S., at 424 (“Money may be paid out only through an appropriation made by law; in other words, the payment of money from the Treasury must be authorized by a statute”); *Reeside v. Walker*, 11 How. 272, 291 (1851) (“However much money may be in the Treasury at any one time, not a dollar of it can be used in the payment of any thing not . . . previously sanctioned” through an appropriation made by Congress). ***

The associations’ challenge turns solely on whether the Bureau’s funding mechanism constitutes an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” ***

1

The Constitution’s text requires an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” Art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Our concern is principally with the meaning of the word “appropriation.” The Constitution’s use of the term “appropriation” in the Appropriations Clause and in other Clauses provides important contextual clues about its meaning. To state the obvious, the Appropriations Clause itself makes clear that an appropriation must authorize withdrawals from a particular source—the public treasury. It provides that money may be “drawn from the Treasury” only “in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Cl. 7. The section preceding the Appropriations Clause further suggests that appropriations assign funds for specific uses: Congress has the power to “raise and support Armies,” but subject to the limitation that “no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.” § 8, cl. 12.

At the time the Constitution was ratified, “appropriation” meant “[t]he act of sequestering, or assigning to a particular use or person, in exclusion of all others.” 1 N. Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language* (1828); see also 1 J. Ash, *The New and Complete Dictionary of the English Language* (2d ed. 1795) (“[t]he application of something to a particular use”); 1 S. Johnson, *A Dictionary of the English Language* (6th ed. 1785) (“[t]he application of something to a particular purpose”); T. Dyche & W. Pardon, *A New General English Dictionary* (14th ed. 1771) (“the appointing a thing to a particular use”). In ordinary usage, then, an appropriation of public money would be a law authorizing the expenditure of particular funds for specified ends.

Taken as a whole, this evidence suggests that, at a minimum, appropriations were understood as a legislative means of authorizing expenditure from a source of public funds for designated purposes.

2

Pre-founding history supports the conclusion that an identified source and purpose are all that is required for a valid appropriation. *** Following the Glorious Revolution, Parliament’s usual practice was to appropriate government revenue “to particular purposes more or less narrowly defined.” Additionally, Parliament began limiting the duration of its revenue grants. For example, the duties on tonnage and poundage were no longer granted to the King for life, but only for a term of years. See 2 Wm. & Mary, c. 4, § 1 (1690); 6 Wm. & Mary, c. 1, § 1 (1694); see also D. Gill, *The Treasury, 1660-1714*, 46 *Eng. Hist. Rev.* 600, 610 (1931). Limiting the duration of these and other revenue grants ensured that the King could not rule without Parliament. As one historian described it, Parliament made sure “the Crown should be altogether unable to pay its way without an annual meeting of Parliament. . . . Every year he and his Ministers had to come, cap in hand, to the House of Commons, and more often than not the Commons drove a bargain and exacted a quid pro quo in return for supply.” G. Trevelyan, *The English Revolution 1688-1689*, pp. 180-181 (1939).

Even with this newfound fiscal supremacy, Parliament did not micromanage every aspect of the King’s finances. *** [P]arliamentary grants of supplies ordinarily gave the Crown broad discretion regarding how much to spend within an appropriated sum. Statutes granting money often stated that the Crown could spend “any Sum not exceeding” a particular amount. See, e.g., 13 Anne, c. 18, § 69 (1713); 1 Anne, c. 6, § 130 (1702). *** Other parliamentary appropriations acts, however, required that money be spent for particular purposes. See, e.g., 2 Wm. & Mary, c. 1, §§ 35-36 (1690); 3 Wm. & Mary, c. 5, §§ 42-43 (1691); see also M. Rappaport, *The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto*, 76 *TULANE L. REV.* 265, 327, n. 211 (2001) (Rappaport).

The appropriations practice in the Colonies and early state legislatures was much the same. *** By the time of the Constitutional Convention, the principle of legislative supremacy over fiscal matters engendered little debate and created no disagreement. It was uncontroversial that the powers to raise and disburse public money would reside in the Legislative Branch. The only disagreement was about whether the right to originate taxation and appropriations bills should rest in a legislative body with proportionate representation. Having reached a tentative agreement on that difference, the Committee of Detail reported a draft constitution giving the House of Representatives the power to originate all revenue and appropriations laws. This proposed draft contained the prototype of what later became

the Appropriations Clause. It provided that “[a]ll bills for raising or appropriating money . . . shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 178 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). Ultimately, the Convention agreed to grant the House an exclusive power to originate revenue laws but not for appropriations laws. Compare Art. I, § 7, cl. 1, with § 9, cl. 7.

In short, the origins of the Appropriations Clause confirm that appropriations needed to designate particular revenues for identified purposes. Beyond that, however, early legislative bodies exercised a wide range of discretion. Some appropriations required expenditure of a particular amount, while others allowed the recipient of the appropriated money to spend up to a cap. Some appropriations were time limited, others were not. And, the specificity with which appropriations designated the objects of the expenditures varied greatly.

3

*** Many early appropriations laws made annual lump-sum grants for the Government’s expenses. Congress’ first annual appropriations law, for instance, divided Government expenditures into four broad categories and authorized disbursements up to certain amounts for those purposes. For example, the law appropriated a “sum not exceeding two hundred and sixteen thousand dollars for defraying the expenses of the civil list,” which covered most nonmilitary executive officers’ salaries and expenses. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 23, 1 Stat. 95; see 5 Papers of Alexander Hamilton 381-388 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke eds. 1962) (reporting detailed line-item estimates for civil-list expenditures). ***

The appropriation of “sums not exceeding” a specified amount did not by itself mandate that the Executive spend that amount; as was the case in England, such appropriations instead provided the Executive discretion over how much to spend up to a cap. *** Congress took even more flexible approaches to appropriations for several early executive agencies and allowed the agencies to indefinitely fund themselves directly from revenue collected. Soon after convening, Congress enacted laws that imposed a detailed schedule of duties on imported goods and tonnage. See Act of July 4, 1789, ch. 2, 1 Stat. 24-27 (imposing duties on imported goods, wares, and merchandises); Act of July 20, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 27-28 (imposing duties on tonnage). It then divided the Nation into customs districts and established a vast federal bureaucracy to oversee the collection of those duties. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29-49. Rather than fund those customs officials through annual appropriations, Congress opted for a fee-based model. Customs collectors were compensated through tonnage- and transaction-based fees specified by law, and through a commission on the amount of duties raised within their districts. For example, customs collectors were entitled to collect from merchants two-and-a-half dollars “for every entrance of any ship or vessel of one hundred tons burthen or upwards” and 20 cents “for every permit to land goods.” *Id.*, at 44. And, collectors in the largest ports were paid “half a per centum on the amount of all monies by them respectively received and paid into the treasury of the United States.” *Id.*, at 45. Other customs functionaries were also compensated on a fee basis. For instance, customs collectors paid weighers 18 cents “out of the revenue” collected “for the measurement of every one hundred bushels of salt or grain.” *Ibid.*

Congress adopted a similarly open-ended funding scheme for the Post Office. Instead of appropriating funds on an annual basis, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to “defray the expense” of carrying the mail of the United States with the revenues generated through postage assessments. Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 3, 1 Stat. 234. The postal statute also provided the Postmaster General a \$2,000 annual salary “to be paid . . . out of the revenues of the post-office.” § 8, *id.*, at 235. And, it authorized the Postmaster General to pay deputy postmasters “such commission on the monies arising from the postage of letters and packets, as he shall think adequate to their respective services,” subject to an upper limit. § 23, *id.*, at 238. These fee-based funding schemes continued year after year without Congress passing an annual appropriation for these agencies. ***

B

The Bureau’s funding statute contains the requisite features of a congressional appropriation. The statute authorizes the Bureau to draw public funds from a particular source—“the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System,” in an amount not exceeding an inflation-adjusted cap. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5497(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). And, it specifies the objects for which the Bureau can use those funds—to “pay the expenses of the Bureau in carrying out its duties and responsibilities.” § 5497(c)(1).

Further, the Bureau’s funding mechanism fits comfortably with the First Congress’ appropriations practice. In design, the Bureau’s authorization to draw an amount that the Director deems reasonably necessary to carry out the agency’s responsibilities, subject to a cap, is similar to the First Congress’ lump-sum appropriations. And, the commission- and fee-based appropriations that supplied the Customs Service and Post Office provided standing authorizations to expend public money in the same way that the Bureau’s funding mechanism does.

For these reasons, we conclude that the statute that authorizes the Bureau to draw funds from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System is an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” We therefore hold that the requirements of the Appropriations Clause are satisfied.

III

The associations make three principal arguments for why the Bureau’s funding mechanism violates the Appropriations Clause, each of which attempts to build additional requirements into the meaning of an “Appropriatio[n] made by Law.” None is persuasive.

A

At the outset, the associations argue that the Bureau’s funding is not “drawn . . . in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law” because the agency, rather than Congress, decides the amount of annual funding that it draws from the Federal Reserve System. This argument proceeds from a mistaken premise. Congress determined the amount of the Bureau’s annual funding by imposing a statutory cap. *** The only sense in which the Bureau decides its own funding, then, is by exercising its discretion to draw less than the statutory cap. But, as we have explained, “sums not exceeding” appropriations, which provided the Executive with the same discretion, were commonplace immediately after the founding. ***

B

Next, the associations suggest that the Bureau’s funding statute is not a valid appropriation because it is not time limited. *** But, the Constitution’s text suggests that, at

least in some circumstances, Congress can make standing appropriations. The Constitution expressly provides that “no Appropriation of Money” to support an army “shall be for a longer Term than two Years.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 12. Hamilton explained that this restriction ensures that, for the army, Congress cannot “vest in the Executive department . . . permanent funds” and must instead “once at least in every two years . . . deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot,” “come to a new resolution on the point,” and “declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents.” The Federalist No. 26, p. 143 (E. Scott ed. 1898). The Framers were thus aware of the dynamic that the associations highlight, but they did not explicitly limit the duration of appropriations for other purposes.

The First Congress’ practice confirms this understanding. Recall that the appropriations that supplied funding to the Customs Service and the Post Office were not time limited. The associations resist the analogy to the Post Office and other fee-based agencies, arguing that such agencies do not enjoy the same level of fiscal independence as the Bureau. Fee-based agencies, the associations reason, “could not demand funds from the federal fisc, but rather needed to persuade the people they served to pay them, and the public could refuse to purchase to influence their conduct.” Brief for Respondents 35. The associations, however, make no attempt to explain why the possibility that the public’s choices could restrain fee-based agencies’ revenue is relevant to the question whether a law complies with the constitutional imperative that there be an appropriation.

C

Finally, the associations contend that the Bureau’s funding mechanism provides a blueprint for destroying the separation of powers, and that it invites tyranny by allowing the Executive to operate free of any meaningful fiscal check. If the Bureau’s funding mechanism is consistent with the Appropriations Clause, the associations reason, then Congress could do the same for any—or every—civilian executive agency. And that, they conclude, would be the very unification of the sword and purse that the Appropriations Clause forbids.

The associations err by reducing the power of the purse to only the principle expressed in the Appropriations Clause. To be sure, the Appropriations Clause presupposes Congress’ powers over the purse. But, its phrasing and location in the Constitution make clear that it is not itself the source of those powers. The Appropriations Clause is phrased as a limitation: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.” Art. I, § 9. And, it is placed within a section of other such limitations. Compare *ibid.* (“No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed”) and *ibid.* (“No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State”), with § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . .”). The associations offer no defensible argument that the Appropriations Clause requires more than a law that authorizes the disbursement of specified funds for identified purposes. Without such a theory, the associations’ Appropriations Clause challenge must fail. See *Haaland v. Brackeen*, 599 U.S.255, 277-278 (2023).

IV

*** Even under the dissent’s “legislative control” theory, its attempt to distinguish the Customs Service and the Post Office from the Bureau is not convincing. The dissent points out that Congress had control over the Customs Service, for instance, because Customs had a “carefully delineated mission” and “early tariff Acts spelled out in excruciating detail the various fees” customs officers could collect, as well as the salaries the officers could be paid from those receipts. According to the dissent, the Bureau is different because “[i]ts powers

are broad and vast,” “[i]t does not collect fees,” and “it is permitted to keep and invest surplus funds.” But, it is unclear why these differences matter under the dissent’s theory. After all, to make a valid appropriation, Congress must designate the objects for which the appropriated funds may be used— as it did here. See 12 U.S.C. § 5497(c)(1). Although there may be other constitutional checks on Congress’ authority to create and fund an administrative agency, specifying the source and purpose is all the control the Appropriations Clause requires.

V

The statute that authorizes the Bureau to draw money from the combined earnings of the Federal Reserve System to carry out its duties satisfies the Appropriations Clause. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAVANAUGH, and JUSTICE BARRETT join, concurring.

*** I would *** add one more point to the Court’s opinion. As the Court describes, the Appropriations Clause’s text and founding-era history support the constitutionality of the CFPB’s funding. See ante, at 6. And so too does a continuing tradition. Throughout our history, Congress has created a variety of mechanisms to pay for government operations. Some schemes specified amounts to go to designated items; others left greater discretion to the Executive. Some were limited in duration; others were permanent. Some relied on general Treasury moneys; others designated alternative sources of funds. Whether or not the CFPB’s mechanism has an exact replica, its essentials are nothing new. And it was devised more than two centuries into an unbroken congressional practice, beginning at the beginning, of innovation and adaptation in appropriating funds. The way our Government has actually worked, over our entire experience, thus provides another reason to uphold Congress’s decision about how to fund the CFPB.

Justice ALITO, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting.

*** [T]oday’s case turns on a simple question: Is the CFPB financially accountable to Congress in the way the Appropriations Clause demands? History tells us it is not. As we said in *Seila Law*, “[p]erhaps the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem’ with an executive entity ‘is [a] lack of historical precedent’ to support it.” 591 U. S., at 220 (quoting *Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd.*, 561 U.S.477, 505 (2010)). And the Government agrees with this principle. In its briefing and at argument, the Government admitted that an utterly unprecedented funding scheme would raise a serious constitutional problem. The Government therefore attempts to show that there is ample precedent for the CFPB scheme, but that effort fails.

The CFPB’s funding scheme contains the following features: (1) it applies in perpetuity; (2) the CFPB has discretion to select the amount of funding that it receives, up to a statutory cap; (3) the funds taken by the CFPB come from other entities; (4) those entities are self-funded corporations that obtain their funding from fees on private parties, “not departments of the Government,” *Emergency Fleet Corp.*, 275 U. S., at 426; (5) the CFPB is not required to return unspent funds or transfer them to the Treasury; and (6) those funds may be placed in a separate fund that earns interest and may be used to pay the CFPB’s

expenses in the future. At argument, the Government was unable to cite any other agency with a funding scheme like this, and thus no other agency—old or new—has enjoyed so many layers of insulation from accountability to Congress.

The Government points to the Post Office and the Customs Service as founding-era precedents for the CFPB, but the analogy is flawed. As noted, funding Government agencies with fees charged to the beneficiaries of their services has long been viewed as consistent with the appropriations requirement. And both the Post Office and the Customs Service fell comfortably into that category. ***

The Government's next-best analogs fare no better. Moving to modern agencies, the Government claims that the CFPB's funding scheme is not materially different from the funding schemes of a list of other currently existing agencies. See Brief for Petitioners 22-23, 29-36 (comparing the CFPB to the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the Farm Credit Administration (FCA), the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), and others).

But unlike the CFPB, the agencies cited by the Government are funded in whole or in part by fees charged those who make use of their services or are subject to their regulation. This is true for the OCC, see 12 U.S.C. § 16; the FDIC, see § 1815; the NCUA, see § 1755; the FCA, § 2250; and the FHFA, see § 4516. ***

Left with no analog in history, the Government employs a divide-and-conquer strategy to defend the CFPB's funding scheme. It argues that even if no prior agency had a funding scheme with all the features of the CFPB's, the funding schemes of other presumptively constitutional agencies contain one or more of the features found in the CFPB's scheme. It then reasons that the combination of these features in the CFPB's scheme must be constitutional as well.

This argument founders for two reasons. First, the CFPB's scheme includes an important feature never before seen. As explained, the CFPB's money does not come from Congress, from private recipients of its services, or from private entities that it regulates. It does not even originate with another Government agency. Instead, the CFPB gets its money via a three-step process: The Federal Reserve Banks earn money from the purchase and sale of securities, as well as from the fees they charge for providing services to depository institutions. The Federal Reserve Banks then deliver these earnings to the Federal Reserve System. Finally, the CFPB requests an amount from the Federal Reserve Board. That feature of the CFPB scheme is entirely new.

Second, the Government's argument fails "to engage with the Dodd-Frank Act as a whole." *Seila Law*, 591 U. S., at 230. By addressing the individual elements of the CFPB's setup one-by-one, the Government seeks to divert attention from the combined layers that insulate the CFPB from accountability to Congress. Elements that are safe or tolerable in isolation may be unsafe when combined. In the case of the CFPB, the combination is deadly. The whole point of the appropriations requirement is to protect "the right of the people," through their elected representatives in Congress, to "be actually consulted" about the expenditure of public money. *St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States* 297 (1803) (C. Wilson ed. 1999). The CFPB's design strips the people of this power. ***

[Opinion of Justice JACKSON, concurring, omitted.]

FDA v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine
602 U.S. 367 (2024)

Justice THOMAS, concurring [joining fully the Court’s opinion and commenting on an assertion of associational standing raised by the Alliance and other plaintiff associations].

I join the Court’s opinion in full because it correctly applies our precedents to conclude that the Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine and other plaintiffs lack standing. Our precedents require a plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s challenged actions caused his asserted injuries. And, the Court aptly explains why plaintiffs have failed to establish that the Food and Drug Administration’s changes to the regulation of mifepristone injured them. ***

I write separately to highlight what appear to be similar problems with another theory of standing asserted in this suit. The Alliance and other plaintiff associations claim that they have associational standing to sue for their members’ injuries. Under the Court’s precedents, “an association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.” *Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n*, 432 U.S.333, 343 (1977). If an association can satisfy these requirements, we allow the association to pursue its members’ claims, without joining those members as parties to the suit.

Associational standing, however, is simply another form of third-party standing. And, the Court has never explained or justified either doctrine’s expansion of Article III standing. In an appropriate case, we should explain just how the Constitution permits associational standing.

I

Associational standing raises constitutional concerns by relaxing both the injury and redressability requirements for Article III standing. It also upsets other legal doctrines. ***

The Alliance’s attempted use of our associational-standing doctrine illustrates how far we have strayed from the traditional rule that plaintiffs must assert only their own injuries. The Alliance is an association whose members are other associations. None of its members are doctors. Instead, the Alliance seeks to have associational standing based on injuries to the doctors who are members of its member associations. Thus, the allegedly injured parties—the doctors—are two degrees removed from the party before us pursuing those injuries.

Second, our associational-standing doctrine does not appear to comport with the requirement that the plaintiff present an injury that the court can redress. For a plaintiff to have standing, a court must be able to “provid[e] a remedy that can redress the plaintiff’s injury.” *Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski*, 592 U.S.279, 291 (2021) (emphasis added). But, as explained, associational standing creates a mismatch: Although the association is the plaintiff in the suit, it has no injury to redress. The party who needs the remedy—the injured

member—is not before the court. Without such members as parties to the suit, it is questionable whether “relief to these nonparties . . . exceed[s] constitutional bounds.” *Association of American Physicians & Surgeons v. FDA*, 13 F. 4th 531, 540 (CA6 2021); see also *Department of Homeland Security v. New York*, 589 U.S. ___, ___, 140 S. Ct. 599, 206 L. Ed. 2d 115 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in grant of stay) (explaining that remedies “are meant to redress the injuries sustained by a particular plaintiff in a particular lawsuit”); Brief for Professor F. Andrew Hessick as Amicus Curiae 18 (“A bedrock principle of the Anglo-American legal system was that the right to a remedy for an injury was personal”).

Consider the remedial problem when an association seeks an injunction, as the Alliance did here. “We have long held” that our equity jurisdiction is limited to “the jurisdiction in equity exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” *Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S. A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.*, 527 U.S.308, 318 (1999). And, “as a general rule, American courts of equity did not provide relief beyond the parties to the case.” *Trump v. Hawaii*, 585 U.S.667, 717 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). For associations, that principle would mean that the relief could not extend beyond the association. But, if a court entered “[a]n injunction that bars a defendant from enforcing a law or regulation against the specific party before the court—the associational plaintiff—[it would] not satisfy Article III because it w[ould] not redress an injury.” *Association of American Physicians & Surgeons*, 13 F. 4th, at 540 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our precedents have provided a workaround for this obvious remedial problem through the invention of the so-called “universal injunction.” Universal injunctions typically “prohibit the Government from enforcing a policy with respect to anyone.” *Trump*, 585 U. S., at 713, n. 1 (Thomas, J., concurring). By providing relief beyond the parties to the case, this remedy is “legally and historically dubious.” *Id.*, at 721; see also *Labrador v. Poe*, 601 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 921 400 (2024) (slip op., at 4-5) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in grant of stay). It seems no coincidence that associational standing’s “emergence in the 1960s overlaps with the emergence of [this] remedial phenomenon” of a similarly questionable nature. *Association of American Physicians & Surgeons*, 13 F. 4th, at 541. Because no party should be permitted to obtain an injunction in favor of nonparties, I have difficulty seeing why an association should be permitted to do so for its members. Associational standing thus seems to distort our traditional understanding of the judicial power.

In addition to these Article III concerns, there is tension between associational standing and other areas of law. First, the availability of associational standing subverts the class-action mechanism. A class action allows a named plaintiff to represent others with similar injuries, but it is subject to the many requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Associational standing achieves that same end goal: One lawsuit can provide relief to a large group of people. “As compared to a class action,” however, associational standing seems to require “show[ing] an injury to only a single member,” and the association “need not show that litigation by representation is superior to individual litigation.” 13A C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, *Federal Practice and Procedure* §3531.9.5, pp. 879-880 (3d ed., Supp. 2023); see also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a). Associational standing thus allows a party to effectively bring a class action without satisfying any of the ordinary requirements. Second, associational standing creates the possibility of asymmetrical preclusion. The basic idea behind preclusion is that a party gets only one bite at the apple. If a party litigates and loses an issue or claim,

it can be barred from reasserting that same issue or claim in another suit. In general, preclusion prevents the relitigation of claims or issues only by a party to a previous action, and we have been careful to limit the exceptions to that rule. See *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S.880, 892-893 (2008). In the context of associational standing, the general rule would mean that preclusion applies only to the association, even though the purpose of the association’s suit is to assert the injuries of its members. But, if the association loses, it is not clear whether the adverse judgment would bind the members. See *Automobile Workers v. Brock*, 477 U.S. 274, 290 (1986) (suggesting that, if an association fails to adequately represent its members, “a judgment won against it might not preclude subsequent claims by the association’s members without offending due process principles”). Associational standing might allow a member two bites at the apple—after an association’s claims are rejected, the underlying members might be able to assert the exact same issues or claims in a suit in their own names.

In short, our associational-standing doctrine appears to create serious problems, both constitutional and otherwise.

II

I am particularly doubtful of associational-standing doctrine because the Court has never attempted to reconcile it with the traditional understanding of the judicial power. Instead, the Court departed from that traditional understanding without explanation, seemingly by accident. To date, the Court has provided only practical reasons for its doctrine.

For over a century and a half, the Court did not have a separate standing doctrine for associations. As far as I can tell, the Court did not expressly contemplate such a doctrine until the late 1950s. In *NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson*, 357 U.S.449 (1958), the Court permitted an association to assert the constitutional rights of its members to prevent the disclosure of its membership lists. While the Court allowed the NAACP to raise a challenge on behalf of its members, it also acknowledged that the NAACP had arguably faced an injury of its own. The Court, however, soon discarded any notion that an association needed to have its own injury, creating our modern associational-standing doctrine. In *National Motor Freight Traffic Assn., Inc. v. United States*, 372 U.S.246 (1963) (per curiam), the Court suggested that an uninjured industry group had standing to challenge a tariff schedule on behalf of its members. The Court offered no explanation for how that theory of standing comported with the traditional understanding of the judicial power. In fact, the Court’s entire analysis consisted of a one-paragraph order denying rehearing. Since then, however, the Court has parroted that “[e]ven in the absence of injury to itself, an association may have standing solely as the representative of its members.” *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S.490, 511 (1975) (emphasis added; citing *National Motor Freight Traffic Assn.*, 372 U.S.246); see also, e.g., *Automobile Workers*, 477 U. S., at 281. The Court has gone so far as to hold that a state agency—not a membership organization at all—had associational standing to “asser[t] the claims of the Washington apple growers and dealers who form its constituency.” *Hunt*, 432 U. S., at 344.

Despite its continued reliance on associational standing, the Court has yet to explain how the doctrine comports with Article III. When once asked to “reconsider and reject the principles of associational standing” in favor of the class-action mechanism, the Court

justified the doctrine solely by reference to its “special features, advantageous both to the individuals represented and to the judicial system as a whole.” *Automobile Workers*, 477 U. S., at 288-289. Those “special features” included an association’s “pre-existing reservoir of expertise and capital,” and the fact that people often join an association “to create an effective vehicle for vindicating interests that they share with others.” But, considerations of practical judicial policy cannot overcome the Constitution’s mandates. The lack of any identifiable justification further suggests that the Court should reconsider its associational-standing doctrine.

No party challenges our associational-standing doctrine today. That is understandable; the Court consistently applies the doctrine, discussing only the finer points of its operation. See, e.g., *Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College*, 600 U.S.181, 199-201 (2023). In this suit, rejecting our associational-standing doctrine is not necessary to conclude that the plaintiffs lack standing. In an appropriate case, however, the Court should address whether associational standing can be squared with Article III’s requirement that courts respect the bounds of their judicial power.

Garland v. Cargill
144 S. Ct. 1613 (2024)

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Congress has long restricted access to “machinegun[s],” a category of firearms defined by the ability to “shoot, automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U.S.C. §5845(b); see also 18 U.S.C. §922(o). Semiautomatic firearms, which require shooters to reengage the trigger for every shot, are not machineguns. This case asks whether a bump stock—an accessory for a semiautomatic rifle that allows the shooter to rapidly reengage the trigger (and therefore achieve a high rate of fire)—converts the rifle into a “machinegun.” We hold that it does not and therefore affirm.

I
A

Under the National Firearms Act of 1934, a “machinegun” is “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b). The statutory definition also includes “any part designed and intended . . . for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun.” *Ibid.* With a machinegun, a shooter can fire multiple times, or even continuously, by engaging the trigger only once. This capability distinguishes a machinegun from a semiautomatic firearm. With a semiautomatic firearm, the shooter can fire only one time by engaging the trigger. The shooter must release and reengage the trigger to fire another shot. Machineguns can ordinarily achieve higher rates of fire than semiautomatic firearms because the shooter does not need to release and reengage the trigger between shots.

Shooters have devised techniques for firing semiautomatic firearms at rates approaching those of some machineguns. One technique is called bump firing. A shooter who bump fires a rifle uses the firearm’s recoil to help rapidly manipulate the trigger. The shooter allows the recoil from one shot to push the whole firearm backward. As the rifle slides back and away from the shooter’s stationary trigger finger, the trigger is released and reset for the next shot. Simultaneously, the shooter uses his nontrigger hand to maintain forward pressure on the rifle’s front grip. The forward pressure counteracts the recoil and causes the firearm (and thus the trigger) to move forward and “bump” into the shooter’s trigger finger. This bump reengages the trigger and causes another shot to fire, and so on.

Bump firing is a balancing act. The shooter must maintain enough forward pressure to ensure that he will bump the trigger with sufficient force to engage it. But, if the shooter applies too much forward pressure, the rifle will not slide back far enough to allow the trigger to reset. The right balance produces a reciprocating motion that permits the shooter to repeatedly engage and release the trigger in rapid succession.

Although bump firing does not require any additional equipment, there are accessories designed to make the technique easier. A “bump stock” is one such accessory. It replaces a semiautomatic rifle’s stock (the back part of the rifle that rests against the shooter’s shoulder) with a plastic casing that allows every other part of the rifle to slide back and forth. This casing helps manage the back-and-forth motion required for bump firing. A

bump stock also has a ledge to keep the shooter's trigger finger stationary. A bump stock does not alter the basic mechanics of bump firing. As with any semiautomatic firearm, the trigger still must be released and reengaged to fire each additional shot.

B

The question in this case is whether a bump stock transforms a semiautomatic rifle into a “machinegun,” as defined by §5845(b). For many years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) took the position that semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks were not machineguns under the statute. On more than 10 separate occasions over several administrations, ATF consistently concluded that rifles equipped with bump stocks cannot “automatically” fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” In April 2017, for example, ATF explained that a rifle equipped with a bump stock does not “operat[e] automatically” because “forward pressure must be applied with the support hand to the forward handguard.” And, because the shooter slides the rifle forward in the stock “to fire each shot, each succeeding shot fir[es] with a single trigger function.”

ATF abruptly reversed course in response to a mass shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada. In October 2017, a gunman fired on a crowd attending an outdoor music festival in Las Vegas, killing 58 people and wounding over 500 more. The gunman equipped his weapons with bump stocks, which allowed him to fire hundreds of rounds in a matter of minutes.

This tragedy created tremendous political pressure to outlaw bump stocks nationwide. Within days, Members of Congress proposed bills to ban bump stocks and other devices “designed . . . to accelerate the rate of fire of a semiautomatic rifle.” S. 1916, 115th Cong., 1st Sess., §2 (2017). *** While the first wave of bills was pending, ATF began considering whether to reinterpret §5845(b)'s definition of “machinegun” to include bump stocks. It proposed a rule that would amend its regulations to “clarify” that bump stocks are machineguns. 83 Fed. Reg. 13442 (2018). ATF's about-face drew criticism from some observers, including those who agreed that bump stocks should be banned. Senator Dianne Feinstein, for example, warned that ATF lacked statutory authority to prohibit bump stocks, explaining that the proposed regulation “hinge[d] on a dubious analysis” and that the “gun lobby and manufacturers [would] have a field day with [ATF's] reasoning” in court. Statement on Regulation To Ban Bump Stocks (Mar. 23, 2018). She asserted that “legislation is the only way to ban bump stocks.”

ATF issued its final Rule in 2018. 83 Fed. Reg. 66514. The agency's earlier regulations simply restated §5845(b)'s statutory definition. *Ibid.* The final Rule amended those regulations by adding the following language:

“[T]he term ‘automatically’ as it modifies ‘shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot,’ means functioning as the result of a self-acting or self-regulating mechanism that allows the firing of multiple rounds through a single function of the trigger; and ‘single function of the trigger’ means a single pull of the trigger and analogous motions. The term ‘machinegun’ includes a bump-stock-type device, i.e., a device that allows a semi-automatic firearm to shoot more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger by harnessing the recoil energy of the semi-automatic firearm to which it is affixed so that the

trigger resets and continues firing without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.”

The final Rule also repudiated ATF’s previous guidance that bump stocks did not qualify as “machineguns” under §5845(b). And, it ordered owners of bump stocks to destroy them or surrender them to ATF within 90 days. Bump-stock owners who failed to comply would be subject to criminal prosecution. *Id.*, at 66525; see also 18 U.S.C. §922(o)(1).

C

Michael Cargill surrendered two bump stocks to ATF under protest. He then filed suit to challenge the final Rule, asserting a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act. As relevant, Cargill alleged that ATF lacked statutory authority to promulgate the final Rule because bump stocks are not “machinegun[s]” as defined in §5845(b). After a bench trial, the District Court entered judgment for ATF. The court concluded that “a bump stock fits the statutory definition of a ‘machinegun.’”

The Court of Appeals initially affirmed, but later reversed after rehearing en banc. A majority agreed, at a minimum, that §5845(b) is ambiguous as to whether a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock fits the statutory definition of a machinegun. And, the majority concluded that the rule of lenity required resolving that ambiguity in Cargill’s favor. An eight-judge plurality determined that the statutory definition of “machinegun” unambiguously excludes such weapons. A semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock, the plurality reasoned, fires only one shot “each time the trigger ‘acts,’” and so does not fire “more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger,” §5845(b). The plurality also concluded that a bump stock does not enable a semiautomatic rifle to fire more than one shot “automatically” because the shooter must “maintain manual, forward pressure on the barrel.”

We granted certiorari to address a split among the Courts of Appeals regarding whether bump stocks meet §5845(b)’s definition of “machinegun.” We now affirm.

II

Section 5845(b) defines a “machinegun” as any weapon capable of firing “automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” We hold that a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not a “machinegun” because it cannot fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” And, even if it could, it would not do so “automatically.” ATF therefore exceeded its statutory authority by issuing a Rule that classifies bump stocks as machineguns.

A

A semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock does not fire more than one shot “by a single function of the trigger.” With or without a bump stock, a shooter must release and reset the trigger between every shot. And, any subsequent shot fired after the trigger has been released and reset is the result of a separate and distinct “function of the trigger.” All that a bump stock does is accelerate the rate of fire by causing these distinct “function[s]” of the trigger to occur in rapid succession.

As always, we start with the statutory text, which refers to “a single function of the trigger.” The “function” of an object is “the mode of action by which it fulfils its purpose.” 4

Oxford English Dictionary 602 (1933); see also American Heritage Dictionary 533 (1969) (“The natural or proper action for which a . . . mechanism . . . is fitted or employed”). And, a “trigger” is an apparatus, such as a “movable catch or lever,” that “sets some force or mechanism in action.” 11 Oxford English Dictionary, at 357; see also American Heritage Dictionary, at 1371 (“The lever pressed by the finger to discharge a firearm” or “[a]ny similar device used to release or activate a mechanism”)**; Webster’s New International Dictionary 2711 (2d ed. 1934) (“A piece, as a lever, connected with a catch or detent as a means of releasing it; specif., Firearms, the part of a lock moved by the finger to release the cock in firing”). The phrase “function of the trigger” thus refers to the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism. For most firearms, including the ones at issue here, the trigger is a curved metal lever. On weapons with these standard trigger mechanisms, the phrase “function of the trigger” means the physical trigger movement required to shoot the firearm.

No one disputes that a semiautomatic rifle without a bump stock is not a machinegun because it fires only one shot per “function of the trigger.” That is, engaging the trigger a single time will cause the firing mechanism to discharge only one shot. To understand why, it is helpful to consider the mechanics of the firing cycle for a semiautomatic rifle. Because the statutory definition is keyed to a “function of the trigger,” only the trigger assembly is relevant for our purposes. Although trigger assemblies for semiautomatic rifles vary, the basic mechanics are generally the same. ***

ATF does not dispute that th[e] complete process is what constitutes a “single function of the trigger.” A shooter may fire the weapon again after the trigger has reset, but only by engaging the trigger a second time and thereby initiating a new firing cycle. For each shot, the shooter must engage the trigger and then release the trigger to allow it to reset. Any additional shot fired after one cycle is the result of a separate and distinct “function of the trigger.”

Nothing changes when a semiautomatic rifle is equipped with a bump stock. The firing cycle remains the same. Between every shot, the shooter must release pressure from the trigger and allow it to reset before reengaging the trigger for another shot. A bump stock merely reduces the amount of time that elapses between separate “functions” of the trigger. The bump stock makes it easier for the shooter to move the firearm back toward his shoulder and thereby release pressure from the trigger and reset it. And, it helps the shooter press the trigger against his finger very quickly thereafter. A bump stock does not convert a semiautomatic rifle into a machinegun any more than a shooter with a lightning-fast trigger finger does. Even with a bump stock, a semiautomatic rifle will fire only one shot for every “function of the trigger.” So, a bump stock cannot qualify as a machinegun under §5845(b)’s definition.

Although ATF agrees on a semiautomatic rifle’s mechanics, it nevertheless insists that a bump stock allows a semiautomatic rifle to fire multiple shots “by a single function of the trigger.” ATF starts by interpreting the phrase “single function of the trigger” to mean “a single pull of the trigger and analogous motions.” 83 Fed. Reg. 66553. A shooter using a bump stock, it asserts, must pull the trigger only one time to initiate a bump-firing sequence of multiple shots. This initial trigger pull sets off a sequence—fire, recoil, bump, fire—that allows the weapon to continue firing “without additional physical manipulation of the trigger by the shooter.” According to ATF, all the shooter must do is keep his trigger finger stationary

on the bump stock's ledge and maintain constant forward pressure on the front grip to continue firing. The dissent offers similar reasoning. *** This argument rests on the mistaken premise that there is a difference between a shooter flexing his finger to pull the trigger and a shooter pushing the firearm forward to bump the trigger against his stationary finger. ATF and the dissent seek to call the shooter's initial trigger pull a "function of the trigger" while ignoring the subsequent "bumps" of the shooter's finger against the trigger before every additional shot. But, §5845(b) does not define a machinegun based on what type of human input engages the trigger—whether it be a pull, bump, or something else. Nor does it define a machinegun based on whether the shooter has assistance engaging the trigger. The statutory definition instead hinges on how many shots discharge when the shooter engages the trigger. And, as we have explained, a semiautomatic rifle will fire only one shot each time the shooter engages the trigger—with or without a bump stock. ***

We conclude that a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not a "machinegun" because it does not fire more than one shot "by a single function of the trigger."

B

A bump stock is not a "machinegun" for another reason: Even if a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock could fire more than one shot "by a single function of the trigger," it would not do so "automatically." Section 5845(b) asks whether a weapon "shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger." The statute thus specifies the precise action that must "automatically" cause a weapon to fire "more than one shot"—a "single function of the trigger."

If something more than a "single function of the trigger" is required to fire multiple shots, the weapon does not satisfy the statutory definition. Firing multiple shots using a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock requires more than a single function of the trigger. A shooter must also actively maintain just the right amount of forward pressure on the rifle's front grip with his nontrigger hand. Too much forward pressure and the rifle will not slide back far enough to release and reset the trigger, preventing the rifle from firing another shot. Too little pressure and the trigger will not bump the shooter's trigger finger with sufficient force to fire another shot. Without this ongoing manual input, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock will not fire multiple shots. Thus, firing multiple shots requires engaging the trigger one time—and then some.

ATF and the dissent counter that machineguns also require continuous manual input from a shooter: He must both engage the trigger and keep it pressed down to continue shooting. In their view, there is no meaningful difference between holding down the trigger of a traditional machinegun and maintaining forward pressure on the front grip of a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock. This argument ignores that Congress defined a machinegun by what happens "automatically" "by a single function of the trigger." Simply pressing and holding the trigger down on a fully automatic rifle is not manual input in addition to a trigger's function—it is what causes the trigger to function in the first place. By contrast, pushing forward on the front grip of a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock is not part of functioning the trigger. After all, pushing on the front grip will not cause the weapon to fire unless the shooter also engages the trigger with his other hand. Thus, while a fully automatic rifle fires multiple rounds "automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger," a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock can achieve the same result only by a single function of the trigger and then some.

Moreover, a semiautomatic rifle with a bump stock is indistinguishable from another weapon that ATF concedes cannot fire multiple shots “automatically”: the Ithaca Model 37 shotgun. The Model 37 allows the user to “slam fire”—that is, fire multiple shots by holding down the trigger while operating the shotgun’s pump action. Each pump ejects the spent cartridge and loads a new one into the chamber. If the shooter is holding down the trigger, the new cartridge will fire as soon as it is loaded. According to ATF, the Model 37 fires more than one shot by a single function of the trigger, but it does not do so “automatically” because the shooter must manually operate the pump action with his nontrigger hand. See 83 Fed. Reg. 66534. That logic mandates the same result here. Maintaining the proper amount of forward pressure on the front grip of a bump-stock equipped rifle is no less additional input than is operating the pump action on the Model 37.8

ATF responds that a shooter is less physically involved with operating a bump-stock equipped rifle than operating the Model 37’s pump action. Once the shooter pulls the rifle’s trigger a single time, the bump stock “harnesses the firearm’s recoil energy in a continuous back-and-forth cycle that allows the shooter to attain continuous firing.” But, even if one aspect of a weapon’s operation could be seen as “automatic,” that would not mean the weapon “shoots . . . automatically more than one shot . . . by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b) (emphasis added). After all, many weapons have some “automatic” features. For example, semiautomatic rifles eject the spent cartridge from the firearm’s chamber and load a new one in its place without any input from the shooter. A semiautomatic rifle is therefore “automatic” in the general sense that it performs some operations that would otherwise need to be completed by hand. But, as all agree, a semiautomatic rifle cannot fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger” because the shooter must do more than simply engage the trigger one time. The same is true of a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock.

Thus, even if a semiautomatic rifle could fire more than one shot by a single function of the trigger, it would not do so “automatically.”

C

Abandoning the text, ATF and the dissent attempt to shore up their position by relying on the presumption against ineffectiveness. That presumption weighs against interpretations of a statute that would “rende[r] the law in a great measure nugatory, and enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy manner.” *The Emily*, 22 U.S. 381 (1824). It is a modest corollary to the commonsense proposition “that Congress presumably does not enact useless laws.” *United States v. Castleman*, 572 U.S.157, 178, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 188 L. Ed. 2d 426 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).

In ATF’s view, Congress “restricted machineguns because they eliminate the manual movements that a shooter would otherwise need to make in order to fire continuously” at a high rate of fire, as bump stocks do. So, ATF reasons, concluding that bump stocks are lawful “simply because the [trigger] moves back and forth . . . would exalt artifice above reality and enable evasion of the federal machinegun ban.” The dissent endorses a similar view.

The presumption against ineffectiveness cannot do the work that ATF and the dissent ask of it. A law is not useless merely because it draws a line more narrowly than one of its conceivable statutory purposes might suggest. Interpreting §5845(b) to exclude semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks comes nowhere close to making it useless.

Under our reading, §5845(b) still regulates all traditional machineguns. The fact that it does not capture other weapons capable of a high rate of fire plainly does not render the law useless. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how ATF can plausibly argue otherwise, given that its consistent position for almost a decade in numerous separate decisions was that §5845(b) does not capture semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks. ***

The dissent’s additional argument for applying the presumption against ineffectiveness fails on its own terms. To argue that our interpretation makes §5845(b) “far less effective,” the dissent highlights that a shooter with a bump-stock-equipped rifle can achieve a rate of fire that rivals traditional machineguns. But, the dissent elsewhere acknowledges that a shooter can do the same with an unmodified semiautomatic rifle using the manual bump-firing technique. The dissent thus fails to prove that our reading makes §5845(b) “far less effective,” much less ineffective (as is required to invoke the presumption). In any event, Congress could have linked the definition of “machinegun” to a weapon’s rate of fire, as the dissent would prefer. But, it instead enacted a statute that turns on whether a weapon can fire more than one shot “automatically . . . by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b). And, “it is never our job to rewrite . . . statutory text under the banner of speculation about what Congress might have done.” *Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc.*, 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017). ***

Justice ALITO, concurring.

I join the opinion of the Court because there is simply no other way to read the statutory language. There can be little doubt that the Congress that enacted 26 U.S.C. §5845(b) would not have seen any material difference between a machinegun and a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a bump stock. But the statutory text is clear, and we must follow it. ***

There is a simple remedy for the disparate treatment of bump stocks and machineguns. Congress can amend the law—and perhaps would have done so already if ATF had stuck with its earlier interpretation. Now that the situation is clear, Congress can act.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

Congress has sharply restricted civilian ownership of machineguns since 1934. Federal law defines a “machinegun” as a weapon that can shoot “automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” 26 U.S.C. §5845(b). Shortly after the Las Vegas massacre, the Trump administration, with widespread bipartisan support, banned bump stocks as machineguns under the statute.

Today, the Court puts bump stocks back in civilian hands. To do so, it casts aside Congress’s definition of “machinegun” and seizes upon one that is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the statutory text and unsupported by context or purpose. When I see a bird that walks like a duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, I call that bird a duck. A bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle fires “automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b). Because I, like Congress, call that a machinegun, I respectfully dissent.

*** A machinegun does not fire itself. The important question under the statute is how a person can fire it. A weapon is a “machinegun” when a shooter can (1) “by a single function of the trigger,” (2) shoot “automatically more than one shot, without manually reloading.” 26 U.S.C. §5845(b). The plain language of that definition refers most obviously to a rifle like an M16, where a single pull of the trigger provides continuous fire as long as the shooter maintains backward pressure on the trigger. The definition of “machinegun” also includes “any part designed and intended . . . for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun.” That language naturally covers devices like bump stocks, which “conver[t]” semiautomatic rifles so that a single pull of the trigger provides continuous fire as long as the shooter maintains forward pressure on the gun.

This is not a hard case. All of the textual evidence points to the same interpretation. A bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle is a machinegun because (1) with a single pull of the trigger, a shooter can (2) fire continuous shots without any human input beyond maintaining forward pressure. The majority looks to the internal mechanism that initiates fire, rather than the human act of the shooter’s initial pull, to hold that a “single function of the trigger” means a reset of the trigger mechanism. *** Then, shifting focus from the internal mechanism of the gun to the perspective of the shooter, the majority holds that continuous forward pressure is too much human input for bump-stock-enabled continuous fire to be “automatic.”

The majority’s reading flies in the face of this Court’s standard tools of statutory interpretation. By casting aside the statute’s ordinary meaning both at the time of its enactment and today, the majority eviscerates Congress’s regulation of machineguns and enables gun users and manufacturers to circumvent federal law.

A

Start with the phrase “single function of the trigger.” All the tools of statutory interpretation, including dictionary definitions, evidence of contemporaneous usage, and this Court’s prior interpretation, point to that phrase meaning the initiation of the firing sequence by an act of the shooter, whether via a pull, push, or switch of the firing mechanism. The majority nevertheless interprets “function of the trigger” as “the mode of action by which the trigger activates the firing mechanism.” Because in a bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle, the trigger’s internal mechanism must reset each time a weapon fires, the majority reads each reset as a new “function.” That reading fixates on a firearm’s internal mechanics while ignoring the human act on the trigger referenced by the statute.

Consider the relevant dictionary definitions. In 1934, when Congress passed the National Firearms Act, “function” meant “the mode of action by which [something] fulfils its purpose.” 4 Oxford English Dictionary 602 (1933). A “trigger” meant the “movable catch or lever” that “sets some force or mechanism in action.” The majority agrees with those definitions. It errs, however, by maintaining a myopic focus on a trigger’s mechanics rather than on how a shooter uses a trigger to initiate fire.

Nothing about those definitions suggests that “function of the trigger” means the mechanism by which the trigger resets mechanically to fire a second shot. *** The most important “function” of a “trigger” is what it enables a shooter to do; what “force or mechanism” it sets “in action.” 11 Oxford English Dictionary, at 357. A “single function of the trigger” more naturally means a single initiation of the firing sequence. Regardless of what is

happening in the internal mechanics of a firearm, if a shooter must activate the trigger only a single time to initiate a firing sequence that will shoot “automatically more than one shot,” that firearm is a “machinegun.” §5845(b).

Evidence of contemporaneous usage overwhelmingly supports that interpretation. The term “function of the trigger” was proposed by the president of the National Rifle Association (NRA) during a hearing on the National Firearms Act before the House. See National Firearms Act: Hearings on H. R. 9066 before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 38-40 (1934). He understood the “distinguishing feature of a machine gun [to be] that by a single pull of the trigger the gun continues to fire.” He emphasized that a firearm “which is capable of firing more than one shot by a single pull of the trigger, a single function of the trigger, is properly regarded . . . as a machine gun.” *Ibid.* Distinguishing a machinegun from a pistol, the NRA president emphasized that for a pistol “[y]ou must release the trigger and pull it again for the second shot to be fired.” He did not say “the hammer slips off the disconnecter just as the square point of the trigger rises into the notch on the hammer . . . thereby reset[ting the trigger mechanism] to the original position.” He instead emphasized the action of the shooter, who must repeatedly activate the trigger for each shot. Predictably, the House and Senate Reports reflect the same understanding of the phrase. See H. R. Rep. No. 1780, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (reporting that the statute “contains the usual definition of machine gun as a weapon designed to shoot more than one shot without reloading and by a single pull of the trigger”); S. Rep. No. 1444, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1934) (same).

The majority cannot disregard these statements as evidence of legislative purpose. They are, along with contemporaneous dictionary definitions, some of the best evidence of contemporaneous understanding. ***

When a shooter initiates the firing sequence on a bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle, he does so with “a single function of the trigger” under that term’s ordinary meaning. Just as the shooter of an M16 need only pull the trigger and maintain backward pressure (on the trigger), a shooter of a bump-stock-equipped AR-15 need only pull the trigger and maintain forward pressure (on the gun). Both shooters pull the trigger only once to fire multiple shots. The only difference is that for an M16, the shooter’s backward pressure makes the rifle fire continuously because of an internal mechanism: The curved lever of the trigger does not move. In a bump-stock-equipped AR-15, the mechanism for continuous fire is external: The shooter’s forward pressure moves the curved lever back and forth against his stationary trigger finger. Both rifles require only one initial action (that is, one “single function of the trigger”) from the shooter combined with continuous pressure to activate continuous fire.

The majority resists this ordinary understanding of the term “function of the trigger” with two technical arguments. First, it attempts to contrast the action required to fire an M16 from that required to fire a bump-stock-equipped AR-15. The majority argues that “holding the trigger down on a fully automatic rifle is not manual input in addition to a trigger’s function—it is what causes the trigger to function in the first place” whereas “pushing on the front grip [of a bump-stock equipped semiautomatic rifle] will not cause the weapon to fire unless the shooter also engages the trigger with his other hand.” The shooter of a bump-stock-equipped AR-15, however, need not “pull” the trigger to fire. Instead, he need only place a finger on the finger rest and push forward on the front grip or barrel with his

other hand. Instead of pulling the trigger, the forward motion pushes the bump stock into his finger.

Second, the majority tries to cabin “single function of the trigger” to a single mechanism for activating continuous fire. A shooter can fire a bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle in two ways. First, he can choose to fire single shots via distinct pulls of the trigger without exerting any additional pressure. Second, he can fire continuously via maintaining constant forward pressure on the barrel or front grip. The majority holds that the forward pressure cannot constitute a “single function of the trigger” because a shooter can also fire single shots by pulling the trigger. That logic, however, would also exclude a Tommy Gun and an M16, the paradigmatic examples of regular machineguns in 1934 and today. Both weapons can fire either automatically or semiautomatically. A shooter using a Tommy Gun in automatic mode could choose to fire single shots with distinct pulls of the trigger, or continuous shots by maintaining constant backward pressure on the trigger. An M16 user can toggle the weapon from semiautomatic mode, which allows only one shot per pull of the trigger, to automatic mode, which enables continuous fire. See M16 Field Manual, Section III, p. 4-8. In 1934 as now, there is no commonsense difference between a firearm where a shooter must hold down a trigger or flip a switch to initiate rapid fire and one where a shooter must push on the front grip or barrel to do the same.***

B

Next, consider what makes a machinegun “automatic.” A bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle is a “machinegun” because with a “single function of the trigger” it “shoot[s], automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading.” §5845(b). Put simply, the bump stock automates the process of firing more than one shot. ***

When a shooter “bump” fires a semiautomatic weapon without a bump stock, he must control several things using his own strength and skill: (1) the backward recoil of each shot, including both the direction in which the rifle moves and how far it moves when recoiling; (2) the trigger finger, by maintaining a stationary position with a loose enough hold on the trigger that the rapidly moving gun will hit his finger each time; and (3) the forward motion of the rifle after it recoils backward. A bump stock automates those processes. The replacement stock controls the direction and distance of the recoil, and the finger rest obviates the need to maintain a stationary finger position. All a shooter must do is rest his finger and press forward on the front grip or barrel for the rifle to fire continuously.

The majority nevertheless concludes that a bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle requires too much human input to fire “automatic[ally]” because it requires the “proper amount of forward pressure on the front grip” to maintain continuous fire. “Automati[c],” however, does not mean zero human input. An M16 requires the shooter to exert the “proper amount of [backward] pressure on the” trigger to maintain continuous fire. *Ibid.* So, too, a machinegun that requires a user to hold down a button. Makers of automatic weapons may require continuous human input for safety purposes; an accidental trigger pull that activates rapid fire is less harmful if it does not require affirmative human action to stop. Requiring continuous pressure for continuous fire, however, does not prevent a firearm from “shoot[ing], automatically more than one shot.” §5845(b).

C

This Court has repeatedly avoided interpretations of a statute that would facilitate its ready “evasion” or “enable offenders to elude its provisions in the most easy manner.” *The Emily*, 22 U.S. 381 (1824); see also *Abramski v. United States*, 573 U.S. 169, 181-182 (2014) (declining to read a gun statute in a way that would permit ready “evasion,” “defeat the point” of the law, or “easily bypass the scheme”). Justice Scalia called this interpretive principle the “presumption against ineffectiveness.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, *Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts* 63 (2012). The majority arrogates Congress’s policymaking role to itself by allowing bump-stock users to circumvent Congress’s ban on weapons that shoot rapidly via a single action of the shooter. ***

Moreover, bump stocks are not the only devices that transform semiautomatic rifles into weapons capable of rapid fire with a single function of the trigger. Recognizing the creativity of gun owners and manufacturers, Congress wrote a statute “loaded with anticircumvention devices.” The definition of “machinegun” captures “any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger.” §5845(b). Not “more than four, five, or six shots,” not “single pull” or “single push” of the trigger. Following that definition, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) has reasonably classified many transformative devices other than bump stocks as “machinegun[s].” For instance, ATF has long classified “forced reset triggers” as machineguns. A forced reset trigger includes a device that forces the trigger back downward after the shooter’s initial pull, repeatedly pushing the curved lever against the shooter’s stationary trigger finger. To a shooter, a semiautomatic rifle equipped with a forced reset trigger feels much like an M16. He must pull the trigger only once and then maintain pressure to achieve continuous fire.

Gun owners themselves also have built motorized devices that will repeatedly pull a semiautomatic firearm’s curved lever to enable continuous fire. ATF has classified such devices as “machinegun[s]” since 1982. In 2003, the Fifth Circuit held that such a contraption qualified as a “machinegun” under the statute. See *United States v. Camp*, 343 F. 3d 743, 745. An owner of a semiautomatic rifle had placed a fishing reel inside the weapon’s trigger guard. When he pulled a switch behind the original trigger, the switch supplied power to a motor connected to the fishing reel. The motor caused the reel to rotate, and that rotation manipulated the curved lever, causing it to fire in rapid succession. ATF in 2017 also classified as a “machinegun” a wearable glove that a shooter could activate to initiate a mechanized piston moving back and forth, repeatedly pulling and releasing a semiautomatic rifle’s curved lever.

The majority tosses aside the presumption against ineffectiveness, claiming that its interpretation only “draws a line more narrowly than one of [Congress’s] conceivable statutory purposes might suggest” because the statute still regulates “all traditional machineguns” like M16s. Congress’s ban on M16s, however, is far less effective if a shooter can instead purchase a bump stock or construct a device that enables his AR-15 to fire at the same rate. ***

Every Member of the majority has previously emphasized that the best way to respect congressional intent is to adhere to the ordinary understanding of the terms Congress

uses.*** Today the majority forgets that principle and substitutes its own view of what constitutes a “machinegun” for Congress’s.

Congress’s definition of “machinegun” encompasses bump stocks just as naturally as M16s. Just like a person can shoot “automatically more than one shot” with an M16 through a “single function of the trigger” if he maintains continuous backward pressure on the trigger, he can do the same with a bump-stock-equipped semiautomatic rifle if he maintains forward pressure on the gun. §5845(b). Today’s decision to reject that ordinary understanding will have deadly consequences. The majority’s artificially narrow definition hamstring the Government’s efforts to keep machineguns from gunmen like the Las Vegas shooter. I respectfully dissent.

Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo
144 S. Ct. 2244 (2024)

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Since our decision in *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S.837 (1984), we have sometimes required courts to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer— even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. In these cases we consider whether that doctrine should be overruled.

I

Our *Chevron* doctrine requires courts to use a two-step framework to interpret statutes administered by federal agencies. After determining that a case satisfies the various preconditions we have set for *Chevron* to apply, a reviewing court must first assess “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” If, and only if, congressional intent is “clear,” that is the end of the inquiry. But if the court determines that “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue” at hand, the court must, at *Chevron*’s second step, defer to the agency’s interpretation if it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” The reviewing courts in each of the cases before us applied *Chevron*’s framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges to the same agency rule.

A

Before 1976, unregulated foreign vessels dominated fishing in the international waters off the U.S.coast, which began just 12 nautical miles offshore. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 94-459, pp. 2-3 (1975). Recognizing the resultant overfishing and the need for sound management of fishery resources, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA). See 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.). The MSA and subsequent amendments extended the jurisdiction of the United States to 200 nautical miles beyond the U.S.territorial sea and claimed “exclusive fishery management authority over all fish” within that area, known as the “exclusive economic zone.” § 1811(a); see Presidential Proclamation No. 5030, 3 CFR 22 (1983 Comp.); §§ 101, 102, 90 Stat. 336. The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) administers the MSA under a delegation from the Secretary of Commerce.

The MSA established eight regional fishery management councils composed of representatives from the coastal States, fishery stakeholders, and NMFS. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a), (b). The councils develop fishery management plans, which NMFS approves and promulgates as final regulations. See §§ 1852(h), 1854(a). In service of the statute’s fishery conservation and management goals, see § 1851(a), the MSA requires that certain provisions—such as “a mechanism for specifying annual catch limits . . . at a level such that overfishing does not occur,” § 1853(a)(15)—be included in these plans, see § 1853(a). The plans may also include additional discretionary provisions. See § 1853(b). For example, plans may “prohibit, limit, condition, or require the use of specified types and quantities of fishing gear, fishing vessels, or equipment,” § 1853(b)(4); “reserve a portion of the allowable biological catch of the fishery for use in scientific research,” § 1853(b)(11); and “prescribe such other measures, requirements, or conditions and restrictions as are determined to be necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the fishery,” § 1853(b)(14).

Relevant here, a plan may also require that “one or more observers be carried on board” domestic vessels “for the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation and management of the fishery.” § 1853(b)(8). The MSA specifies three groups that must cover costs associated with observers: (1) foreign fishing vessels operating within the exclusive economic zone (which must carry observers), see §§ 1821(h)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6); (2) vessels participating in certain limited access privilege programs, which impose quotas permitting fishermen to harvest only specific quantities of a fishery’s total allowable catch, see §§ 1802(26), 1853a(c)(1)(H), (e)(2), 1854(d)(2); and (3) vessels within the jurisdiction of the North Pacific Council, where many of the largest and most successful commercial fishing enterprises in the Nation operate, see § 1862(a). In the latter two cases, the MSA expressly caps the relevant fees at two or three percent of the value of fish harvested on the vessels. See §§ 1854(d)(2)(B), 1862(b)(2)(E). And in general, it authorizes the Secretary to impose “sanctions” when “any payment required for observer services provided to or contracted by an owner or operator . . . has not been paid.” § 1858(g)(1)(D).

The MSA does not contain similar terms addressing whether Atlantic herring fishermen may be required to bear costs associated with any observers a plan may mandate. And at one point, NMFS fully funded the observer coverage the New England Fishery Management Council required in its plan for the Atlantic herring fishery. In 2013, however, the council proposed amending its fishery management plans to empower it to require fishermen to pay for observers if federal funding became unavailable. Several years later, NMFS promulgated a rule approving the amendment. See 85 Fed. Reg. 7414 (2020).

With respect to the Atlantic herring fishery, the Rule created an industry funded program that aims to ensure observer coverage on 50 percent of trips undertaken by vessels with certain types of permits. Under that program, vessel representatives must “declare into” a fishery before beginning a trip by notifying NMFS of the trip and announcing the species the vessel intends to harvest. If NMFS determines that an observer is required, but declines to assign a Government-paid one, the vessel must contract with and pay for a Government-certified third-party observer. NMFS estimated that the cost of such an observer would be up to \$710 per day, reducing annual returns to the vessel owner by up to 20 percent.

B

Petitioners Loper Bright Enterprises, Inc., H&L Axelsson, Inc., Lund Marr Trawlers LLC, and Scombus One LLC are family businesses that operate in the Atlantic herring fishery. In February 2020, they challenged the Rule under the MSA, 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f), which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551 *et seq.* In relevant part, they argued that the MSA does not authorize NMFS to mandate that they pay for observers required by a fishery management plan. The District Court granted summary judgment to the Government. It concluded that the MSA authorized the Rule, but noted that even if these petitioners’ arguments were enough to raise an ambiguity in the statutory text, “deference to the agency’s interpretation would be warranted under *Chevron*.”

A divided panel of the D. C. Circuit affirmed. See 45 F. 4th 359 (2022). The majority addressed various provisions of the MSA and concluded that it was not “wholly unambiguous” whether NMFS may require Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for observers. Because there remained “some question” as to Congress’s intent, the court proceeded to *Chevron*’s second step and deferred to the agency’s interpretation as a “reasonable” construction of the MSA. In dissent, Judge Walker concluded that Congress’s silence on industry funded observers for

the Atlantic herring fishery—coupled with the express provision for such observers in other fisheries and on foreign vessels—unambiguously indicated that NMFS lacked the authority to “require [Atlantic herring] fishermen to pay the wages of at-sea monitors.”

C

Petitioners Relentless Inc., Huntress Inc., and Seafreeze Fleet LLC own two vessels that operate in the Atlantic herring fishery: the F/V Relentless and the F/V Persistence. [The district court rejected their parallel challenge to the Rule and the First Circuit affirmed, relying on *Chevron*.]

II

A

Article III of the Constitution assigns to the Federal Judiciary the responsibility and power to adjudicate “Cases” and “Controversies”—concrete disputes with consequences for the parties involved. The Framers appreciated that the laws judges would necessarily apply in resolving those disputes would not always be clear. Cognizant of the limits of human language and foresight, they anticipated that “[a]ll new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,” would be “more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning” was settled “by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.” The Federalist No. 37, p. 236 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison).

The Framers also envisioned that the final “interpretation of the laws” would be “the proper and peculiar province of the courts.” *Id.*, No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton). Unlike the political branches, the courts would by design exercise “neither Force nor Will, but merely judgment.” To ensure the “steady, upright and impartial administration of the laws,” the Framers structured the Constitution to allow judges to exercise that judgment independent of influence from the political branches. ***

The Court also recognized from the outset, though, that exercising independent judgment often included according due respect to Executive Branch interpretations of federal statutes. For example, in *Edwards’ Lessee v. Darby*, 12 Wheat. 206 (1827), the Court explained that “[i]n the construction of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”

Such respect was thought especially warranted when an Executive Branch interpretation was issued roughly contemporaneously with enactment of the statute and remained consistent over time. *** “Respect,” though, was just that. The views of the Executive Branch could inform the judgment of the Judiciary, but did not supersede it.

B

*** During [the New Deal], the Court often treated agency determinations of *fact* as binding on the courts, provided that there was “evidence to support the findings.” *St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States*, 298 U.S.38, 51 (1936). “When the legislature itself acts within the broad field of legislative discretion,” the Court reasoned, “its determinations are conclusive.” Congress could therefore “appoint[] an agent to act within that sphere of legislative authority” and “endow the agent with power to make *findings of fact* which are conclusive, provided the requirements of due process which are specially applicable to such

an agency are met, as in according a fair hearing and acting upon evidence and not arbitrarily.” *Ibid.* (emphasis added).

But the Court did not extend similar deference to agency resolutions of questions of law. *** Perhaps most notably along those lines, in *Skidmore v. Swift & Co.*, 323 U.S.134 (1944), the Court explained that the “interpretations and opinions” of the relevant agency, “made in pursuance of official duty” and “based upon . . . specialized experience,” “constitute[d] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants [could] properly resort for guidance,” even on legal questions. “The weight of such a judgment in a particular case,” the Court observed, would “depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” ***

C

Congress in 1946 enacted the APA “as a check upon administrators whose zeal might otherwise have carried them to excesses not contemplated in legislation creating their offices.” Morton Salt, 338 U. S., at 644. It was the culmination of a “comprehensive rethinking of the place of administrative agencies in a regime of separate and divided powers.” *Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians*, 476 U.S.667, 670-671 (1986).

In addition to prescribing procedures for agency action, the APA delineates the basic contours of judicial review of such action. As relevant here, Section 706 directs that “[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706. It further requires courts to “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law.” § 706(2)(A).

The APA thus codifies for agency cases the unremarkable, yet elemental proposition reflected by judicial practice dating back to *Marbury*: that courts decide legal questions by applying their own judgment. It specifies that courts, not agencies, will decide “*all* relevant questions of law” arising on review of agency action, § 706 (emphasis added)— even those involving ambiguous laws—and set aside any such action inconsistent with the law as they interpret it. And it prescribes no deferential standard for courts to employ in answering those legal questions. That omission is telling, because Section 706 *does* mandate that judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential. See § 706(2)(A) (agency action to be set aside if “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”); § 706(2)(E) (agency factfinding in formal proceedings to be set aside if “unsupported by substantial evidence”). *** Professor Louis Jaffe, who had served in several agencies at the advent of the New Deal, thought that § 706 leaves it up to the reviewing “court” to “decide as a ‘question of law’ whether there is ‘discretion’ in the premises”—that is, whether the statute at issue delegates particular discretionary authority to an agency. *Judicial Control of Administrative Action* 570 (1965). ***

In a case involving an agency, of course, the statute’s meaning may well be that the agency is authorized to exercise a degree of discretion. Congress has often enacted such statutes. For example, some statutes “expressly delegate[]” to an agency the authority to

give meaning to a particular statutory term. *Batterton v. Francis*, 432 U.S.416, 425 (1977) (emphasis deleted). Others empower an agency to prescribe rules to “fill up the details” of a statutory scheme, *Wayman v. Southard*, 10 Wheat. 1, 43 (1825), or to regulate subject to the limits imposed by a term or phrase that “leaves agencies with flexibility,” *Michigan v. EPA*, 576 U.S.743, 752 (2015), such as “appropriate” or “reasonable.”

When the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court under the APA is, as always, to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional limits. The court fulfills that role by recognizing constitutional delegations, “fix[ing] the boundaries of [the] delegated authority,” H. Monaghan, *Marbury and the Administrative State*, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 27 (1983), and ensuring the agency has engaged in “reasoned decisionmaking” within those boundaries, *Michigan*, 576 U. S., at 750 (quoting *Allentown Mack Sales & Service, Inc. v. NLRB*, 522 U.S.359, 374 (1998)); see also *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S.29 (1983). By doing so, a court upholds the traditional conception of the judicial function that the APA adopts.

III ***

A

[*Chevron* and subsequent cases establish] “a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” ***

B ***

Chevron defies the command of the APA that “the reviewing court”—not the agency whose action it reviews—is to “decide *all* relevant questions of law” and “interpret . . . statutory provisions.” § 706 (emphasis added). It requires a court to ignore, not follow, “the reading the court would have reached” had it exercised its independent judgment as required by the APA. *Chevron*, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11. And although exercising independent judgment is consistent with the “respect” historically given to Executive Branch interpretations, *Chevron* insists on much more. It demands that courts mechanically afford binding deference to agency interpretations, including those that have been inconsistent over time. Still worse, it forces courts to do so even when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds that the statute means something else—unless the prior court happened to also say that the statute is “unambiguous.” *National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X Internet Services*, 545 U.S.967, 982 (2005). That regime is the antithesis of the time honored approach the APA prescribes. In fretting over the prospect of “allow[ing]” a judicial interpretation of a statute “to override an agency’s” in a dispute before a court, *Chevron* turns the statutory scheme for judicial review of agency action upside down.

Chevron cannot be reconciled with the APA, as the Government and the dissent contend, by presuming that statutory ambiguities are implicit delegations to agencies. Presumptions have their place in statutory interpretation, but only to the extent that they approximate reality. *Chevron*’s presumption does not, because “[a]n ambiguity is simply not a delegation of law-interpreting power. *Chevron* confuses the two.” C. Sunstein, *Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State*, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 405, 445 (1989). As *Chevron* itself noted,

ambiguities may result from an inability on the part of Congress to squarely answer the question at hand, or from a failure to even “consider the question” with the requisite precision. In neither case does an ambiguity necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency, as opposed to a court, resolve the resulting interpretive question. And many or perhaps most statutory ambiguities may be unintentional. ***

In an agency case as in any other, though, even if some judges might (or might not) consider the statute ambiguous, there is a best reading all the same—“the reading the court would have reached” if no agency were involved. *Chevron*, 467 U. S., at 843, n. 11. It therefore makes no sense to speak of a “permissible” interpretation that is not the one the court, after applying all relevant interpretive tools, concludes is best. In the business of statutory interpretation, if it is not the best, it is not permissible.

Perhaps most fundamentally, *Chevron*’s presumption is misguided because agencies have no special competence in resolving statutory ambiguities. Courts do. *** The very point of the traditional tools of statutory construction—the tools courts use every day—is to resolve statutory ambiguities. That is no less true when the ambiguity is about the scope of an agency’s own power—perhaps the occasion on which abdication in favor of the agency is least appropriate.

2

[E]ven when an ambiguity happens to implicate a technical matter, it does not follow that Congress has taken the power to authoritatively interpret the statute from the courts and given it to the agency. Congress expects courts to handle technical statutory questions. *** In an agency case in particular, the court will go about its task with the agency’s “body of experience and informed judgment,” among other information, at its disposal. *Skidmore*, 323 U. S., at 140. And although an agency’s interpretation of a statute “cannot bind a court,” it may be especially informative “to the extent it rests on factual premises within [the agency’s] expertise.” *Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms v. FLRA*, 464 U.S.89, 98, n. 8 (1983). Such expertise has always been one of the factors which may give an Executive Branch interpretation particular “power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” *Skidmore*, 323 U. S., at 140; see, e.g., *County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund*, 590 U.S.165, 180 (2020).

*** Nor does a desire for the uniform construction of federal law justify *Chevron*. Given inconsistencies in how judges apply *Chevron*, it is unclear how much the doctrine as a whole (as opposed to its highly deferential second step) actually promotes such uniformity. In any event, there is little value in imposing a uniform interpretation of a statute if that interpretation is wrong. We see no reason to presume that Congress prefers uniformity for uniformity’s sake over the correct interpretation of the laws it enacts.

The view that interpretation of ambiguous statutory provisions amounts to policymaking suited for political actors rather than courts is especially mistaken, for it rests on a profound misconception of the judicial role. It is reasonable to assume that Congress intends to leave policymaking to political actors. But resolution of statutory ambiguities involves legal interpretation. That task does not suddenly become policymaking just because a court has an “agency to fall back on.” ***

IV

The only question left is whether *stare decisis*, the doctrine governing judicial adherence to precedent, requires us to persist in the *Chevron* project. It does not. *Stare decisis* is not an “inexorable command,” *Payne v. Tennessee*, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991), and the *stare decisis* considerations most relevant here—“the quality of [the precedent’s] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, . . . and reliance on the decision,” *Knick v. Township of Scott*, 588 U.S.180, 203 (2019)—all weigh in favor of letting *Chevron* go.

*** The defining feature of [*Chevron*’s] framework is the identification of statutory ambiguity, which requires deference at the doctrine’s second step. But the concept of ambiguity has always evaded meaningful definition. ***

Because *Chevron* in its original, two-step form was so indeterminate and sweeping, we have instead been forced to clarify the doctrine again and again. Our attempts to do so have only added to *Chevron*’s unworkability, transforming the original two-step into a dizzying breakdance. ***

Nor has *Chevron* been the sort of “stable background’ rule” that fosters meaningful reliance. Given our constant tinkering with and eventual turn away from *Chevron*, and its inconsistent application by the lower courts, it instead is hard to see how anyone—Congress included—could reasonably expect a court to rely on *Chevron* in any particular case. ***

Chevron accordingly has undermined the very “rule of law” values that *stare decisis* exists to secure. *** [T]he only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” *Vasquez v. Hillery*, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986), is for us to leave *Chevron* behind.

By doing so, however, we do not call into question prior cases that relied on the *Chevron* framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of *Chevron* itself—are still subject to statutory *stare decisis* despite our change in interpretive methodology. See *CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries*, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008). Mere reliance on *Chevron* cannot constitute a “special justification” for overruling such a holding, because to say a precedent relied on *Chevron* is, at best, “just an argument that the precedent was wrongly decided.” *Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.*, 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014). That is not enough to justify overruling a statutory precedent. ***

Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry. And when a particular statute delegates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it. But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.

Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on *Chevron* in deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justice KAGAN, with whom JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR and JUSTICE JACKSON join,* dissenting.

*** Begin with the problem that gave rise to *Chevron* (and also to its older precursors): The regulatory statutes Congress passes often contain ambiguities and gaps. Sometimes they are intentional. Perhaps Congress “consciously desired” the administering agency to fill in aspects of the legislative scheme, believing that regulatory experts would be “in a better position” than legislators to do so. *Chevron*, 467 U.S., at 865. Or “perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side” of a question, and the contending parties “decided to take their chances with” the agency’s resolution. Sometimes, though, the gaps or ambiguities are what might be thought of as predictable accidents. They may be the result of sloppy drafting, a not infrequent legislative occurrence. Or they may arise from the wellknown limits of language or foresight. “The subject matter” of a statutory provision may be too “specialized and varying” to “capture in its every detail.” *Kisor v. Wilkie*, 588 U.S. 558, 566 (2019) (plurality opinion). Or the provision may give rise, years or decades down the road, to an issue the enacting Congress could not have anticipated. Whichever the case—whatever the reason—the result is to create uncertainty about some aspect of a provision’s meaning.

[The *Chevron*] framework “reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial branches.” *Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc.*, 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991). Where Congress has spoken, Congress has spoken; only its judgments matter. And courts alone determine when that has happened: Using all their normal interpretive tools, they decide whether Congress has addressed a given issue. But when courts have decided that Congress has not done so, a choice arises. Absent a legislative directive, either the administering agency or a court must take the lead. And the matter is more fit for the agency. The decision is likely to involve the agency’s subject-matter expertise; to fall within its sphere of regulatory experience; and to involve policy choices, including cost-benefit assessments and trade-offs between conflicting values. So a court without relevant expertise or experience, and without warrant to make policy calls, appropriately steps back. The court still has a role to play: It polices the agency to ensure that it acts within the zone of reasonable options. But the court does not insert itself into an agency’s expertise-driven, policy-laden functions. That is the arrangement best suited to keep every actor in its proper lane. And it is the one best suited to ensure that Congress’s statutes work in the way Congress intended.

The majority makes two points in reply, neither convincing. First, it insists that “agencies have no special competence” in filling gaps or resolving ambiguities in regulatory statutes; rather, “[c]ourts do.” Score one for self-confidence; maybe not so high for self-reflection or -knowledge. Of course courts often construe legal texts, hopefully well. And *Chevron*’s first step takes full advantage of that talent: There, a court tries to divine what Congress meant, even in the most complicated or abstruse statutory schemes. The deference comes in only if the court cannot do so—if the court must admit that standard legal tools will not avail to fill a statutory silence or give content to an ambiguous term. *** When does an

* JUSTICE JACKSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case in No. 22-451 and joins this opinion only as it applies to the case in No. 22-1219.

alpha amino acid polymer qualify as a “protein”? How distinct is “distinct” for squirrel populations? What size “geographic area” will ensure appropriate hospital reimbursement? As between two equally feasible understandings of “stationary source,” should one choose the one more protective of the environment or the one more favorable to economic growth? The idea that courts have “special competence” in deciding such questions whereas agencies have “no[ne]” is, if I may say, malarkey. Answering those questions right does not mainly demand the interpretive skills courts possess. Instead, it demands one or more of: subject-matter expertise, long engagement with a regulatory scheme, and policy choice. It is courts (not agencies) that “have no special competence”—or even legitimacy—when those are the things a decision calls for.

Second, the majority complains that an ambiguity or gap does not “necessarily reflect a congressional intent that an agency” should have primary interpretive authority. On that score, I’ll agree with the premise: It doesn’t “necessarily” do so. *Chevron* is built on a *presumption*. The decision does not maintain that Congress in every case wants the agency, rather than a court, to fill in gaps. The decision maintains that when Congress does not expressly pick one or the other, we need a default rule; and the best default rule—agency or court?—is the one we think Congress would generally want. As to why Congress would generally want the agency: The answer lies in everything said above about Congress’s delegation of regulatory power to the agency and the agency’s special competencies. The majority appears to think it is a showstopping rejoinder to note that many statutory gaps and ambiguities are “unintentional.” But to begin, many are not; the ratio between the two is uncertain. And to end, why should that matter in any event? Congress may not have deliberately introduced a gap or ambiguity into the statute; but it knows that pretty much everything it drafts will someday be found to contain such a “flaw.” Given that knowledge, *Chevron* asks, what would Congress want? The presumed answer is again the same (for the same reasons): The agency. And as with any default rule, if Congress decides otherwise, all it need do is say. ***

[APA section 706], contra the majority, “does not resolve the *Chevron* question.” C. Sunstein, *Chevron As Law*, 107 *Geo. L. J.* 1613, 1642 (2019) (Sunstein). *** The majority highlights the phrase “decide all relevant questions of law” (italicizing the “all”), and notes that the provision “prescribes no deferential standard” for answering those questions. But just as the provision does not prescribe a deferential standard of review, so too it does not prescribe a de novo standard of review (in which the court starts from scratch, without giving deference). In point of fact, Section 706 does not specify any standard of review for construing statutes. And when a court uses a deferential standard—here, by deciding whether an agency reading is reasonable—it just as much “decide[s]” a “relevant question[] of law” as when it uses a de novo standard. § 706. The deferring court then conforms to Section 706 “by determining whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its assigned discretion—that is, whether the agency has construed [the statute it administers] reasonably.” J. Manning, *Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator*, 128 *Harv. L. Rev.* 457, 459 (2014); see *Arlington v. FCC*, 569 U.S.290, 317 (2013) (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (“We do not ignore [Section 706’s] command when we afford an agency’s statutory interpretation *Chevron* deference; we respect it”).

Section 706’s references to standards of review in other contexts only further undercut the majority’s argument. The majority notes that Section 706 requires deferential review for agency fact-finding and policy-making (under, respectively, a substantial-evidence standard

and an arbitrary-and-capricious standard). Congress, the majority claims, “surely would have articulated a similarly deferential standard applicable to questions of law had it intended to depart” from de novo review. Surely? In another part of Section 706, Congress explicitly referred to de novo review. § 706(2)(F). With all those references to standards of review—both deferential and not—running around Section 706, what is “telling” is the absence of any standard for reviewing an agency’s statutory constructions. That silence left the matter, as noted above, “generally indeterminate”: Section 706 neither mandates nor forbids *Chevron*-style deference. ***

Of course, respecting precedent is not an “inexorable command.” *Payne v. Tennessee*, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). But overthrowing it requires far more than the majority has offered up here. *Chevron* is entitled to stare decisis’s strongest form of protection. The majority thus needs an exceptionally strong reason to overturn the decision, above and beyond thinking it wrong. And it has nothing approaching such a justification, proposing only a bewildering theory about *Chevron*’s “unworkability.” Just five years ago, this Court in *Kisor* rejected a plea to overrule *Auer v. Robbins*, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), which requires judicial deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations. The case against overruling *Chevron* is at least as strong. In particular, the majority’s decision today will cause a massive shock to the legal system, “cast[ing] doubt on many settled constructions” of statutes and threatening the interests of many parties who have relied on them for years. ***

Congress and agencies alike have relied on *Chevron*—have assumed its existence—in much of their work for the last 40 years. Statutes passed during that time reflect the expectation that *Chevron* would allocate interpretive authority between agencies and courts. Rules issued during the period likewise presuppose that statutory ambiguities were the agencies’ to (reasonably) resolve. Those agency interpretations may have benefited regulated entities; or they may have protected members of the broader public. Either way, private parties have ordered their affairs—their business and financial decisions, their health-care decisions, their educational decisions—around agency actions that are suddenly now subject to challenge. In *Kisor*, this Court refused to overrule *Auer* because doing so would “cast doubt on” many longstanding constructions of rules, and thereby upset settled expectations. Overruling *Chevron*, and thus raising new doubts about agency constructions of statutes, will be far more disruptive. ***

Ohio v. EPA
144 S. Ct. 2040 (2024)

JUSTICE GORSUCH delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Clean Air Act envisions States and the federal government working together to improve air quality. Under that law’s terms, States bear “primary responsibility” for developing plans to achieve air-quality goals. 42 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3). Should a State fail to prepare a legally compliant plan, however, the federal government may sometimes step in and assume that authority for itself. §7410(c)(1). Here, the federal government announced its intention to reject over 20 States’ plans for controlling ozone pollution. In their place, the government sought to impose a single, uniform federal plan. This litigation concerns whether, in adopting that plan, the federal government complied with the terms of the Act.

I
A

“The Clean Air Act regulates air quality through a federal-state collaboration.” *EME Homer City Generation, L.P. v. EPA*, 795 F. 3d 118, 124, 417 U.S. App. D.C. 381 (CADDC 2015). Periodically, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets standards for common air pollutants, as necessary to “protect the public health.” §§7409(a)(1), (b)(1). Once EPA sets a new standard, the clock starts ticking: States have three years to design and submit a plan—called a State Implementation Plan, or SIP—providing for the “implementation, maintenance, and enforcement” of that standard in their jurisdictions. §7410(a)(1). Under the Act, States decide how to measure ambient air quality. §7410(a)(2)(B). States pick “emission limitations and other control measures.” §7410(a)(2)(A). And States provide for the enforcement of their prescribed measures. §7410(a)(2)(C).

At the same time, States must design these plans with their neighbors in mind. Because air currents can carry pollution across state borders, emissions in upwind States sometimes affect air quality in downwind States. See *EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L.P.*, 572 U.S. 489, 496 (2014). To address that externality problem, under the Act’s “Good Neighbor Provision,” state plans must prohibit emissions “in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State” of the relevant air-quality standard. §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).

Because the States bear “primary responsibility” for developing compliance plans, §7401(a)(3), EPA has “no authority to question the wisdom of a State’s choices of emission limitations.” *Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975). So long as a SIP satisfies the “applicable requirements” of the Act, including the Good Neighbor Provision, EPA “shall approve” it within 18 months of its submission. §7410(k)(3); see §§7410(k)(1)(B), (k)(2). If, however, a SIP falls short, EPA “shall” issue a Federal Implementation Plan, or FIP, for the noncompliant State—that is, “unless” the State corrects the deficiencies in its SIP first. §7410(c)(1). EPA must also ensure States meet the new air-quality standard by a statutory deadline. See §7511.

B

A layer of ozone in the atmosphere shields the world from the sun’s radiation. But closer to earth, ozone can hurt more than it helps. Forming when sunlight interacts with a

wide range of precursor pollutants, ground-level ozone can trigger and exacerbate health problems and damage vegetation. 80 Fed. Reg. 65299, 65302, 65370 (2015).

To mitigate those and other problems, in 2015 EPA revised its air-quality standards for ozone from 75 to 70 parts per billion. That change triggered a requirement for States to submit new SIPs. Along the way, EPA issued a guidance document advising States that they had “flexibility” in choosing how to address their Good Neighbor obligations. See EPA, *Memorandum, Information on the Interstate Transport State Implementation Plan Submissions for the 2015 Ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standards* 3 (Mar. 27, 2018). With that and other guidance in hand, many (though not all) States submitted SIPs. See 84 Fed. Reg. 66612 (2019). And many of the States that did submit SIPs said that they need not adopt emissions-control measures to comply with the Good Neighbor Provision because, among other things, they were not linked to downwind air-quality problems or they could identify no additional cost-effective methods of controlling the emissions beyond those they were currently employing. See, e.g., 87 Fed. Reg. 9798, 9810 (2022); 87 Fed. Reg. 9545, 9552 (2022); see generally 88 Fed. Reg. 9336, 9354-9361 (2023).

For over two years, EPA did not act on the SIPs it received. See, e.g., 87 Fed. Reg. 9838, 9845-9851 (2022). Then, in February 2022, the agency announced its intention to disapprove 19 of them on the ground that the States submitting them had failed to address adequately their obligations under the Good Neighbor Provision. A few months later, the agency proposed disapproving four more SIPs. Pursuant to the Act, the agency issued its proposed SIP disapprovals for public comment before finalizing them. See §7607(d)(3).

C

During that public comment period, the agency proposed a single FIP to bind all 23 States. 87 Fed. Reg. 20036, 20038 (2022). Rather than continue to encourage “flexibilit[y]” and different state approaches, EPA now apparently took the view that “[e]ffective policy solutions to the problem of interstate ozone transport” demanded that kind of “uniform framework” and “[n]ationwide consistency.” 87 Fed. Reg. 9841; see 87 Fed. Reg. 20073. The FIP the agency proposed set as its target the reduction of the emissions of one family of ozone precursors in particular: nitrogen oxides. And it sought to impose nitrogen oxide emissions-control measures that “maximized cost-effectiveness” in achieving “downwind ozone air quality improvements.”

In broad strokes, here is how EPA’s proposed rule worked to eliminate a State’s “significant contribution” to downwind ozone problems. First, the agency identified various emissions-control measures and, using nationwide data, calculated how much each typically costs to reduce a ton of nitrogen-oxide emissions. Next, the agency sought to predict how much each upwind State’s nitrogen-oxide emissions would fall if emissions-producing facilities in the State adopted each measure. In making those predictions, EPA often considered data specific to the emissions-producing facilities in the State, and fed “unit-level and state-level” values into its calculations. Then, the agency estimated how much, on average, ozone levels would fall in downwind States with the adoption of each measure. In making those estimations, too, EPA calibrated its modeling to each State’s features, “determin[ing] the relationship between changes in emissions and changes in ozone contributions on a state-by-state . . . basis.”

To pick which measures would “maximiz[e] costeffectiveness” in achieving “downwind ozone air quality improvements,” 87 Fed. Reg. 20055, EPA focused on what it called the “knee in the curve,” or the point at which more expenditures in the upwind States were likely to produce “very little” in the way of “additional emissions reductions and air quality improvement” downwind. EPA used this point to select a “uniform level” of cost, and so a uniform package of emissions-reduction tools, for upwind States to adopt. And EPA performed this analysis on two “parallel tracks”—one for power plants, one for other industries. Pursuant to the Clean Air Act, §§7607(d)(1)(B), (d)(3)-(6), the agency published its proposed FIP for notice and comment in April 2022, 87 Fed. Reg. 20036.

Immediately, commenters warned of a potential pitfall in the agency’s approach. EPA had determined which emissions-control measures were cost effective at addressing downwind ozone levels based on an assumption that the FIP would apply to all covered States. But what happens if some or many of those States are not covered? As the commenters portrayed the SIPs, this was not an entirely speculative possibility. Many believed EPA’s disapprovals of the SIPs were legally flawed. *** They added that EPA’s FIP was “inextricably linked” to the SIP disapprovals. Without a SIP disapproval or missing SIP, after all, EPA could not include a State in its FIP.

Commenters added that failing to include a State could have consequences for the proposed FIP. If the FIP did not wind up applying to all 23 States as EPA envisioned, commenters argued, the agency would need “to conduct a new assessment and modeling of contribution and subject those findings to public comment.” *** Why? As noted above, EPA assessed “significant contribution” by determining what measures in upwind States would maximize cost-effective ozone-level improvements in the States downwind of them. And a different set of States might mean that the “knee in the curve” would shift. After all, each State differs in its mix of industries, in its preexisting emissions-control measures, and in the impact those measures may have on emissions and downwind air quality. See 87 Fed. Reg. 20052, 20060, 20071-20073; EPA, Technical Memorandum, Screening Assessment of Potential Emissions Reductions, Air Quality Impacts, and Costs from Non-EGU Emissions Units for 2026, pp. 12-13 (2022). ***

Despite those comments and developments, the agency proceeded to issue its final FIP. 88 Fed. Reg. 36654 (2023). In response to the problem commenters raised, EPA adopted a severability provision stating that, should any jurisdiction drop out, its rule would “continue to be implemented as to any remaining jurisdictions.” But in doing so, EPA did not address whether or why the same emissions-control measures it mandated would continue to further the FIP’s stated purpose of maximizing cost-effective air-quality improvement if fewer States remained in the plan.

D

After EPA issued its final FIP, litigation over the agency’s SIP disapprovals continued. One court after another issued one stay after another. Each new stay meant another State to which EPA could not apply its FIP. See §7410(c)(1). Ultimately, EPA recognized that it could not apply its FIP to 12 of the 23 original States. Together, these 12 States accounted for over 70 percent of the emissions EPA had planned to address through its FIP. See Application for Ohio et al. in No. 23A349, p. 1 (States’ Application); see also 88 Fed. Reg. 36738-36739.

A number of the remaining States and industry groups challenged the remnants of the FIP in the D.C. Circuit. They pointed to the Act’s provisions authorizing a court to “reverse any . . . action” taken in connection with a FIP that is “arbitrary” or “capricious.” §7607(d)(9)(A). And they argued that EPA’s decision to apply the FIP to them even after so many other States had dropped out met that standard. As part of their challenge, they asked that court to stay any effort to enforce the FIP against them while their appeal unfolded. After that court denied relief, the applicants renewed their request here. ***

II

A ***

When States and other parties seek to stay the enforcement of a federal regulation against them, often “the harms and equities [will be] very weighty on both sides.” *Labrador v. Poe*, 144 S. Ct. 921 (opinion of Kavanaugh, J.). *** On one side of the ledger, the federal government points to the air-quality benefits its FIP offers downwind States. On the other side, the States observe that a FIP issued unlawfully (as they contend this one was) necessarily impairs their sovereign interests in regulating their own industries and citizens—interests the Act expressly recognizes. The States observe, too, that having to comply with the FIP during the pendency of this litigation risks placing them at a “competitive disadvantage” to their exempt peers. The States and the private applicants also stress that complying with the FIP during the pendency of this litigation would require them to incur “hundreds of millions[,] if not billions of dollars.” Those costs, the applicants note, are “nonrecoverable.”

Because each side has strong arguments about the harms they face and equities involved, our resolution of these stay requests ultimately turns on the merits and the question who is likely to prevail at the end of this litigation. See *Nken v. Holder*, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009).

B

When it comes to that question, the parties agree on the rules that guide our analysis. The applicants argue that a court is likely to hold EPA’s final FIP “arbitrary” or “capricious” within the meaning of the Act and thus enjoin its enforcement against them. An agency action qualifies as “arbitrary” or “capricious” if it is not “reasonable and reasonably explained.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). In reviewing an agency’s action under that standard, a court may not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009). But it must ensure, among other things, that the agency has offered “a satisfactory explanation for its action[,] including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, an agency cannot simply ignore “an important aspect of the problem.”

We agree with the applicants that EPA’s final FIP likely runs afoul of these long-settled standards. The problem stems from the way EPA chose to determine which emissions “contribute[d] significantly” to downwind States’ difficulty meeting national ozone standards. 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). Recall that EPA’s plan rested on an assumption that all 23 upwind States would adopt emissions-reduction tools up to a “uniform” level of “costs” to the

point of diminishing returns. But as the applicants ask: What happens—as in fact did happen—when many of the upwind States fall out of the planned FIP and it may now cover only a fraction of the States and emissions EPA anticipated? Does that affect the “knee in the curve,” or the point at which the remaining States might still “maximiz[e] cost-effectiv[e]” downwind ozone-level improvements? As “the mix of states changes, . . . and their particular technologies and industries drop out with them,” might the point at which emissions-control measures maximize cost-effective downwind air-quality improvements also shift?

Although commenters posed this concern to EPA during the notice and comment period, EPA offered no reasoned response. Indeed, at argument the government acknowledged that it could not represent with certainty whether the cost-effectiveness analysis it performed collectively for 23 States would yield the same results and command the same emissions-control measures if conducted for, say, just one State. Perhaps there is some explanation why the number and identity of participating States does not affect what measures maximize cost-effective downwind air-quality improvements. But if there is an explanation, it does not appear in the final rule. As a result, the applicants are likely to prevail on their argument that EPA’s final rule was not “reasonably explained,” *Prometheus Radio Project*, 592 U.S., at 423, that the agency failed to supply “a satisfactory explanation for its action[.]” *State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.*, 463 U.S., at 43, and that it instead ignored “an important aspect of the problem” before it. The applicants are therefore likely to be entitled to “revers[al]” of the FIP’s mandates on them. §7607(d)(9).

III

A

Resisting this conclusion, EPA advances three alternative arguments.

First, the government insists, the agency did offer a reasoned response to the applicants’ concern, just not the one they hoped. When finalizing its rule in response to public comments, the government represents, “the agency did consider whether the [FIP] could cogently be applied to a subset of the 23 covered States.” And that consideration, the government stresses, led EPA to add a “severability” provision to its final rule in which the agency announced that the FIP would “continue to be implemented” without regard to the number of States remaining, even if just one State remained subject to its terms. EPA Response 27 (quoting 88 Fed. Reg. 36693). In support of its severability provision, EPA cited, among other things, its intent to address “important public health and environmental benefits” and encourage reliance by others “on th[e] final rule in their planning.”

None of this, however, solves the agency’s problem. True, the severability provision highlights that EPA was aware of the applicants’ concern. But awareness is not itself an explanation. The severability provision highlights, too, the agency’s desire to apply its rule expeditiously and “to the greatest extent possible,” no matter how many States it could cover. But none of that, nor anything else EPA said in support of its severability provision, addresses whether and how measures found to maximize cost effectiveness in achieving downwind ozone air-quality improvements with the participation of 23 States remain so when many fewer States, responsible for a much smaller amount of the originally targeted emissions, might be subject to the agency’s plan. Put simply, EPA’s response did not address the applicants’ concern so much as sidestep it.

Second, the government pivots in nearly the opposite direction. Now, it says, if its final rule lacks a reasoned response to the applicants' concern, it is because no one raised that concern during the public comment period. And, the agency stresses, a litigant may pursue in court only claims premised on objections first "raised with reasonable specificity" before the agency during the public comment period. ***. ***

Here, EPA had notice of the objection the applicants seek to press in court. Commenters alerted the agency that, should some States no longer participate in the plan, the agency would need to return to the drawing board and "conduct a new assessment and modeling of contribution" to determine what emissions-control measures maximized cost effectiveness in securing downwind ozone air-quality improvements. ***

Third, the government pursues one more argument in the alternative. As the agency sees it, the applicants must return to EPA and file a motion asking it to reconsider its final rule before presenting their objection in court. They must, the agency says, because the "grounds for [their] objection arose after the period for public comment." §7607(d)(7)(B). As just discussed, however, EPA had the basis of the applicants' objection before it during the comment period. It chose to respond with a severability provision that in no way grappled with their concern. Nothing requires the applicants to return to EPA to raise (again) a concern EPA already had a chance to address.

Taking the government's argument (much) further, the dissent posits that every "objection that [a] final rule was not reasonably explained" must be raised in a motion for reconsideration. But there is a reason why the government does not go so far. The Clean Air Act opens the courthouse doors to those with objections the agency already ignored. If an "objection [is] raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment" but not reasonably addressed in the final rule, the Act permits an immediate challenge. §7607(d)(7)(B). A person need not go back to the agency and insist on an explanation a second time. Tellingly, the case on which the dissent relies involves an entirely different situation: a "logical outgrowth" challeng[e]. There, the objection was that EPA had supposedly "significantly amend[ed] the [r]ule between the proposed and final versions," making it impossible for people to comment on the rule during the comment period. That is nothing like the challenge here, where EPA failed to address an important problem the public could and did raise during the comment period.

B

With the government's theories unavailing, the dissent advances others of its own. It begins by suggesting that the problem the applicants raise was not "important" enough to warrant a reasoned reply from the agency because the methodology EPA employed in its FIP "appear[s] not to depend on the number of covered States." Then, coming at the same point from another direction, the dissent seeks to excuse the agency's lack of a reasoned reply as "harmless" given, again, "the apparent lack of connection between the number of States covered and the FIP's methodology."

The trouble is, if the government had arguments along these lines, it did not make them. It did not despite its ample resources and voluminous briefing. ***

If anything, we see one reason for caution after another. Start with the fact the dissent itself expresses little confidence in its own theories, contending no more than it “appear[s]” EPA’s methodology did not depend on the number of covered States. Add to that the fact that, at oral argument, even the government refused to say with certainty that EPA would have reached the same conclusions regardless of which States were included in the FIP. Combine all that with the further fact that, in developing the FIP, EPA said it used the “same regulatory framework” this Court described in *EME Homer City Generation, L. P. v. EPA*, 572 U.S. 489. And, at least as the Court described that framework, state-level analyses play a significant role in EPA’s work. Finally, observe that, while the Act seems to anticipate, as the dissent suggests, that the agency’s “procedural determinations” may be subject to harmless-error review, §7607(d)(8), the Act also seems to treat separately challenges to agency “actions” like the FIP before us, authorizing courts to “reverse any . . . action,” found to be “arbitrary” or “capricious,” §7607(d)(9)(A) (emphasis added). With so many reasons for caution, we think sticking to our normal course of declining to consider forfeited arguments the right course here.

The applications for a stay in Nos. 23A349, 23A350, 23A351, and 23A384 are granted. Enforcement of EPA’s rule against the applicants shall be stayed pending the disposition of the applicants’ petitions for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit and any petition for writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought. Should the petition for certiorari be denied, this order will terminate automatically. If the petition is granted, this order shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice BARRETT, with whom Justice SOTOMAYOR, Justice KAGAN, and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

The Court today enjoins the enforcement of a major Environmental Protection Agency rule based on an underdeveloped theory that is unlikely to succeed on the merits. In so doing, the Court grants emergency relief in a fact intensive and highly technical case without fully engaging with both the relevant law and the voluminous record. While the Court suggests that the EPA failed to explain itself sufficiently in response to comments, this theory must surmount sizable procedural obstacles and contrary record evidence. Applicants therefore cannot satisfy the stringent conditions for relief in this posture.

I

I will start by setting the record straight with respect to some important background.

First, the Court downplays EPA’s statutory role in ensuring that States meet air-quality standards. The Clean Air Act directs EPA to “establish national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for pollutants at levels that will protect public health.” *EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.*, 572 U.S. 489, 498 (2014); see 42 U.S.C. §§7408, 7409. States must create State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure that their air meets these standards. §7410(a)(1). But States also face an externality problem: “Pollutants generated by upwind sources are often transported by air currents . . . to downwind States,” relieving upwind States “of the associated costs” and making it difficult for downwind States to “maintain satisfactory air quality.” *EME*, 572 U.S., at 496, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 188 L. Ed. 2d 775. So the Act’s Good Neighbor Provision requires SIPs to “prohibi[t]” the State’s emissions sources from “emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will . . . contribute significantly

to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any [NAAQS].” §7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I).

Given the incentives of upwind States to underregulate the pollution they send downwind, the Act requires EPA to determine whether a State “has failed to submit an adequate SIP.” EME, 572 U.S., at 498, 134 S. Ct. 1584, 188 L. Ed. 2d 775; see §7410(c)(1). If a SIP does not prevent the State’s polluters from significantly contributing to nonattainment in downwind States, EPA “shall” promulgate a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that does. §7410(c)(1). And EPA must stop the State’s significant contributions by the statutory deadline for the affected downwind States to achieve compliance. See *Wisconsin v. EPA*, 938 F.3d 303, 313-314 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam); §7511.

Second, the Court fails to recognize that EPA’s SIP disapprovals may, in fact, be valid. EPA justified its findings that 23 States had failed to submit adequate SIPs. It found that these States all significantly contributed to ozone pollution in downwind States. See 88 Fed. Reg. 36656 (2023). But 21 of these States, including applicants, proposed to do nothing to reduce their ozone-precursor (i.e., NO_x) emissions—arguing that they did not actually contribute to downwind nonattainment or that there were no other cost-effective emissions-reduction measures they could impose. See 88 Fed. Reg. 9354-9361 (2023). The other two States failed to submit a SIP at all. See 84 Fed. Reg. 66614 (2019). While 12 of EPA’s SIP disapprovals have been temporarily stayed, no court yet has invalidated one. So EPA’s replacement FIP—the Good Neighbor Plan—may yet apply to all 23 original States. Indeed, EPA and the plaintiffs who challenged Nevada’s SIP disapproval have proposed a settlement that would lift that stay. 89 Fed. Reg. 35091 (2024).

Third, the Court claims that commenters on the proposed FIP warned that its emissions limits might change if it covered fewer States, but EPA failed to respond. Not exactly. As I will elaborate below, commenters merely criticized EPA’s decision to propose a FIP before its SIP disapprovals were final. EPA responded that this sequencing was “consistent with [its] past practice in [its] efforts to timely address good neighbor obligations”: Given the August 2024 deadline for certain States to comply with the 2015 ozone NAAQS, EPA was “obligated” to start the years-long process of promulgating a FIP so that one could be effective in time. EPA, Response to Public Comments on Proposed Rule 149-150, (EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668-1127, June 2023) (Response to Comments).

Finally, the Court repeatedly characterizes the FIP as relying on an “assumption that [it] would apply to all covered States.” But try as it might, the Court identifies no evidence that the FIP’s emissions limits would have been different for a different set of States or that EPA’s consideration of state-specific inputs was anything but confirmatory of the limits it calculated based on nationwide data. The Court leans on the fact that EPA “considered data specific to the emissions-producing facilities in [each] State” to calculate “how much each upwind State’s [NO_x] emissions would fall” if the State’s emitters “adopted each [emissions-control] measure.” *** But the Proposed Ozone Analysis makes clear that EPA did these state-specific calculations to determine each State’s “emissions budget.” Proposed Ozone Analysis 7-13. A State’s budget consists of the “emissions that would remain” after the State’s power plants meet the emissions limits that EPA independently calculated. 88 Fed. Reg. 36762; see Proposed Ozone Analysis 13 (“adjust[ed]” “unit-level emissions are summed up to the state level”). Of course each State’s emissions budget will depend on the emitters in that State. What matters is whether the limits the FIP imposes on each emitter depend on the

number of States the FIP covers. Tellingly, the Court does not identify any NO_x limit for any industry that relied on state-specific data.

On the contrary, as I will explain in Part II-B, the final rule and its supporting documents suggest that EPA’s methodology for setting emissions limits did not depend on the number of States in the plan, but on nationwide data for the relevant industries—and the FIP contains many examples of emissions limits that EPA created using nationwide inputs. Moreover, EPA has now confirmed this interpretation. During this litigation, EPA received petitions seeking reconsideration of the FIP on the ground that it should not be implemented in just a subset of the original States. EPA denied these petitions on April 4, 2024. 89 Fed. Reg. 23526. It thoroughly explained how its “methodology for defining” each State’s emissions obligations is “independent of the number of states included in the Plan” because it “relies on a determination regarding what emissions reductions each type of regulated source can cost-effectively achieve.” EPA, Basis for Partial Denial of Petitions for Reconsideration on Scope 1, (EPA-HQ-OAR-2021-0668-1255, Apr. 2024) (Denial). The “control technologies and cost-effectiveness figures the EPA consider[ed] . . . do not depend in any way on the number of states included.” *Id.*, at 2. So “[s]ources in the remaining upwind states currently regulated by the Plan . . . would bear the same actual emission reduction obligations” regardless of the number of covered States. *Id.*, at 3-4.

II ***

The Court holds that applicants are likely to succeed on a claim that the Good Neighbor Plan is “arbitrary” or “capricious.” 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(9). The “arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires that agency action” be both “[1] reasonable and [2] reasonably explained.” *FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project*, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). The Court’s theory is that EPA did not “‘reasonably explain[ed]” “‘why the number and identity of participating States does not affect what measures maximize cost-effective downwind air-quality improvement.” So to be clear, the Court does not conclude that EPA’s actions were substantively unreasonable—e.g., that the FIP cannot rationally be applied to fewer States because a change in the number of participants would undermine its rationale or render it ineffective. Nor could it, given the significant evidence in the record (not to mention EPA’s denial of reconsideration) that the covered States did not, in fact, affect the plan’s emissions-reduction obligations. Thus, the only basis for the Court’s decision is the argument that EPA failed to provide “a satisfactory explanation for its action” and a “reasoned response” to comments. There are at least three major barriers to success on such a claim.

A

The Clean Air Act imposes a procedural bar on the challenges that a plaintiff can bring in court: Only objections that were “raised with reasonable specificity during the period for public comment . . . may be raised during judicial review.” §7607(d)(7)(B). *** While EPA has now separately denied petitions for reconsideration of the Good Neighbor Plan, this case came to us directly; we are assessing applicants’ likelihood of success in challenging the plan itself, not the denial of reconsideration. So the procedural bar on objections not raised in the comments presents a significant obstacle—in two ways.

First, consider the Court’s basic theory: that EPA offered “no reasoned response” to comments allegedly questioning whether the plan’s emissions limits depend on the States covered. That EPA failed to adequately explain its final rule in response to comments is “an objection to the notice and comment process itself,” which applicants “obviously did not and

could not have raised . . . during the period for public comment.” *EME Homer City Generation, L. P. v. EPA*, 795 F. 3d 118, 137 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J.). No one could have raised during the proposal’s comment period the objection that the “final rule was not ‘reasonably explained.’”

The D. C. Circuit, on remand in *EME Homer*, considered a similar objection that EPA had “violated the Clean Air Act’s notice and comment requirements”: EPA had “significantly amend[ed] the Rule between the proposed and final versions without providing additional opportunity for notice and comment.” But because this procedural objection could not have been raised during the comment period, “the only appropriate path for petitioners” under §7607(d)(7)(B) was to raise it “through an initial petition for reconsideration to EPA.” So the D. C. Circuit lacked “authority at th[at] time to reach this question.” *Ibid.* While such “logical outgrowth” challenges typically are cognizable under the Administrative Procedure Act, the Clean Air Act channels these challenges through reconsideration proceedings. This Court’s failure-to-explain objection may face the same problem: It is not judicially reviewable in its current posture.

Second, even putting aside this aspect of §7607(d)(7)(B), it is not clear that any commenter raised with “reasonable specificity” the underlying substantive issue: that the exclusion of some States from the FIP would undermine EPA’s cost-effectiveness analyses and resulting emissions controls. §7607(d)(7)(B). The Court concludes otherwise only by putting in the commenters’ mouths words they did not say. It first cites a bevy of comments arguing that EPA’s “disapprovals of the SIP were legally flawed” and noting the obvious point that EPA cannot “include a State in its FIP” unless it validly disapproves the State’s SIP. These comments do not address the continued efficacy of a FIP that applies to a subset of the originally covered States. ***

The closest comment that the Court can find—which it quotes repeatedly—is one sentence that obliquely refers to some “new assessment and modeling of contribution” that EPA might need to perform. Comments of Air Stewardship Coalition 13-14 (June 21, 2022). The Court dresses up this comment by characterizing it as a warning about what might happen “[i]f the FIP did not wind up applying to all 23 States” and responding to the concern that a “different set of States might mean that the ‘knee in the curve’ might shift” and change the cost-effective “emissions-control measures.” But those words are the Court’s, not the commenter’s.

The commenter’s actual objection was to EPA’s sequencing of its actions—proposing a FIP before it finalized its SIP disapprovals. The commenter titled this section “EPA Step Two Screening is Premised on the Premature Disapproval of 19 Upwind States['] Good Neighbor SIPs.” And the relevant sentence reads in full:

“The proposed FIP essentially prejudices the outcome of those pending SIP actions and, in the event EPA takes a different action on those SIPs than contemplated in this proposal, it would be required to conduct a new assessment and modeling of contribution and subject those findings to public comment.”

This sentence says nothing about what would be required if after EPA finalizes its SIP disapprovals and issues a final FIP, some States drop out of the plan. Nor does it suggest

that the plan’s cost-effectiveness thresholds or emissions controls would change with a different number of States. Nor is it clear what the comment means by its bare reference to a “new assessment and modeling of contribution”: Would EPA be required to perform a new evaluation of which upwind States cause pollution in downwind States? A new analysis of how much pollution each source must eliminate? A new assessment of the plan’s impact on downwind States?

It is therefore difficult to see how this comment raised with “reasonable specificity” the objection that the removal of some States from the final plan would invalidate EPA’s cost-effectiveness thresholds and chosen emissions-control measures. That is not how EPA understood it. EPA characterized this comment as arguing that “by taking action before considering comments on the proposed disapprovals, the EPA is presupposing the outcome of its proposed rulemakings on the SIPs.” And EPA explained that it “disagree[d]” with the argument that the “sequence” of its actions was “improper, unreasonable, or bad policy”; EPA had a statutory obligation to promulgate a FIP by the August 2024 NAAQS attainment deadline. If a commenter had said with reasonable specificity what the Court says today—that “a different set of States might mean that the ‘knee in the curve’ might shift,”—EPA could have responded with more explanation of why its methodology did not depend on the number of covered States—as it has recently explained. But EPA cannot be penalized if it did not have reasonable notice of this objection.

In sum, §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar likely forecloses both the failure-to-explain objection that the Court credits and any substantive challenge to the reasonableness of applying the FIP to a subset of the originally covered States.

B

Even if applicants clear §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar, they face an uphill battle on the merits. ***

To begin, the rule and its supporting documents arguably make clear that EPA’s methodology for calculating cost-effectiveness thresholds and imposing emissions controls did not depend on the number of covered States. The rule applied EPA’s longstanding “4-step interstate transport framework” to create emissions limits that will prevent NO_x sources in upwind States from significantly contributing to ozone pollution in downwind States. 88 Fed. Reg. 36659; see 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(D). Under that framework, EPA (1) identifies “downwind receptors that are expected to have problems attaining or maintaining the NAAQS”; (2) identifies which upwind States are “link[ed]” to those downwind receptors because they contribute at least 1% of a receptor’s ozone; (3) determines which NO_x sources in the linked upwind States “significantly contribute” to downwind nonattainment or interference; and (4) implements emissions limits to stop those sources’ significant contributions. 88 Fed. Reg. 36659; see *EME*, 572 U.S., at 500-501 (describing similar approach used in earlier FIP). The first two steps determine which States the FIP must cover. The rubber meets the road at steps 3 and 4: How much do sources in those States “significantly contribute” to downwind pollution, and what must they do about it?

Here is how EPA explains that methodology. A source “significantly contributes” to downwind pollution if there are cost-effective measures it could implement to reduce its emissions: It must halt those emissions that can be eliminated at a cost “under the cost threshold set by the Agency” for sources in that industry. *EME*, 572 U.S., at 518 (upholding this approach). So the “amount” of pollution that sources must eliminate is “that amount . .

. in excess of the emissions control strategies the EPA has deemed cost effective.” 88 Fed. Reg. 36676. EPA calculates for each type of source a “uniform level of NO_x emissions control stringency” expressed as a “cost per ton of emissions reduction.” *Id.*, at 36719. This cost-effectiveness threshold is based on the point “at which further emissions mitigation strategies become excessively costly on a per-ton basis while also delivering far fewer additional emissions reductions.” *Id.*, at 36683 (describing this “knee in the curve” analysis). The plan requires sources in each covered State to reduce their emissions accordingly.

Crucially, the final rule suggests that EPA calculated cost-effectiveness thresholds based on the likely cost and impact of available emissions-reduction technology given national, industry-wide data. Contrary to the Court’s speculations, these thresholds and the FIP’s resulting emissions limits appear not to depend on the number of covered States. Consider the plan’s approach to power plants (“electric generating units,” or EGUs). EPA assessed the cost and impact of different NO_x mitigation strategies that EGUs could implement. One strategy was to fully operate “selective catalytic reduction” (SCR) technology. 88 Fed. Reg. 36655; see *id.*, at 36720. EPA estimated that a “representative marginal cost” for this strategy would be \$1,600 per ton, and a “reasonable level of performance” would be 0.08 lb/mmBtu—based on “nationwide” power plant “emissions data.” EPA thus determined that SCR optimization was a “viable mitigation strategy for the 2023 ozone season” and built this assumption into the plan’s emission limits. In other words, EPA relied on nationwide industry data to select cost thresholds that corresponded to how much it would cost to use particular emissions-reduction technologies, and it applied that “uniform control stringency to EGUs within the covered upwind states.”

In fact, some commenters criticized EPA’s reliance on a “nationwide data set” to calculate emissions limits, arguing that EPA should “limit the dataset to . . . just the covered states”—an approach that would have made the cost effectiveness thresholds depend on which States were covered. But EPA expressly defended its approach based on its “intention to identify a *technology-specific* representative emissions rate” and its interest in “the performance potential of a technology”—which were best served by the “largest dataset possible (i.e., *nationwide*).” EPA explained that it used the same approach it had successfully applied in previous rulemakings: It “derive[d] technology performance averages” based on nationwide data. Then it applied the relevant industry standard “on a uniform basis” to each emitter across the covered States.

The Court, perhaps recognizing the problem that the FIP’s seemingly state-agnostic methodology poses for its theory, throws at the wall a cherry-picked assortment of EPA statements mentioning state data. None stick. The fundamental problem with the Court’s citations is that they discuss analyses that EPA performed after it chose cost thresholds and emissions limits based on nationwide industry data. EPA did assess the impact on downwind States if particular upwind States met the proposed emissions limits, and that impact depended on the States included in the modeling. But EPA said that these “‘findings regarding air quality improvement,’ served only to ‘cement EPA’s identification of the selected . . . mitigation measures as the appropriate control stringency.’” EPA explained that the statutory requirement to “eliminate significant contribution” depends on the implementation of cost-effective emissions controls at individual “industrial sources,” not some overall impact on “downwind areas’ nonattainment and maintenance problems.” EPA assessed the FIP’s impact assuming the participation of particular States primarily to ensure that its emissions limits did not result in “overcontrol”—i.e., more reductions than necessary

to help downwind States comply with the NAAQS. The technical document that the Court cites makes this point clear: “The downwind air quality impacts are used to inform EPA’s assessment of potential overcontrol.” Proposed Ozone Analysis 31.

EPA’s analysis confirmed that its chosen emissions limits would not result in overcontrol if they were implemented in the States originally covered by the FIP. 88 Fed. Reg. 36741. Importantly, implementing the FIP “in fewer upwind states does not (and cannot possibly) result in overcontrol” given that “there was no overcontrol even when more states, making more emission reductions, were included.” Denial 22. So the fact that EPA used state-specific data in its overcontrol analysis does not mean that the FIP’s emissions limits depended on the number of States it covered. And the inclusion of fewer States in that analysis logically could not have affected the results.

Thus, EPA generally characterized the FIP’s emissions limits as dependent on nationwide data, not on any particular set of States. Confirming this interpretation, the final rule contemplates its application to a different number of States. It recognizes that “states may replace FIPs with SIPs if EPA approves them,” and several sections explain how States may exit this FIP. And the rule’s severability provision explains that EPA views the plan as “severable along . . . state and/or tribal jurisdictional lines.”

Moreover, EPA justified the FIP’s severability: EPA “must address good neighbor obligations as expeditiously as practicable and by no later than the next applicable attainment date”; severability serves “important public health and environmental benefits” and ensures that stakeholders can “rely on this final rule in their planning.” *Ibid.* These rationales align with EPA’s response to critics of its decision to propose a FIP before finalizing its SIP disapprovals: Quickly proposing a FIP—just like keeping the FIP in place even if some States drop out—is a reasonable and prudent means of assuring that [EPA’s] statutory obligation to reduce air pollution affecting the health and welfare of people in downwind states is implemented without delay.” Response to Comments 151.

Given these justifications and the state-agnostic methodology apparent in the final rule, EPA’s “path may reasonably be discerned.” *State Farm*, 463 U.S., at 43. The FIP’s cost thresholds and emissions limits did not depend in any significant way on the number of States included, so the drawbacks of severability were minimal. On the other hand, severability was necessary so that EPA could fulfill, to the greatest extent possible, its statutory obligation to eliminate the significant ozone contributions of upwind States and reduce harmful pollution in downwind States in time to meet the attainment deadlines. See Response to Comments 150 (noting the August 2024 ozone-NAAQS attainment deadline). If the FIP were not severable, EPA would have to go back to the drawing board for all States whenever a single State is removed—thwarting its mission for little reason.

Finally, it is unlikely that EPA’s response to comments evinces a “fail[ure] to consider an *important* aspect of the problem.” *State Farm*, 463 U.S., at 43 (emphasis added). An agency must respond to “‘relevant’ and ‘significant’ public comments,” and that requirement is not “‘particularly demanding’”; the “agency need not respond at all to comments that are ‘purely speculative and do not disclose the factual or policy basis on which they rest.’”

C

Applicants face one more impediment: the Clean Air Act’s stringent harmless-error rule. A court “reviewing alleged procedural errors . . . may invalidate [an EPA] rule only if the errors were so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly changed if such errors had not been made.” §7607(d)(8) (emphasis added). This provision appears “tailor-made to undo” any “rigid presumption of vacatur” that might apply in other contexts. N. Bagley, *Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law*, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 253, 291 (2017).

The alleged error here plausibly is subject to §7607(d)(8)’s harmless-error rule. As explained above, the Court does not suggest that it is substantively “[un]reasonable” to apply the FIP to fewer States, only that EPA did not “reasonably explain” the FIP’s severability in response to comments. *Prometheus*, 592 U.S., at 423. That is arguably an “alleged procedural error” within the meaning of §7607(d)(8). In fact, the Act contemplates that at least some “arbitrary or capricious” challenges allege failures to “observ[e] . . . procedure required by law,” and such challenges may only succeed if §7607(d)(8)’s “condition is . . . met.” §7607(d)(9)(D). ***

Given that applicants’ theory has evolved throughout the course of this litigation, we can hardly fault EPA for failing to raise every potentially meritorious defense in its response brief. That is particularly true given the compressed briefing schedule in this litigation’s emergency posture: The Court gave EPA less than two weeks to respond to multiple applications raising a host of general and industry-specific technical challenges, filed less than a week earlier. Even still, EPA raised §7607(d)(7)(B)’s procedural bar. And on the merits, EPA expressly argued that the FIP’s “viability and validity do not depend on the number of jurisdictions it covers”; the “Rule need not apply to any minimum number of States in order to operate coherently.” EPA could also have demonstrated how the FIP’s state-agnostic methodology for selecting cost thresholds was apparent in the final rule. But EPA cannot have forfeited that more specific point because applicants did not raise it to begin with. ***

SEC v. Jarkesy
144 S. Ct. 2117 (2024)

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission initiated an enforcement action against respondents George Jarkesy, Jr., and Patriot28, LLC, seeking civil penalties for alleged securities fraud. The SEC chose to adjudicate the matter in-house before one of its administrative law judges, rather than in federal court where respondents could have proceeded before a jury. We consider whether the Seventh Amendment permits the SEC to compel respondents to defend themselves before the agency rather than before a jury in federal court.

I
A

*** The Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 *** respectively govern the registration of securities, the trading of securities, and the activities of investment advisers. *** Although each regulates different aspects of the securities markets, their pertinent provisions—collectively referred to by regulators as “the antifraud provisions”—target the same basic behavior: misrepresenting or concealing material facts.

The three antifraud provisions are Section 17(a) of the Securities Act, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, and Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act. Section 17(a) prohibits regulated individuals from “obtain[ing] money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact,” as well as causing certain omissions of material fact. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2). As implemented by Rule 10b-5, Section 10(b) prohibits using “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” making “untrue statement[s] of . . . material fact,” causing certain material omissions, and “engag[ing] in any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud.” 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (2023); see 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). And finally, Section 206(b), as implemented by Rule 206(4)-8, prohibits investment advisers from making “any untrue statement of a material fact” or engaging in “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative” acts with respect to investors or prospective investors. 17 CFR §§ 275.206(4)-8(a)(1), (2); see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4).

To enforce these Acts, Congress created the SEC. The SEC may bring an enforcement action in one of two forums. First, the Commission can adjudicate the matter itself. See §§ 77h-1, 78u-2, 78u-3, 80b-3. Alternatively, it can file a suit in federal court. See §§ 77t, 78u, 80b-9. The SEC’s choice of forum dictates two aspects of the litigation: The procedural protections enjoyed by the defendant, and the remedies available to the SEC.

Procedurally, these forums differ in who presides and makes legal determinations, what evidentiary and discovery rules apply, and who finds facts. Most pertinently, in federal court a jury finds the facts, depending on the nature of the claim. See U.S.Const., Amdt. 7. In addition, a life-tenured, salary-protected Article III judge presides, see Art. III, § 1, and the litigation is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence and the ordinary rules of discovery.

Conversely, when the SEC adjudicates the matter inhouse, there are no juries. Instead, the Commission presides and finds facts while its Division of Enforcement prosecutes the case. The Commission may also delegate its role as judge and factfinder to one of its members or to an administrative law judge (ALJ) that it employs. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1. In these proceedings, the Commission or its delegee decides discovery disputes, see, e.g., 17 CFR § 201.232(b), and the SEC's Rules of Practice govern, see 17 CFR § 201.100 et seq. The Commission or its delegee also determines the scope and form of permissible evidence and may admit hearsay and other testimony that would be inadmissible in federal court. See §§ 201.320, 201.326.

When a Commission member or an ALJ presides, the full Commission can review that official's findings and conclusions, but it is not obligated to do so. See § 201.360; 15 U.S.C. § 78d-1. Judicial review is also available once the proceedings have concluded. See §§ 77i(a), 78y(a)(1), 80b-13(a). But such review is deferential. By law, a reviewing court must treat the agency's factual findings as "conclusive" if sufficiently supported by the record, e.g., § 78y(a)(4); see *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S.389, 401 (1971), even when they rest on evidence that could not have been admitted in federal court.

The remedy at issue in this case, civil penalties, also originally depended upon the forum chosen by the SEC. Except in cases against registered entities, the SEC could obtain civil penalties only in federal court. See Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, § 2, 98 Stat. 1264; Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, §§ 101, 201-202, 104 Stat. 932-933, 935-938. [But in] 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act), 124 Stat. 1376. That Act "ma[de] the SEC's authority in administrative penalty proceedings coextensive with its authority to seek penalties in Federal court." H. R. Rep. No. 111-687, p. 78 (2010). In other words, the SEC may now seek civil penalties in federal court, or it may impose them through its own in-house proceedings. See Dodd-Frank Act, § 929P(a), 124 Stat. 1862-1864 (codified in relevant part as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h-1(g), 78u-2(a), 80b-3(i)(1)). Civil penalties rank among the SEC's most potent enforcement tools. These penalties consist of fines of up to \$725,000 per violation. See §§ 77h-1(g), 78u-2, 80b-3(i). And the SEC may levy these penalties even when no investor has actually suffered financial loss. See *SEC v. Blavin*, 760 F. 2d 706, 711 (CA6 1985) (per curiam).

B

Shortly after passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC began investigating Jarkesy and Patriot28 for securities fraud. Between 2007 and 2010, Jarkesy launched two investment funds, raising about \$24 million from 120 "accredited" investors—a class of investors that includes, for example, financial institutions, certain investment professionals, and high net worth individuals. Patriot28, which Jarkesy managed, served as the funds' investment adviser. According to the SEC, Jarkesy and Patriot28 misled investors in at least three ways: (1) by misrepresenting the investment strategies that Jarkesy and Patriot28 employed, (2) by lying about the identity of the funds' auditor and prime broker, and (3) by inflating the funds' claimed value so that Jarkesy and Patriot28 could collect larger management fees. The SEC initiated an enforcement action, contending that these actions violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act, and sought civil penalties and other remedies.

Relying on the new authority conferred by the Dodd-Frank Act, the SEC opted to adjudicate the matter itself rather than in federal court. In 2014, the presiding ALJ issued an initial decision. The SEC reviewed the decision and then released its final order in 2020. The final order levied a civil penalty of \$300,000 against Jarquesy and Patriot28, directed them to cease and desist committing or causing violations of the antifraud provisions, ordered Patriot28 to disgorge earnings, and prohibited Jarquesy from participating in the securities industry and in offerings of penny stocks.

Jarquesy and Patriot28 petitioned for judicial review. 34 F. 4th 446, 450 (CA5 2022). A divided panel of the Fifth Circuit granted their petition and vacated the final order. Applying a two-part test from *Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg*, 492 U.S.33 (1989), the panel held that the agency’s decision to adjudicate the matter in-house violated Jarquesy’s and Patriot28’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. *** It also identified two further constitutional problems. First, it determined that Congress had violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the SEC, without adequate guidance, to choose whether to litigate this action in an Article III court or to adjudicate the matter itself. The panel also found that the insulation of the SEC ALJs from executive supervision with two layers of for-cause removal protections violated the separation of powers. Judge Davis dissented. The Fifth Circuit denied rehearing en banc, and we granted certiorari.

II

This case poses a straightforward question: whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties against him for securities fraud. Our analysis of this question follows the approach set forth in *Granfinanciera* and *Tull v. United States*, 481 U.S.412 (1987). ***

A

We first explain why this action implicates the Seventh Amendment.

1

The right to trial by jury is “of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right” has always been and “should be scrutinized with the utmost care.” *Dimick v. Schiedt*, 293 U.S.474, 486 (1935). *** In the [Revolutionary War’s] aftermath, perhaps the “most success[ful]” critique leveled against the proposed Constitution was its “want of a . . . provision for the trial by jury in civil cases.” The Federalist No. 83, p. 495 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) (emphasis deleted). The Framers promptly adopted the Seventh Amendment to fix that flaw. In so doing, they “embedded” the right in the Constitution, securing it “against the passing demands of expediency or convenience.” *Reid v. Covert*, 354 U.S.1, 10 (1957) (plurality opinion). Since then, “every encroachment upon it has been watched with great jealousy.” *Parsons v. Bedford*, 3 Pet. 433, 446 (1830).

2

By its text, the Seventh Amendment guarantees that in “[s]uits at common law, . . . the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.” In construing this language, we have noted that the right is not limited to the “common-law forms of action recognized” when the Seventh Amendment was ratified. *Curtis v. Loether*, 415 U.S.189, 193 (1974). As Justice Story explained, the Framers used the term “common law” in the Amendment “in contradistinction

to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence.” *Parsons*, 3 Pet., at 446. The Amendment therefore “embrace[s] all suits which are not of equity or admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume.” *Id.*, at 447.

The Seventh Amendment extends to a particular statutory claim if the claim is “legal in nature.” *Granfinanciera*, 492 U. S., at 53. As we made clear in *Tull*, whether that claim is statutory is immaterial to this analysis. In that case, the Government sued a real estate developer for civil penalties in federal court. The developer responded by invoking his right to a jury trial. Although the cause of action arose under the Clean Water Act, the Court surveyed early cases to show that the statutory nature of the claim was not legally relevant. “Actions by the Government to recover civil penalties under statutory provisions,” we explained, “historically ha[d] been viewed as [a] type of action in debt requiring trial by jury.” To determine whether a suit is legal in nature, we directed courts to consider the cause of action and the remedy it provides. Since some causes of action sound in both law and equity, we concluded that the remedy was the “more important” consideration.

In this case, the remedy is all but dispositive. For respondents’ alleged fraud, the SEC seeks civil penalties, a form of monetary relief. While monetary relief can be legal or equitable, money damages are the prototypical common law remedy. What determines whether a monetary remedy is legal is if it is designed to punish or deter the wrongdoer, or, on the other hand, solely to “restore the status quo.” *Tull*, 481 U. S., at 422. As we have previously explained, “a civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment.” *Austin v. United States*, 509 U.S.602, 610 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). And while courts of equity could order a defendant to return unjustly obtained funds, only courts of law issued monetary penalties to “punish culpable individuals.” *Tull*, 481 U. S., at 422. Applying these principles, we have recognized that “civil penalt[ies are] a type of remedy at common law that could only be enforced in courts of law.” The same is true here.

To start, the Securities Exchange Act and the Investment Advisers Act condition the availability of civil penalties on six statutory factors: (1) whether the alleged misconduct involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard for regulatory requirements, (2) whether it caused harm, (3) whether it resulted in unjust enrichment, accounting for any restitution made, (4) whether the defendant had previously violated securities laws or regulations, or had previously committed certain crimes, (5) the need for deterrence, and (6) other “matters as justice may require.” §§ 78u-2(c), 80b-3(i)(3). Of these, several concern culpability, deterrence, and recidivism. Because they tie the availability of civil penalties to the perceived need to punish the defendant rather than to restore the victim, such considerations are legal rather than equitable.

The same is true of the criteria that determine the size of the available remedy. The Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act establish three “tiers” of civil penalties. See §§ 77h-1(g)(2), 78u-2(b), 80b-3(i)(2). Violating a federal securities law or regulation exposes a defendant to a first tier penalty. A second tier penalty may be ordered if the violation involved fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard for regulatory requirements. Finally, if those acts also resulted in substantial gains to the defendant or losses to another, or created a “significant risk” of the latter, the defendant

is subject to a third tier penalty. Each successive tier authorizes a larger monetary sanction. See *ibid.*

Like the considerations that determine the availability of civil penalties in the first place, the criteria that divide these tiers are also legal in nature. Each tier conditions the available penalty on the culpability of the defendant and the need for deterrence, not the size of the harm that must be remedied. Indeed, showing that a victim suffered harm is not even required to advance a defendant from one tier to the next. Since nothing in this analysis turns on “restor[ing] the status quo,” *Tull*, 481 U. S., at 422, these factors show that these civil penalties are designed to be punitive.

The final proof that this remedy is punitive is that the SEC is not obligated to return any money to victims. Although the SEC can choose to compensate injured shareholders from the civil penalties it collects, see 15 U.S.C. § 7246(a), it admits that it is not required to do so. Such a penalty by definition does not “restore the status quo” and can make no pretense of being equitable. *Tull*, 481 U. S., at 422. ***

The close relationship between the causes of action in this case and common law fraud confirms that conclusion. Both target the same basic conduct: misrepresenting or concealing material facts. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q(a)(2), 78j(b), 80b-6(4); 17 CFR §§ 240.10b-5(b), 275.206(4)-8(a)(1), with Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm, §§ 9, 13 (2018). That is no accident. Congress deliberately used “fraud” and other common law terms of art in the Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Investment Advisers Act. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(3) (prohibiting any practice “which operates . . . as a fraud”). In so doing, Congress incorporated prohibitions from common law fraud into federal securities law. The SEC has followed suit in rulemakings. Rule 10b-5, for example, prohibits “any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,” and “engag[ing] in any act . . . which operates or would operate as a fraud.” 17 CFR §§ 240.10b-5(a), (c).

Congress’s decision to draw upon common law fraud created an enduring link between federal securities fraud and its common law “ancestor.” *Foster v. Wilson*, 504 F. 3d 1046, 1050 (CA9 2007). “[W]hen Congress transplants a common-law term, the old soil comes with it.” *United States v. Hansen*, 599 U.S.762, 778 (2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our precedents therefore often consider common law fraud principles when interpreting federal securities law.

That is not to say that federal securities fraud and common law fraud are identical. In some respects, federal securities fraud is narrower. *** Nevertheless, the close relationship between federal securities fraud and common law fraud confirms that this action is “legal in nature.” *Granfinanciera*, 492 U. S., at 53.

B
1

Although the claims at issue here implicate the Seventh Amendment, the Government and the dissent argue that a jury trial is not required because the “public rights” exception applies. Under this exception, Congress may assign the matter for decision to an agency without a jury, consistent with the Seventh Amendment. But this case does not fall within the exception, so Congress may not avoid a jury trial by preventing the case from being heard before an Article III tribunal.

The Constitution prohibits Congress from “withdraw[ing] from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law.” *Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.*, 18 How. 272, 284 (1856). Once such a suit “is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction,” an Article III court must decide it, with a jury if the Seventh Amendment applies. *Stern v. Marshall*, 564 U.S.462, 484 (2011). These propositions are critical to maintaining the proper role of the Judiciary in the Constitution: “Under ‘the basic concept of separation of powers . . . that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite government’ adopted in the Constitution, ‘the judicial Power of the United States’” cannot be shared with the other branches. *Id.*, at 483 (quoting *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S.683, 704 (1974); alteration in original). ***

A hallmark that we have looked to in determining if a suit concerns private rights is whether it “is made of ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789.’” *Id.*, at 484 (quoting *Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.*, 458 U.S.50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment)). If a suit is in the nature of an action at common law, then the matter presumptively concerns private rights, and adjudication by an Article III court is mandatory.

At the same time, our precedent has also recognized a class of cases concerning what we have called “public rights.” Such matters “historically could have been determined exclusively by [the executive and legislative] branches,” even when they were “presented in such form that the judicial power [wa]s capable of acting on them,” *Murray’s Lessee*, 18 How., at 284. In contrast to common law claims, no involvement by an Article III court in the initial adjudication is necessary in such a case.

The decision that first recognized the public rights exception was *Murray’s Lessee*. In that case, a federal customs collector failed to deliver public funds to the Treasury, so the Government issued a “warrant of distress” to compel him to produce the withheld sum. Pursuant to the warrant, the Government eventually seized and sold a plot of the collector’s land. Plaintiffs later attacked the purchaser’s title, arguing that the initial seizure was void because the Government had audited the collector’s account and issued the warrant itself without judicial involvement.

The Court upheld the sale. It explained that pursuant to its power to collect revenue, the Government could rely on “summary proceedings” to compel its officers to “pay such balances of the public money” into the Treasury “as may be in their hands.” Indeed, the Court observed, there was an unbroken tradition—long predating the founding—of using these kinds of proceedings to “enforce payment of balances due from receivers of the revenue.” In light of this historical practice, the Government could issue a valid warrant without intruding on the domain of the Judiciary. The challenge to the sale thus lacked merit.

*** This Court has since held that certain other historic categories of adjudications fall within the exception, including relations with Indian tribes, see *United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation*, 564 U.S.162, 174 (2011), the administration of public lands, *Crowell v. Benson*, 285 U.S. 22, 51 (1932), and the granting of public benefits such as payments to veterans, *ibid.*, pensions, *ibid.*, and patent rights, *United States v. Duell*, 172 U.S.576, 582-583 (1899).

Nevertheless, since *Murray's Lessee*, this Court has typically evaluated the legal basis for the assertion of the doctrine with care. *** From the beginning we have emphasized one point: “To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, we think it proper to state that we do not consider congress can . . . withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” *Murray's Lessee*, 18 How., at 284. ***

2

*** *Granfinanciera* involved a statutory action for fraudulent conveyance. As codified in the Bankruptcy Code, the claim permitted a trustee to void a transfer or obligation made by the debtor before bankruptcy if the debtor “received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation.” 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1982 ed., Supp. V). Actions for fraudulent conveyance were well known at common law. Even when Congress added these claims to the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it preserved parties’ rights to a trial by jury,. In 1984, however, Congress designated fraudulent conveyance actions “core [bankruptcy] proceedings” and authorized non-Article III bankruptcy judges to hear them without juries.

The issue in *Granfinanciera* was whether this designation was permissible under the public rights exception. We explained that it was not. *** “[T]raditional legal claims” must be decided by courts, “whether they originate in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme or possess a long line of common-law forebears.” To determine whether the claim implicated the Seventh Amendment, the Court applied the principles distilled in *Tull*. We examined whether the matter was “from [its] nature subject to ‘a suit at common law.’” A survey of English cases showed that “actions to recover . . . fraudulent transfers were often brought at law in late 18th-century England.” The remedy the trustee sought was also one “traditionally provided by law courts.” Fraudulent conveyance actions were thus “quintessentially suits at common law.”

We also considered whether these actions were “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy regime. Some bankruptcy claims, such as “creditors’ hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res,” are highly interdependent and require coordination. Resolving such claims fairly is only possible if they are all submitted at once to a single adjudicator. Otherwise, parties with lower priority claims can rush to the courthouse to seek payment before higher priority claims exhaust the estate, and an orderly disposition of a bankruptcy is impossible. Other claims, though, can be brought in standalone suits, because they are neither prioritized nor subordinated to related claims. Since fraudulent conveyance actions fall into that latter category, we concluded that these actions were not “closely intertwined” with the bankruptcy process. We also noted that Congress had already authorized jury trials for certain bankruptcy matters, demonstrating that jury trials were not generally “incompatible” with the overall regime.

We accordingly concluded that fraudulent conveyance actions were akin to “suits at common law” and were not inseparable from the bankruptcy process. The public rights exception therefore did not apply, and a jury was required.

3

Granfinanciera effectively decides this case. Even when an action “originate[s] in a newly fashioned regulatory scheme,” what matters is the substance of the action, not where Congress has assigned it. And in this case, the substance points in only one direction.

According to the SEC, these are actions under the “antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws” for “fraudulent conduct.” App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a-73a (opinion of the Commission). They provide civil penalties, a punitive remedy that we have recognized “could only be enforced in courts of law.” *Tull*, 481 U. S., at 422. And they target the same basic conduct as common law fraud, employ the same terms of art, and operate pursuant to similar legal principles. In short, this action involves a “matter[] of private rather than public right.” *Granfinanciera*, 492 U. S., at 56. Therefore, “Congress may not ‘withdraw’ it ‘from judicial cognizance.’” *Stern*, 564 U. S., at 484 (quoting *Murray’s Lessee*, 18 How., at 284).

4

[The Government emphasizes it] is the party prosecuting this action. But we have never held that “the presence of the United States as a proper party to the proceeding is . . . sufficient” by itself to trigger the exception. *Northern Pipeline Constr. Co.*, 458 U. S., at 69, n. 23 (plurality opinion). Again, what matters is the substance of the suit, not where it is brought, who brings it, or how it is labeled. The object of this SEC action is to regulate transactions between private individuals interacting in a pre-existing market. To do so, the Government has created claims whose causes of action are modeled on common law fraud and that provide a type of remedy available only in law courts. This is a common law suit in all but name. And such suits typically must be adjudicated in Article III courts.

5

The principal case on which the SEC and the dissent rely is *Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission*, 430 U.S.442 (1977). *** The litigation in *Atlas Roofing* arose under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSH Act), a federal regulatory regime created to promote safe working conditions. The Act authorized the Secretary of Labor to promulgate safety regulations, and it empowered the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to adjudicate alleged violations. If a party violated the regulations, the agency could impose civil penalties.

Unlike the claims in *Granfinanciera* and this action, the OSH Act did not borrow its cause of action from the common law. Rather, it simply commanded that “[e]ach employer . . . shall comply with occupational safety and health standards promulgated under this chapter.” 84 Stat. 1593, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976 ed.). These standards bring no common law soil with them. Rather than reiterate common law terms of art, they instead resembled a detailed building code. For example, the OSH Act regulations directed that a ground trench wall of “Solid Rock, Shale, or Cemented Sand and Gravels” could be constructed at a 90 degree angle to the ground. 29 CFR § 1926.652, Table P-1 (1976); see *Atlas Roofing*, 430 U. S., at 447 (discussing Table P-1). But a wall of “Compacted Angular Gravels” needed to be sloped at 63 degrees, and a wall of “Well Rounded Loose Sand” at 26 degrees. § 1926.652, Table P-1. The purpose of this regime was not to enable the Federal Government to bring or adjudicate claims that traced their ancestry to the common law. Rather, Congress stated that it intended the agency to “develop[] innovative methods, techniques, and approaches for dealing with occupational safety and health problems.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(5) (1976 ed.). In both concept and execution, the Act was self-consciously novel.

*** As the Court explained, the case involved “a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law.” The Seventh Amendment, the Court concluded, was accordingly “no bar to . . . enforcement outside the regular courts of law.”

Jarkesy and Patriot28 are entitled to a jury trial in an Article III court. We do not reach the remaining constitutional issues and affirm the ruling of the Fifth Circuit on the Seventh Amendment ground alone.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

[Concurring opinion of Justice GORSUCH, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joined, omitted.]

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE KAGAN and JUSTICE JACKSON join, dissenting.

*** [The Seventh] Amendment is limited to “Suits at common law.” That means two things. First, that the right applies only in judicial proceedings. *** Second, the requirement that the “[s]uit” must be one “at common law” means that the claim at issue must be “legal in nature.” So, whether a defendant is entitled to a jury under the Seventh Amendment depends on both the forum and the cause of action. If the claim is in an Article III proceeding, then the right to a jury attaches if the claim is “legal in nature” and the amount in controversy exceeds \$20. *Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg*, 492 U.S.33, 53 (1989); *Atlas Roofing*, 430 U. S., at 454, n. 12, 461, n. 16. ***

The conclusion that Congress properly assigned a matter to an agency for adjudication therefore necessarily “resolves [any] Seventh Amendment challenge.” *** So, the critical issue in this type of case is whether Congress can assign a particular matter to a non-Article III factfinder. ***

In *Atlas Roofing*, the Court explained how Congress identified a national problem, concluded that existing legal remedies were inadequate to address it, and then created a new statutory scheme that endorsed Executive in-house enforcement as a solution. Specifically, Congress found “that work-related deaths and injuries had become a ‘drastic’ national problem,” and that existing causes of action, including tort actions for negligence and wrongful death, did not adequately “protect the employee population from death and injury due to unsafe working conditions.” In response, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) to require employers “to avoid maintaining unsafe or unhealthy working conditions.” OSHA in turn “empower[ed] the Secretary of Labor to promulgate health and safety standards,” and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to impose civil penalties on employers maintaining unsafe working conditions, regardless of whether any worker was in fact injured or killed. ***

This Court upheld OSHA’s statutory scheme. It relied on the long history of public-rights cases endorsing Congress’s now-settled practice of assigning the Government’s rights to civil penalties for violations of a statutory obligation to in-house adjudication in the first instance. In light of this “history and our cases,” the Court concluded that, where Congress “create[s] a new cause of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law,” it is

free to “plac[e] their enforcement in a tribunal supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved.” “That is the case even if the Seventh Amendment would have required a jury where the adjudication of those rights is assigned to a federal court of law.”

*** This case may involve a different statute from *Atlas Roofing*, but the schemes are remarkably similar. Here, just as in *Atlas Roofing*, Congress identified a problem; concluded that the existing remedies were inadequate; and enacted a new regulatory scheme as a solution. The problem was a lack of transparency and accountability in the securities market that contributed to the Great Depression of the 1930s. The inadequate remedies were the then-existing state statutory and common-law fraud causes of action. The solution was a comprehensive federal scheme of securities regulation consisting of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. In particular, Congress enacted these securities laws to ensure “full disclosure” and promote ethical business practices “in the securities industry,” *SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.*, 375 U.S.180, 186 (1963), as well as to “protect investors against manipulation of stock prices,” *Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder*, 425 U.S.185, 195 (1976).

The prophylactic nature of the statutory regime also is virtually indistinguishable from the OSHA scheme at issue in *Atlas Roofing*. *** Moreover, both here and in *Atlas Roofing*, Congress empowered the Government to institute administrative enforcement proceedings to adjudicate potential violations of federal law and impose civil penalties on a private party for those violations, all while making the final agency decision subject to judicial review. In bringing a securities claim, the SEC seeks redress for a “violation” that “is committed against the United States rather than an aggrieved individual,” which “is why, for example, a securities-enforcement action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not parties to the prosecution.” *Kokesh v. SEC*, 581 U.S.455, 463 (2017). Put differently, the SEC seeks to “remedy harm to the public at large” for violation of the Government’s rights. The Government likewise seeks to remedy a public harm when it enforces OSHA’s prohibition of unsafe working conditions.

Ultimately, both cases arise between the Government and others in connection with the performance of the Government’s constitutional functions, and involve the Government acting in its sovereign capacity to bring a statutory claim on behalf of the United States in order to vindicate the public interest. They both involve, as *Atlas Roofing* put it, “new cause[s] of action, and remedies therefor, unknown to the common law.” Neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment prohibits Congress from assigning the enforcement of these new “Government[t] rights to civil penalties” to non-Article III adjudicators, and thus “supplying speedy and expert resolutions of the issues involved.” ***

Trump v. United States
144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024)

Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case concerns the federal indictment of a former President of the United States for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office. We consider the scope of a President’s immunity from criminal prosecution.

I

From January 2017 until January 2021, Donald J. Trump served as President of the United States. On August 1, 2023, a federal grand jury indicted him on four counts for conduct that occurred during his Presidency following the November 2020 election. The indictment alleged that after losing that election, Trump conspired to overturn it by spreading knowingly false claims of election fraud to obstruct the collecting, counting, and certifying of the election results.

According to the indictment, Trump advanced his goal through five primary means. First, he and his co-conspirators “used knowingly false claims of election fraud to get state legislators and election officials to . . . change electoral votes for [Trump’s] opponent, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., to electoral votes for [Trump].” Second, Trump and his co-conspirators “organized fraudulent slates of electors in seven targeted states” and “caused these fraudulent electors to transmit their false certificates to the Vice President and other government officials to be counted at the certification proceeding on January 6.” Third, Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to use the Justice Department “to conduct sham election crime investigations and to send a letter to the targeted states that falsely claimed that the Justice Department had identified significant concerns that may have impacted the election outcome.” Fourth, Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to persuade “the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” And when that failed, on the morning of January 6, they “repeated knowingly false claims of election fraud to gathered supporters, falsely told them that the Vice President had the authority to and might alter the election results, and directed them to the Capitol to obstruct the certification proceeding.” *Ibid.* Fifth, when “a large and angry crowd . . . violently attacked the Capitol and halted the proceeding,” Trump and his co-conspirators “exploited the disruption by redoubling efforts to levy false claims of election fraud and convince Members of Congress to further delay the certification.”

Based on this alleged conduct, the indictment charged Trump with (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, (2) conspiracy to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of §1512(k), (3) obstruction of and attempt to obstruct an official proceeding in violation of §1512(c)(2), §2, and (4) conspiracy against rights in violation of §241.

Trump moved to dismiss the indictment based on Presidential immunity. In his view, the conduct alleged in the indictment, properly characterized, was that while he was President he (1) “made public statements about the administration of the federal election”; (2) communicated with senior Justice Department officials “about investigating election fraud and about choosing the leadership” of the Department; (3) “communicated with state officials about the administration of the federal election and their exercise of official duties

with respect to it”; (4) “communicated with the Vice President” and with “Members of Congress about the exercise of their official duties regarding the election certification”; and (5) “authorized or directed others to organize contingent slates of electors in furtherance of his attempts to convince the Vice President to exercise his official authority in a manner advocated for by President Trump.” Trump argued that all of the indictment’s allegations fell within the core of his official duties. And he contended that a President has absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for actions performed within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, to ensure that he can undertake the especially sensitive duties of his office with bold and unhesitating action.

The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that “former Presidents do not possess absolute federal criminal immunity for any acts committed while in office.” 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215162, 2023 WL 8359833, *15 (DC, Dec. 1, 2023). The District Court recognized that the President is immune from damages liability in civil cases, to protect against the chilling effect such exposure might have on the carrying out of his responsibilities. See *Nixon v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 731, 749-756 (1982). But it reasoned that “the possibility of vexatious post-Presidency litigation is much reduced in the criminal context” in light of “[t]he robust procedural safeguards attendant to federal criminal prosecutions.” The District Court declined to decide whether the indicted conduct involved official acts.

The D. C. Circuit affirmed. 91 F. 4th 1173 (2024) (per curiam). Citing *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), the court distinguished between two kinds of official acts: discretionary and ministerial. It observed that “although discretionary acts are ‘only politically examinable,’ the judiciary has the power to hear cases” involving ministerial acts that an officer is directed to perform by the legislature. From this distinction, the D. C. Circuit concluded that the “separation of powers doctrine, as expounded in *Marbury* and its progeny, necessarily permits the Judiciary to oversee the federal criminal prosecution of a former President for his official acts because the fact of the prosecution means that the former President has allegedly acted in defiance of the Congress’s laws.” In the court’s view, the fact that Trump’s actions “allegedly violated generally applicable criminal laws” meant that those actions “were not properly within the scope of his lawful discretion.” The D. C. Circuit thus concluded that Trump had “no structural immunity from the charges in the Indictment.” Like the District Court, the D. C. Circuit declined to analyze the actions described in the indictment to determine whether they involved official acts.

We granted certiorari to consider the following question: “Whether and if so to what extent does a former President enjoy presidential immunity from criminal prosecution for conduct alleged to involve official acts during his tenure in office.”

II

*** The parties before us do not dispute that a former President can be subject to criminal prosecution for unofficial acts committed while in office. They also agree that some of the conduct described in the indictment includes actions taken by Trump in his unofficial capacity.

They disagree, however, about whether a former President can be prosecuted for his official actions. Trump contends that just as a President is absolutely immune from civil

damages liability for acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities, *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 756, he must be absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for such acts. And Trump argues that the bulk of the indictment’s allegations involve conduct in his official capacity as President. Although the Government agrees that some official actions are included in the indictment’s allegations, it maintains that a former President does not enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for any actions, regardless of how they are characterized.

We conclude that under our constitutional structure of separated powers, the nature of Presidential power requires that a former President have some immunity from criminal prosecution for official acts during his tenure in office. At least with respect to the President’s exercise of his core constitutional powers, this immunity must be absolute. As for his remaining official actions, he is also entitled to immunity. At the current stage of proceedings in this case, however, we need not and do not decide whether that immunity must be absolute, or instead whether a presumptive immunity is sufficient.

A

*** No matter the context, the President’s authority to act necessarily “stem[s] either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.” *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952). In the latter case, the President’s authority is sometimes “conclusive and preclusive.” *Id.*, at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). When the President exercises such authority, he may act even when the measures he takes are “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress.” *Id.*, at 637. The exclusive constitutional authority of the President “disabl[es] the Congress from acting upon the subject.” *Id.*, at 637-638. And the courts have “no power to control [the President’s] discretion” when he acts pursuant to the powers invested exclusively in him by the Constitution. *Marbury*, 5 U.S. 137.

If the President claims authority to act but in fact exercises mere “individual will” and “authority without law,” the courts may say so. *Youngstown*, 343 U.S., at 655. In *Youngstown*, for instance, we held that President Truman exceeded his constitutional authority when he seized most of the Nation’s steel mills. But once it is determined that the President acted within the scope of his exclusive authority, his discretion in exercising such authority cannot be subject to further judicial examination.

The Constitution, for example, vests the “Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States” in the President. Art. II, §2, cl. 1. During and after the Civil War, President Lincoln offered a full pardon, with restoration of property rights, to anyone who had “engaged in the rebellion” but agreed to take an oath of allegiance to the Union. *United States v. Klein*, 80 U.S. 128, 139-141 (1872). But in 1870, Congress enacted a provision that prohibited using the President’s pardon as evidence of restoration of property rights. Chief Justice Chase held the provision unconstitutional because it “impair[ed] the effect of a pardon, and thus infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive.” “To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon,” and the “legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law.” The President’s authority to pardon, in other words, is “conclusive and preclusive,” “disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.” *Youngstown*, 343 U.S., at 637-638 (Jackson, J., concurring).

Some of the President’s other constitutional powers also fit that description. “The President’s power to remove—and thus supervise—those who wield executive power on his behalf,” for instance, “follows from the text of Article II.” *Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau*, 591 U.S. 197, 204 (2020). We have thus held that Congress lacks authority to control the President’s “unrestricted power of removal” with respect to “executive officers of the United States whom he has appointed.” *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52, 106 (1926); see *Youngstown*, 343 U.S., at 638, n. 4, 72 S. Ct. 863, 96 L. Ed. 1153, 62 Ohio Law Abs. 417 (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing the President’s “exclusive power of removal in executive agencies” as an example of “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority). The power “to control recognition determinations” of foreign countries is likewise an “exclusive power of the President.” *Zivotofsky v. Kerry*, 576 U.S. 1, 32 (2015). Congressional commands contrary to the President’s recognition determinations are thus invalid.

Congress cannot act on, and courts cannot examine, the President’s actions on subjects within his “conclusive and preclusive” constitutional authority. It follows that an Act of Congress—either a specific one targeted at the President or a generally applicable one—may not criminalize the President’s actions within his exclusive constitutional power. Neither may the courts adjudicate a criminal prosecution that examines such Presidential actions. We thus conclude that the President is absolutely immune from criminal prosecution for conduct within his exclusive sphere of constitutional authority.

B

But of course not all of the President’s official acts fall within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority. As Justice Robert Jackson recognized in *Youngstown*, the President sometimes “acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,” or in a “zone of twilight” where “he and Congress may have concurrent authority.” The reasons that justify the President’s absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for acts within the scope of his exclusive authority therefore do not extend to conduct in areas where his authority is shared with Congress.

We recognize that only a limited number of our prior decisions guide determination of the President’s immunity in this context. *** To resolve the matter, therefore, we look primarily to the Framers’ design of the Presidency within the separation of powers, our precedent on Presidential immunity in the civil context, and our criminal cases where a President resisted prosecutorial demands for documents.

1

The President “occupies a unique position in the constitutional scheme,” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 749, as “the only person who alone composes a branch of government,” *Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP*, 591 U.S. 848, 868 (2020). The Framers “sought to encourage energetic, vigorous, decisive, and speedy execution of the laws by placing in the hands of a single, constitutionally indispensable, individual the ultimate authority that, in respect to the other branches, the Constitution divides among many.” *Clinton v. Jones*, 520 U.S. 681, 712 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). They “deemed an energetic executive essential to ‘the protection of the community against foreign attacks,’ ‘the steady administration of the laws,’ ‘the protection of property,’ and ‘the security of liberty.’” *Seila Law*, 591 U.S., at 223-224 (quoting *The Federalist* No. 70, p. 471 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton)). The purpose of a “vigorous” and “energetic” Executive, they thought, was to

ensure “good government,” for a “feeble executive implies a feeble execution of the government.” *Id.*, at 471-472.

The Framers accordingly vested the President with “supervisory and policy responsibilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 750. He must make “the most sensitive and far-reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our constitutional system.” There accordingly “exists the greatest public interest” in providing the President with “the maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with’ the duties of his office.” *Ibid.* (quoting *Ferri v. Ackerman*, 444 U.S. 193, 203 (1979)). Appreciating the “unique risks to the effective functioning of government” that arise when the President’s energies are diverted by proceedings that might render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties,” we have recognized Presidential immunities and privileges “rooted in the constitutional tradition of the separation of powers and supported by our history.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 749, 751, 752, n. 32.

In *Nixon v. Fitzgerald*, for instance, we recognized that as “a functionally mandated incident of [his] unique office,” a former President “is entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability predicated on his official acts.” That case involved a terminated Air Force employee who sued former President Richard Nixon for damages, alleging that Nixon approved an Air Force reorganization that wrongfully led to his firing. In holding that Nixon was immune from that suit, “our dominant concern” was to avoid “diversion of the President’s attention during the decisionmaking process caused by needless worry as to the possibility of damages actions stemming from any particular official decision.” *Clinton*, 520 U.S., at 694, n. 19. “[T]he singular importance of the President’s duties” implicating “matters likely to ‘arouse the most intense feelings,’” coupled with “the sheer prominence of [his] office,” heightens the prospect of private damages suits that would threaten such diversion. *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 751-753 (quoting *Pierson v. Ray*, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)). We therefore concluded that the President must be absolutely immune from “damages liability for acts within the ‘outer perimeter’ of his official responsibility.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 756.

By contrast, when prosecutors have sought evidence from the President, we have consistently rejected Presidential claims of absolute immunity. For instance, during the treason trial of former Vice President Aaron Burr, Chief Justice Marshall rejected President Thomas Jefferson’s claim that the President could not be subjected to a subpoena. Marshall reasoned that “the law does not discriminate between the president and a private citizen.” *United States v. Burr*, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34, F. Cas. No. 14692d (No. 14,692d) (CC Va. 1807) (*Burr I*). Because a President does not “stand exempt from the general provisions of the constitution,” including the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that those accused shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses for their defense, a subpoena could issue.

Marshall acknowledged, however, the existence of a “privilege” to withhold certain “official paper[s]” that “ought not on light ground to be forced into public view.” *United States v. Burr*, 25 F. Cas. 187, 192, F. Cas. No. 14694 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807) (*Burr II*); see also *Burr I*, 25 F. Cas., at 37, F. Cas. No. 14692d (stating that nothing before the court showed that the document in question “contain[ed] any matter the disclosure of which would endanger the public safety”). And he noted that a court may not “be required to proceed

against the president as against an ordinary individual.” *Burr II*, 25 F. Cas., at 192, F. Cas. No. 14694.

Similarly, when a subpoena issued to President Nixon to produce certain tape recordings and documents relating to his conversations with aides and advisers, this Court rejected his claim of “absolute privilege,” given the “constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions.” *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974). But we simultaneously recognized “the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking,” as well as the need to protect “communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties.” Because the President’s “need for complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the courts,” we held that a “presumptive privilege” protects Presidential communications. That privilege, we explained, “relates to the effective discharge of a President’s powers.” We thus deemed it “fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”

2

Criminally prosecuting a President for official conduct undoubtedly poses a far greater threat of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch than simply seeking evidence in his possession, as in *Burr* and *Nixon*. The danger is akin to, indeed greater than, what led us to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from civil damages liability—that the President would be chilled from taking the “bold and unhesitating action” required of an independent Executive. *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 745. Although the President might be exposed to fewer criminal prosecutions than the range of civil damages suits that might be brought by various plaintiffs, the threat of trial, judgment, and imprisonment is a far greater deterrent. Potential criminal liability, and the peculiar public opprobrium that attaches to criminal proceedings, are plainly more likely to distort Presidential decisionmaking than the potential payment of civil damages.

The hesitation to execute the duties of his office fearlessly and fairly that might result when a President is making decisions under “a pall of potential prosecution,” *McDonnell v. United States*, 579 U.S. 550, 575 (2016), raises “unique risks to the effective functioning of government,” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 751. A President inclined to take one course of action based on the public interest may instead opt for another, apprehensive that criminal penalties may befall him upon his departure from office. And if a former President’s official acts are routinely subjected to scrutiny in criminal prosecutions, “the independence of the Executive Branch” may be significantly undermined. *Vance*, 591 U.S., at 800. The Framers’ design of the Presidency did not envision such counterproductive burdens on the “vigor[]” and “energy” of the Executive. The Federalist No. 70, at 471-472.

We must, however, “recognize[] the countervailing interests at stake.” *Vance*, 591 U.S., at 799. Federal criminal laws seek to redress “a wrong to the public” as a whole, not just “a wrong to the individual.” *Huntington v. Attrill*, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892). There is therefore a compelling “public interest in fair and effective law enforcement.” *Vance*, 591 U.S., at 808. The President, charged with enforcing federal criminal laws, is not above them.

Taking into account these competing considerations, we conclude that the separation of powers principles explicated in our precedent necessitate at least a presumptive immunity from criminal prosecution for a President's acts within the outer perimeter of his official responsibility. [I]f presumptive protection for the President is necessary to enable the "effective discharge" of his powers when a prosecutor merely seeks evidence of his official papers and communications, it is certainly necessary when the prosecutor seeks to charge, try, and imprison the President himself for his official actions. At a minimum, the President must therefore be immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose no "dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch." *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 754.

But as we explain below, the current stage of the proceedings in this case does not require us to decide whether this immunity is presumptive or absolute. See Part III-B, *infra*. Because we need not decide that question today, we do not decide it. "[O]ne case" in more than "two centuries does not afford enough experience" to definitively and comprehensively determine the President's scope of immunity from criminal prosecution.

C

As for a President's unofficial acts, there is no immunity. *** The "justifying purposes" of the immunity we recognized in *Fitzgerald*, and the one we recognize today, are not that the President must be immune because he is the President; rather, they are to ensure that the President can undertake his constitutionally designated functions effectively, free from undue pressures or distortions. "[I]t [is] the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who perform[s] it, that inform[s] our immunity analysis." *Forrester v. White*, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988). The separation of powers does not bar a prosecution predicated on the President's unofficial acts.

III

Determining whether a former President is entitled to immunity from a particular prosecution requires applying the principles we have laid out to his conduct at issue. The first step is to distinguish his official from unofficial actions. In this case, however, no court has thus far considered how to draw that distinction, in general or with respect to the conduct alleged in particular.

*** Critical threshold issues in this case are how to differentiate between a President's official and unofficial actions, and how to do so with respect to the indictment's extensive and detailed allegations covering a broad range of conduct. We offer guidance on those issues below. Certain allegations—such as those involving Trump's discussions with the Acting Attorney General—are readily categorized in light of the nature of the President's official relationship to the office held by that individual. Other allegations—such as those involving Trump's interactions with the Vice President, state officials, and certain private parties, and his comments to the general public—present more difficult questions. Although we identify several considerations pertinent to classifying those allegations and determining whether they are subject to immunity, that analysis ultimately is best left to the lower courts to perform in the first instance.

A ***

In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives. Such an inquiry would risk exposing even the most obvious instances of official conduct to judicial examination on the mere allegation of improper purpose, thereby intruding on the Article II interests that immunity seeks to protect. Indeed, “[i]t would seriously cripple the proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive branch of the government” if “[i]n exercising the functions of his office,” the President was “under an apprehension that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the subject of inquiry.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 745. We thus rejected such inquiries in *Fitzgerald*. The plaintiff there contended that he was dismissed from the Air Force for retaliatory reasons. The Air Force responded that the reorganization that led to Fitzgerald’s dismissal was undertaken to promote efficiency. Because under Fitzgerald’s theory “an inquiry into the President’s motives could not be avoided,” we rejected the theory, observing that “[i]nquiries of this kind could be highly intrusive.” “[B]are allegations of malice should not suffice to subject government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery.” *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S. 800, 817-818 (1982).

Nor may courts deem an action unofficial merely because it allegedly violates a generally applicable law. For instance, when Fitzgerald contended that his dismissal violated various congressional statute and thus rendered his discharge “outside the outer perimeter of [Nixon’s] duties,” we rejected that contention. 457 U.S., at 756. Otherwise, Presidents would be subject to trial on “every allegation that an action was unlawful,” depriving immunity of its intended effect.

B

With these principles in mind, we turn to the conduct alleged in the indictment.

1

The indictment broadly alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators sought to “overturn the legitimate results of the 2020 presidential election.” It charges that they conspired to obstruct the January 6 congressional proceeding at which electoral votes are counted and certified, and the winner of the election is certified as President-elect. As part of this conspiracy, Trump and his co-conspirators allegedly attempted to leverage the Justice Department’s power and authority to convince certain States to replace their legitimate electors with Trump’s fraudulent slates of electors. According to the indictment, Trump met with the Acting Attorney General and other senior Justice Department and White House officials to discuss investigating purported election fraud and sending a letter from the Department to those States regarding such fraud. The indictment further alleges that after the Acting Attorney General resisted Trump’s requests, Trump repeatedly threatened to replace him.

The Government does not dispute that the indictment’s allegations regarding the Justice Department involve Trump’s “use of official power.” The allegations in fact plainly implicate Trump’s “conclusive and preclusive” authority. “[I]nvestigation and prosecution of crimes is a quintessentially executive function.” Brief for United States 19 (quoting *Morrison v. Olson*, 487 U.S. 654, 706 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). And the Executive Branch has “exclusive authority and absolute discretion” to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute, including with respect to allegations of election crime. *Nixon*, 418 U.S., at 693 (2023) (“Under Article II, the Executive Branch possesses authority to decide ‘how to prioritize and how aggressively to pursue legal actions against defendants who violate

the law.” (quoting *TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez*, 594 U.S. 413, 429 (2021))). The President may discuss potential investigations and prosecutions with his Attorney General and other Justice Department officials to carry out his constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Art. II, §3. And the Attorney General, as head of the Justice Department, acts as the President’s “chief law enforcement officer” who “provides vital assistance to [him] in the performance of [his] constitutional duty to ‘preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.’” *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 520 (1985) (quoting Art. II, §1, cl. 8).

Investigative and prosecutorial decisionmaking is “the special province of the Executive Branch,” *Heckler v. Chaney*, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985), and the Constitution vests the entirety of the executive power in the President, Art. II, §1. For that reason, Trump’s threatened removal of the Acting Attorney General likewise implicates “conclusive and preclusive” Presidential authority. *** The President’s “management of the Executive Branch” requires him to have “unrestricted power to remove the most important of his subordinates”—such as the Attorney General—“in their most important duties.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 750 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).

The indictment’s allegations that the requested investigations were “sham[s]” or proposed for an improper purpose do not divest the President of exclusive authority over the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Justice Department and its officials. And the President cannot be prosecuted for conduct within his exclusive constitutional authority. Trump is therefore absolutely immune from prosecution for the alleged conduct involving his discussions with Justice Department officials.

2

The indictment next alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators “attempted to enlist the Vice President to use his ceremonial role at the January 6 certification proceeding to fraudulently alter the election results.” In particular, the indictment alleges several conversations in which Trump pressured the Vice President to reject States’ legitimate electoral votes or send them back to state legislatures for review.

The Government explained at oral argument that although it “has not yet had to come to grips with how [it] would analyze” Trump’s interactions with the Vice President, there is “support” to characterize that conduct as official. Indeed, our constitutional system anticipates that the President and Vice President will remain in close contact regarding their official duties over the course of the President’s term in office. *** It is thus important for the President to discuss official matters with the Vice President to ensure continuity within the Executive Branch and to advance the President’s agenda in Congress and beyond.

The Vice President may in practice also serve as one of the President’s closest advisers. The Office of Legal Counsel has explained that within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s “sole function [is] advising and assisting the President.” Whether the Office of the Vice President Is an ‘Agency’ for Purposes of the Freedom of Information Act, 18 Op. OLC 10 (1994). ***

As the President’s second in command, the Vice President has historically performed important functions “at the will and as the representative of the President.” Participation of the Vice President in the Affairs of the Executive Branch, 1 Op. O.L.C. Supp. 214, 220 (1961).

*** At the President’s discretion, “the Vice President may engage in activities ranging into the highest levels of diplomacy and negotiation and may do so anywhere in the world.” 1 Op. OLC Supp., at 220. Domestically, he may act as the President’s delegate to perform any duties “co-extensive with the scope of the President’s power of delegation.” *Ibid.*

Whenever the President and Vice President discuss their official responsibilities, they engage in official conduct. Presiding over the January 6 certification proceeding at which Members of Congress count the electoral votes is a constitutional and statutory duty of the Vice President. Art. II, §1, cl. 3; Amdt. 12; 3 U.S.C. §15. The indictment’s allegations that Trump attempted to pressure the Vice President to take particular acts in connection with his role at the certification proceeding thus involve official conduct, and Trump is at least presumptively immune from prosecution for such conduct.

The question then becomes whether that presumption of immunity is rebutted under the circumstances. When the Vice President presides over the January 6 certification proceeding, he does so in his capacity as President of the Senate. Despite the Vice President’s expansive role of advising and assisting the President within the Executive Branch, the Vice President’s Article I responsibility of “presiding over the Senate” is “not an ‘executive branch’ function.” Memorandum from L. Silberman, Deputy Atty. Gen., to R. Burrell, Office of the President, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising Out of the President’s Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller To Be Vice President Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution 2 (Aug. 28, 1974). With respect to the certification proceeding in particular, Congress has legislated extensively to define the Vice President’s role in the counting of the electoral votes, see, e.g., 3 U.S.C. §15, and the President plays no direct constitutional or statutory role in that process. So the Government may argue that consideration of the President’s communications with the Vice President concerning the certification proceeding does not pose “dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 754 ***.

At the same time, however, the President may frequently rely on the Vice President in his capacity as President of the Senate to advance the President’s agenda in Congress. When the Senate is closely divided, for instance, the Vice President’s tiebreaking vote may be crucial for confirming the President’s nominees and passing laws that align with the President’s policies. Applying a criminal prohibition to the President’s conversations discussing such matters with the Vice President—even though they concern his role as President of the Senate—may well hinder the President’s ability to perform his constitutional functions.

It is ultimately the Government’s burden to rebut the presumption of immunity. We therefore remand to the District Court to assess in the first instance, with appropriate input from the parties, whether a prosecution involving Trump’s alleged attempts to influence the Vice President’s oversight of the certification proceeding in his capacity as President of the Senate would pose any dangers of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.

3

The indictment’s remaining allegations cover a broad range of conduct. Unlike the allegations describing Trump’s communications with the Justice Department and the Vice President, these remaining allegations involve Trump’s interactions with persons outside the

Executive Branch: state officials, private parties, and the general public. Many of the remaining allegations, for instance, cover at great length events arising out of communications that Trump and his co-conspirators initiated with state legislators and election officials in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin regarding those States' certification of electors.

Specifically, the indictment alleges that Trump and his co-conspirators attempted to convince those officials that election fraud had tainted the popular vote count in their States, and thus electoral votes for Trump's opponent needed to be changed to electoral votes for Trump. After Trump failed to convince those officials to alter their state processes, he and his co-conspirators allegedly developed a plan "to marshal individuals who would have served as [Trump's] electors, had he won the popular vote" in Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, "and cause those individuals to make and send to the Vice President and Congress false certifications that they were legitimate electors." If the plan worked, "the submission of these fraudulent slates" would position the Vice President to "open and count the fraudulent votes" at the certification proceeding and set up "a fake controversy that would derail the proper certification of Biden as president-elect." According to the indictment, Trump used his campaign staff to effectuate the plan. On the same day that the legitimate electors met in their respective jurisdictions to cast their votes, the indictment alleges that Trump's "fraudulent electors convened sham proceedings in the seven targeted states to cast fraudulent electoral ballots" in his favor. Those ballots "were mailed to the President of the Senate, the Archivist of the United States, and others."

At oral argument, Trump appeared to concede that at least some of these acts—those involving "private actors" who "helped implement a plan to submit fraudulent slates of presidential electors to obstruct the certification proceeding" at the direction of Trump and a co-conspirator—entail "private" conduct. He later asserted, however, that asking "the chairwoman of the Republican National Committee . . . to gather electors" qualifies as official conduct because "the organization of alternate slates of electors is based on, for example, the historical example of President Grant as something that was done pursuant to and ancillary and preparatory to the exercise of " a core Presidential power. *** As the Government sees it, however, these allegations encompass nothing more than Trump's "private scheme with private actors." In its view, Trump can point to no plausible source of authority enabling the President to not only organize alternate slates of electors but also cause those electors—unapproved by any state official—to transmit votes to the President of the Senate for counting at the certification proceeding, thus interfering with the votes of States' properly appointed electors. ***

Determining whose characterization may be correct, and with respect to which conduct, requires a close analysis of the indictment's extensive and interrelated allegations. Unlike Trump's alleged interactions with the Justice Department, this alleged conduct cannot be neatly categorized as falling within a particular Presidential function. The necessary analysis is instead fact specific, requiring assessment of numerous alleged interactions with a wide variety of state officials and private persons. And the parties' brief comments at oral argument indicate that they starkly disagree on the characterization of these allegations. The concerns we noted at the outset—the expedition of this case, the lack of factual analysis by the lower courts, and the absence of pertinent briefing by the parties—thus become more prominent. We accordingly remand to the District Court to determine in

the first instance—with the benefit of briefing we lack—whether Trump’s conduct in this area qualifies as official or unofficial.

4

Finally, the indictment contains various allegations regarding Trump’s conduct in connection with the events of January 6 itself. It alleges that leading up to the January 6 certification proceeding, Trump issued a series of Tweets (to his nearly 89 million followers) encouraging his supporters to travel to Washington, D. C., on that day. Trump and his co-conspirators addressed the gathered public that morning, asserting that certain States wanted to recertify their electoral votes and that the Vice President had the power to send those States’ ballots back for recertification. Trump then allegedly “directed the crowd in front of him to go to the Capitol” to pressure the Vice President to do so at the certification proceeding. When it became public that the Vice President would not use his role at the certification proceeding to determine which electoral votes should be counted, the crowd gathered at the Capitol “broke through barriers cordoning off the Capitol grounds” and eventually “broke into the building.”

The alleged conduct largely consists of Trump’s communications in the form of Tweets and a public address. The President possesses “extraordinary power to speak to his fellow citizens and on their behalf.” *Hawaii*, 585 U.S., at 701. As the sole person charged by the Constitution with executing the laws of the United States, the President oversees—and thus will frequently speak publicly about—a vast array of activities that touch on nearly every aspect of American life. Indeed, a long-recognized aspect of Presidential power is using the office’s “bully pulpit” to persuade Americans, including by speaking forcefully or critically, in ways that the President believes would advance the public interest. He is even expected to comment on those matters of public concern that may not directly implicate the activities of the Federal Government—for instance, to comfort the Nation in the wake of an emergency or tragedy. For these reasons, most of a President’s public communications are likely to fall comfortably within the outer perimeter of his official responsibilities.

There may, however, be contexts in which the President, notwithstanding the prominence of his position, speaks in an unofficial capacity—perhaps as a candidate for office or party leader. To the extent that may be the case, objective analysis of “content, form, and context” will necessarily inform the inquiry. *** The analysis therefore must be fact specific and may prove to be challenging.

The indictment reflects these challenges. It includes only select Tweets and brief snippets of the speech Trump delivered on the morning of January 6, omitting its full text or context. Whether the Tweets, that speech, and Trump’s other communications on January 6 involve official conduct may depend on the content and context of each. Knowing, for instance, what else was said contemporaneous to the excerpted communications, or who was involved in transmitting the electronic communications and in organizing the rally, could be relevant to the classification of each communication. This necessarily factbound analysis is best performed initially by the District Court. We therefore remand to the District Court to determine in the first instance whether this alleged conduct is official or unofficial.

C

*** The Government does not dispute that if Trump is entitled to immunity for certain official acts, he may not “be held criminally liable” based on those acts. But it nevertheless contends that a jury could “consider” evidence concerning the President’s official acts “for

limited and specified purposes,” and that such evidence would “be admissible to prove, for example, [Trump’s] knowledge or notice of the falsity of his election-fraud claims.” That proposal threatens to eviscerate the immunity we have recognized. It would permit a prosecutor to do indirectly what he cannot do directly—invite the jury to examine acts for which a President is immune from prosecution to nonetheless prove his liability on any charge. *** [T]he Government’s position is untenable in light of the separation of powers principles we have outlined.

If official conduct for which the President is immune may be scrutinized to help secure his conviction, even on charges that purport to be based only on his unofficial conduct, the “intended effect” of immunity would be defeated. *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 756. The President’s immune conduct would be subject to examination] by a jury on the basis of generally applicable criminal laws. Use of evidence about such conduct, even when an indictment alleges only unofficial conduct, would thereby heighten the prospect that the President’s official decisionmaking will be distorted.

The Government asserts that these weighty concerns can be managed by the District Court through the use of “evidentiary rulings” and “jury instructions.” But such tools are unlikely to protect adequately the President’s constitutional prerogatives. Presidential acts frequently deal with “matters likely to ‘arouse the most intense feelings.’” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 752 (quoting *Pierson*, 386 U.S., at 554). Allowing prosecutors to ask or suggest that the jury probe official acts for which the President is immune would thus raise a unique risk that the jurors’ deliberations will be prejudiced by their views of the President’s policies and performance while in office. The prosaic tools on which the Government would have courts rely are an inadequate safeguard against the peculiar constitutional concerns implicated in the prosecution of a former President. Although such tools may suffice to protect the constitutional rights of individual criminal defendants, the interests that underlie Presidential immunity seek to protect not the President himself, but the institution of the Presidency.

IV A

Trump asserts a far broader immunity than the limited one we have recognized. He contends that the indictment must be dismissed because the Impeachment Judgment Clause requires that impeachment and Senate conviction precede a President’s criminal prosecution. The text of the Clause provides little support for such an absolute immunity. It states that an impeachment judgment “shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” Art. I, §3, cl. 7. It then specifies that “the Party convicted shall *nevertheless* be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” *Ibid.* (emphasis added). The Clause both limits the consequences of an impeachment judgment and clarifies that notwithstanding such judgment, subsequent prosecution may proceed. By its own terms, the Clause does not address whether and on what conduct a President may be prosecuted if he was never impeached and convicted.

Historical evidence likewise lends little support to Trump’s position. For example, Justice Story reasoned that without the Clause’s clarification that “Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment” may nevertheless follow Senate conviction, “it might be matter of extreme doubt, whether . . . a second trial for the same offence could be had, either after

an acquittal, or a conviction in the court of impeachments.” 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §780, p. 251 (1833). James Wilson, who served on the Committee that drafted the Clause and later as a Justice of this Court, similarly concluded that acquittal of impeachment charges posed no bar to subsequent prosecution. See 2 Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 492 (M. Jensen ed. 1979). ***

The implication of Trump’s theory is that a President who evades impeachment for one reason or another during his term in office can never be held accountable for his criminal acts in the ordinary course of law. So if a President manages to conceal certain crimes throughout his Presidency, or if Congress is unable to muster the political will to impeach the President for his crimes, then they must forever remain impervious to prosecution.

Impeachment is a political process by which Congress can remove a President who has committed “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Art. II, §4. Transforming that political process into a necessary step in the enforcement of criminal law finds little support in the text of the Constitution or the structure of our Government.

B

The Government asserts that the [categorical immunities recognized by the Court are unnecessary because of the] “[r]obust safeguards” available in typical criminal proceedings ***. First, it points to the Justice Department’s “longstanding commitment to the impartial enforcement of the law,” as well as the criminal justice system’s further protections: grand juries, a defendant’s procedural rights during trial, and the requirement that the Government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Next, it contends that “existing principles of statutory construction and as-applied constitutional challenges” adequately address the separation of powers concerns involved in applying generally applicable criminal laws to a President. Finally, the Government cites certain defenses that would be available to the President in a particular prosecution, such as the public-authority defense or the advice of the Attorney General.

These safeguards, though important, do not alleviate the need for [immunities enforceable via] pretrial review. They fail to address the fact that under our system of separated powers, criminal prohibitions cannot apply to certain Presidential conduct to begin with. *** Questions about whether the President may be held liable for particular actions, consistent with the separation of powers, must be addressed at the outset of a proceeding. Even if the President were ultimately not found liable for certain official actions, the possibility of an extended proceeding alone may render him “unduly cautious in the discharge of his official duties.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 752, n. 32. Vulnerability “to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute.” *Id.*, at 752-753, n. 32 (quoting *Gregoire v. Biddle*, 177 F. 2d 579, 581 (CA2 1949) (Hand, L., C. J.)). The Constitution does not tolerate such impediments to “the effective functioning of government.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 751. ***

C

The principal dissent’s [argument] that unlike Speech and Debate Clause immunity, no constitutional text supports Presidential immunity is one that the Court rejected decades ago as “unpersuasive.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 750, n. 31 “[A] specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 750, n. 31. Nor is that premise correct. True, there is no “Presidential immunity clause” in the

Constitution. But there is no “separation of powers clause” either. *Seila Law*, 591 U.S., at 227. Yet that doctrine is undoubtedly carved into the Constitution’s text by its three articles separating powers and vesting the Executive power solely in the President. ***

The principal dissent then cites the Impeachment Judgment Clause, arguing that it “clearly contemplates that a former President may be subject to criminal prosecution.” But that Clause does not indicate whether a former President may, consistent with the separation of powers, be prosecuted for his official conduct in particular. And the assortment of historical sources the principal dissent cites are unhelpful for the same reason. As the Court has previously noted, relevant historical evidence on the question of Presidential immunity is of a “fragmentary character.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 752, n.31. “[T]he most compelling arguments,” therefore, “arise from the Constitution’s separation of powers and the Judiciary’s historic understanding of that doctrine.” *Fitzgerald*, 457 U.S., at 752, n. 31. ***

*** The principal dissent suggests that there is an “established understanding” that “former Presidents are answerable to the criminal law for their official acts.” Conspicuously absent is mention of the fact that since the founding, no President has ever faced criminal charges—let alone for his conduct in office. And accordingly no court has ever been faced with the question of a President’s immunity from prosecution. All that our Nation’s practice establishes on the subject is silence.

[T]he dissents repeatedly level variations of the accusation that the Court has rendered the President “above the law.” *** Like everyone else, the President is subject to prosecution in his unofficial capacity. But unlike anyone else, the President is a branch of government, and the Constitution vests in him sweeping powers and duties. Accounting for that reality—and ensuring that the President may exercise those powers forcefully, as the Framers anticipated he would—does not place him above the law; it preserves the basic structure of the Constitution from which that law derives. ***

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice BARRETT, concurring in part.

For reasons I explain below, I do not join Part III-C of the Court’s opinion. The remainder of the opinion is consistent with my view that the Constitution prohibits Congress from criminalizing a President’s exercise of core Article II powers and closely related conduct. That said, I would have framed the underlying legal issues differently. *** Though I agree that a President cannot be held criminally liable for conduct within his “conclusive and preclusive” authority and closely related acts, the Constitution does not vest every exercise of executive power in the President’s sole discretion, *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Congress has concurrent authority over many Government functions, and it may sometimes use that authority to regulate the President’s official conduct, including by criminal statute. Article II poses no barrier to prosecution in such cases.

I would thus assess the validity of criminal charges predicated on most official acts—i.e., those falling outside of the President’s core executive power—in two steps. The first

question is whether the relevant criminal statute reaches the President’s official conduct. Not every broadly worded statute does. For example, §956 covers conspiracy to murder in a foreign country and does not expressly exclude the President’s decision to, say, order a hostage rescue mission abroad. 18 U.S.C. §956(a). The underlying murder statute, however, covers only “unlawful” killings. §1111. The Office of Legal Counsel has interpreted that phrase to reflect a public-authority exception for official acts involving the military and law enforcement. Memorandum from D. Barron, Acting Assistant Atty. Gen., to E. Holder, Atty. Gen., Re: Applicability of Federal Criminal Laws and the Constitution to Contemplated Lethal Operations Against Shaykh Anwar al-Aulaqi 12-19 (July 16, 2010); see also Brief for United States 29-30 *** I express no view about the merits of that interpretation, but it shows that the threshold question of statutory interpretation is a nontrivial step.

If the statute covers the alleged official conduct, the prosecution may proceed only if applying it in the circumstances poses no “dange[r] of intrusion on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” On remand, the lower courts will have to apply that standard to various allegations involving the President’s official conduct. Some of those allegations raise unsettled questions about the scope of Article II power, but others do not. For example, the indictment alleges that the President “asked the Arizona House Speaker to call the legislature into session to hold a hearing” about election fraud claims. The President has no authority over state legislatures or their leadership, so it is hard to see how prosecuting him for crimes committed when dealing with the Arizona House Speaker would unconstitutionally intrude on executive power.

*** A criminal defendant in federal court normally must wait until after trial to seek review of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss charges. See *United States v. MacDonald*, 435 U.S. 850, 853-854 (1978); see also 18 U.S.C. §3731. But where trial itself threatens certain constitutional interests, we have treated the trial court’s resolution of the issue as a “final decision” for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.

The present circumstances fall squarely within our precedent authorizing interlocutory review. When a President moves to dismiss an indictment on Article II grounds, he “makes no challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him.” *Abney v. United States*, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 97 S. Ct. 2034, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651 (1977) (allowing interlocutory appeal of rejection of double jeopardy defense). He instead contests whether the Constitution allows Congress to criminalize the alleged conduct, a question that is “collateral to, and separable from” his guilt or innocence. *** [T]he possibility that the President will be made to defend his official conduct before a jury after he leaves office could distort his decisions while in office. These Article II concerns do not insulate the President from prosecution. But they do justify interlocutory review of the trial court’s final decision on the President’s as-applied constitutional challenge.

I understand most of the Court’s opinion to be consistent with these views. I do not join Part III-C, however, which holds that the Constitution limits the introduction of protected conduct as evidence in a criminal prosecution of a President, beyond the limits afforded by executive privilege. I disagree with that holding; on this score, I agree with the dissent. The Constitution does not require blinding juries to the circumstances surrounding conduct for which Presidents can be held liable. Consider a bribery prosecution—a charge not at issue here but one that provides a useful example. The federal bribery statute forbids any public official to seek or accept a thing of value “for or because of any official act.” 18

U.S.C. §201(c). The Constitution, of course, does not authorize a President to seek or accept bribes, so the Government may prosecute him if he does so. Yet excluding from trial any mention of the official act connected to the bribe would hamstring the prosecution. To make sense of charges alleging a quid pro quo, the jury must be allowed to hear about both the quid and the quo, even if the quo, standing alone, could not be a basis for the President's criminal liability.

I appreciate the Court's concern that allowing into evidence official acts for which the President cannot be held criminally liable may prejudice the jury. But the rules of evidence are equipped to handle that concern on a case-by-case basis. Most importantly, a trial court can exclude evidence of the President's protected conduct "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice" or "confusing the issues." Fed. Rule Evid. 403; see also Rule 105 (requiring the court to "restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly"). The balance is more likely to favor admitting evidence of an official act in a bribery prosecution, for instance, than one in which the protected conduct has little connection to the charged offense. And if the evidence comes in, the trial court can instruct the jury to consider it only for lawful purposes. I see no need to depart from that familiar and time-tested procedure here. ***

The Constitution does not insulate Presidents from criminal liability for official acts. But any statute regulating the exercise of executive power is subject to a constitutional challenge. *** Thus, a President facing prosecution may challenge the constitutionality of a criminal statute as applied to official acts alleged in the indictment. If that challenge fails, however, he must stand trial.

Justice SOTOMAYOR, with whom Justice KAGAN and Justice JACKSON join, dissenting.

Today's decision to grant former Presidents criminal immunity reshapes the institution of the Presidency. It makes a mockery of the principle, foundational to our Constitution and system of Government, that no man is above the law. Relying on little more than its own misguided wisdom about the need for "bold and unhesitating action" by the President, ante, the Court gives former President Trump all the immunity he asked for and more. ***

The majority makes three moves that, in effect, completely insulate Presidents from criminal liability. First, the majority creates absolute immunity for the President's exercise of "core constitutional powers." This holding is unnecessary on the facts of the indictment, and the majority's attempt to apply it to the facts expands the concept of core powers beyond any recognizable bounds. In any event, it is quickly eclipsed by the second move, which is to create expansive immunity for all "official act[s]." Whether described as presumptive or absolute, under the majority's rule, a President's use of any official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt, is immune from prosecution. That is just as bad as it sounds, and it is baseless. Finally, the majority declares that evidence concerning acts for which the President is immune can play no role in any criminal prosecution against him. That holding, which will prevent the Government from using a President's official acts to prove knowledge or intent in prosecuting private offenses, is nonsensical. ***

The Constitution's text contains no provision for immunity from criminal prosecution for former Presidents. Of course, "the silence of the Constitution on this score is not

dispositive.” *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 706, n. 16 (1974). Insofar as the majority rails against the notion that a “specific textual basis” it is attacking an argument that has not been made here. The omission in the text of the Constitution is worth noting, however, for at least three reasons.

First, the Framers clearly knew how to provide for immunity from prosecution. They did provide a narrow immunity for legislators in the Speech or Debate Clause. See Art. I, §6, cl. 1 (“Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place”). They did not extend the same or similar immunity to Presidents.

Second, “some state constitutions at the time of the Framing specifically provided ‘express criminal immunities’ to sitting governors.” Brief for Scholars of Constitutional Law as *Amici Curiae* 4 (quoting S. Prakash, *Prosecuting and Punishing Our Presidents*, 100 Tex. L. Rev. 55, 69 (2021)). The Framers chose not to include similar language in the Constitution to immunize the President. If the Framers “had wanted to create some constitutional privilege to shield the President . . . from criminal indictment,” they could have done so. Memorandum from R. Rotunda to K. Starr re: Indictability of the President 18 (May 13, 1998). They did not.

Third, insofar as the Constitution does speak to this question, it actually contemplates some form of criminal liability for former Presidents. The majority correctly rejects Trump’s argument that a former President cannot be prosecuted unless he has been impeached by the House and convicted by the Senate for the same conduct. The majority ignores, however, that the Impeachment Judgment Clause cuts against its own position. That Clause presumes the availability of criminal process as a backstop by establishing that an official impeached and convicted by the Senate “shall *nevertheless* be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.” Art. I, §3, cl. 7 (emphasis added). That Clause clearly contemplates that a former President may be subject to criminal prosecution for the same conduct that resulted (or could have resulted) in an impeachment judgment—including conduct such as “Bribery,” Art. II, §4, which implicates official acts almost by definition. ***

The historical evidence that exists on Presidential immunity from criminal prosecution cuts decisively against it. For instance, Alexander Hamilton wrote that former Presidents would be “liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.” *The Federalist* No. 69, p. 452 (J. Harv. Lib. ed. 2009). For Hamilton, that was an important distinction between “the king of Great Britain,” who was “sacred and inviolable,” and the “President of the United States,” who “would be amenable to personal punishment and disgrace.” In contrast to the king, the President should be subject to “personal responsibility” for his actions, “stand[ing] upon no better ground than a governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of Maryland and Delaware,” whose State Constitutions gave them some immunity.

*** Other commentators around the time of the Founding observed that federal officials had no immunity from prosecution, drawing no exception for the President. James Wilson recognized that federal officers who use their official powers to commit crimes “may be tried by their country; and if their criminality is established, the law will punish. A grand

jury may present, a petty jury may convict, and the judges will pronounce the punishment.” 2 Debates on the Constitution 177 (J. Elliot ed. 1836). A few decades later, Justice Story evinced the same understanding. He explained that, when a federal official commits a crime in office, “it is indispensable, that provision should be made, that the common tribunals of justice should be at liberty to entertain jurisdiction of the offence, for the purpose of inflicting, the common punishment applicable to unofficial offenders.” 2 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §780, pp. 250-251 (1833). Without a criminal trial, he explained, “the grossest official offenders might escape without any substantial punishment, even for crimes, which would subject their fellow citizens to capital punishment.” ***

Setting aside this evidence, the majority announces that former Presidents are “absolute[ly],” or “at least . . . presumptive[ly],” immune from criminal prosecution for all of their official acts. The majority purports to keep us in suspense as to whether this immunity is absolute or presumptive, but it quickly gives up the game. It explains that, “[a]t a minimum, the President must . . . be immune from prosecution for an official act unless the Government can show that applying a criminal prohibition to that act would pose *no ‘dangers of intrusion’* on the authority and functions of the Executive Branch.” No dangers, none at all. It is hard to imagine a criminal prosecution for a President’s official acts that would pose no dangers of intrusion on Presidential authority in the majority’s eyes. ***

Quick on the heels of announcing this astonishingly broad official-acts immunity, the majority assures us that a former President can still be prosecuted for “unofficial acts.” *** [But] the majority’s dividing line between “official” and “unofficial” conduct narrows the conduct considered “unofficial” almost to a nullity. It says that whenever the President acts in a way that is “not manifestly or palpably beyond [his] authority,” he is taking official action. It then goes a step further: “In dividing official from unofficial conduct, courts may not inquire into the President’s motives.” It is one thing to say that motive is irrelevant to questions regarding the scope of civil liability, but it is quite another to make it irrelevant to questions regarding criminal liability. Under that rule, any use of official power for any purpose, even the most corrupt purpose indicated by objective evidence of the most corrupt motives and intent, remains official and immune. Under the majority’s test, if it can be called a test, the category of Presidential action that can be deemed “unofficial” is destined to be vanishingly small.

Ultimately, the majority pays lip service to the idea that “[t]he President, charged with enforcing federal criminal laws, is not above them,” but it then proceeds to place former Presidents beyond the reach of the federal criminal laws for any abuse of official power. ***

[The majority’s reliance on cases involving civil liability is in error.] In *Fitzgerald*, the threat of vexatious civil litigation loomed large. The Court observed that, given the “visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil damages.” 457 U.S. at 753. Although “the effect of [the President’s] actions on countless people’ could result in untold numbers of private plaintiffs suing for damages based on any number of Presidential acts” in the civil context, the risk in the criminal context is “only that a former President may face one federal prosecution, in one jurisdiction, for each criminal offense allegedly committed while in office.” The majority’s bare assertion that the burden of exposure to federal criminal prosecution is more limiting to a President than the burden of exposure to civil suits does not make it true, and it is not persuasive.

[B]ecause of longstanding interpretations by the Executive Branch, every sitting President has so far believed himself under the threat of criminal liability after his term in office and nevertheless boldly fulfilled the duties of his office. *** [O]ne wonders why requiring some small amount of his attention (or his legal advisers' attention) to go towards complying with federal criminal law is such a great burden. If the President follows the law that he must "take Care" to execute, Art. II, §3, he has not been rendered "unduly cautious." *** It is a far greater danger if the President feels empowered to violate federal criminal law, buoyed by the knowledge of future immunity. ***

So what exactly is the majority worried about deterring when it expresses great concern for the "deterrent" effect that "the threat of trial, judgment, and imprisonment" would pose? *** [T]he majority's main concern could be that Presidents will be deterred from taking necessary and lawful action by the fear that their successors might pin them with a baseless criminal prosecution—a prosecution that would almost certainly be doomed to fail, if it even made it out of the starting gate. The Court should not have so little faith in this Nation's Presidents. As this Court has said before in the context of criminal proceedings, "[t]he chance that now and then there may be found some timid soul who will take counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive power is too remote and shadowy to shape the course of justice." *Nixon*, 418 U.S., at 712, n. 20 (quoting *Clark v. United States*, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933)). The concern that countless (and baseless) civil suits would hamper the Executive may have been justified in *Fitzgerald*, but a well-founded federal criminal prosecution poses no comparable danger to the functioning of the Executive Branch. ***

The majority's single-minded fixation on the President's need for boldness and dispatch ignores the countervailing need for accountability and restraint. The Framers were not so single-minded. In the Federalist Papers, after "endeavor[ing] to show" that the Executive designed by the Constitution "combines . . . all the requisites to energy," Alexander Hamilton asked a separate, equally important question: "Does it also combine the requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due dependence on the people, a due responsibility?" The Federalist No. 77, p. 507 (J. Harvard Library ed. 2009). The answer then was yes, based in part upon the President's vulnerability to "prosecution in the common course of law." The answer after today is no.

Never in the history of our Republic has a President had reason to believe that he would be immune from criminal prosecution if he used the trappings of his office to violate the criminal law. Moving forward, however, all former Presidents will be cloaked in such immunity. If the occupant of that office misuses official power for personal gain, the criminal law that the rest of us must abide will not provide a backstop.

With fear for our democracy, I dissent.

[Opinions of Justices THOMAS, concurring, and JACKSON, J., dissenting, omitted.]

**Note on *Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System*
144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024)**

Insert new note at p. 608 prior to existing note 11:

When Does the Limitations Period for Facial Challenges to Agency Regulations Begin to Run? Unless a statute specifies a different period, challenges to agency regulations under the APA are subject to the six-year statute of limitations that applies to suits against the government under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a). That section provides: “every civil action commenced against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues.”

In *Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System*, 144 S. Ct. 2440 (2024), the Supreme Court considered how this language applies to challenges to agency regulations filed by entities that did not exist when a final regulation was promulgated. At issue in *Corner Post* was a Federal Reserve rule capping “interchange” fees charged to merchants who accept debit cards. Before the plaintiff, *Corner Post*, brought suit, an industry association filed a challenge to the regulation that was dismissed on statute-of-limitations grounds. After that case was dismissed, the association arranged for *Corner Post* to file a new suit raising the same challenges as the dismissed case. *Corner Post* argued that its suit was timely because it did not exist when the regulation was finalized.

While it was clear since *Yakus v. United States*, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), that regulated parties could challenge the validity of regulation as a defense to an enforcement action, all but one of the courts of appeals held prior to *Corner Post* that the statute of limitations for “facial” challenges—i.e., affirmative, pre-enforcement challenges contending that the regulation is invalid under the APA—begins to run when a regulation is published in the Federal Register. Relying on cases in which individuals sued the government for personal injuries, a case under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §3729 *et seq.*, and legal dictionaries, the Supreme Court rejected this interpretation. It held that [a] right of action “accrues” under section 2401(a) “when the plaintiff has a ‘complete and present cause of action’”—that is, when the challenger can show it has suffered a cognizable legal injury by reason of the regulation. An entity created after a regulation was finalized could thus file a facial challenge to a final regulation, even if the regulation was promulgated decades prior to the suit. The Court rejected the argument that the right of action accrues under section 2401(a) when a regulation is finalized as inconsistent with the statutory text. Section 2401(a), in the majority’s view, created a statute of limitations, not a statute of repose, and was triggered by injury to the plaintiff. The government suggested that the Court’s interpretation would upset reliance interests and open long-settled regulations to legal challenges, but the Court rejected those arguments as policy matters that were for Congress to address.